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Abstract 
 
The Internet of Things (IoT) has opened a new chapter in data access. It has brought obvious 
opportunities as well as major security and privacy challenges. Access control is one of the 
challenges in IoT. This holds true as the existing, conventional access control paradigms do not fit 
into IoT, thus access control requires more investigation and remains an open issue. IoT has a 
number of inherent characteristics, including scalability, heterogeneity and dynamism, which 
hinder access control. While most of the impact of these characteristics have been well studied in 
the literature, we highlighted “indeterminacy” in authentication as a neglected research issue. This 
work stresses that an indeterminacy-resilient model for IoT authentication is missing from the 
literature. According to our findings, indeterminacy consists of at least two facets: “uncertainty” 
and “ambiguity”. As a result, various relevant theories were studied in this work. Our proposed 
framework is based on well-known machine learning models and Attribute-Based Access Control 
(ABAC). To implement and evaluate our framework, we first generate datasets, in which the 
location of the users is a main dataset attribute, with the aim to analyse the role of user mobility in 
the performance of the prediction models. Next, multiple classification algorithms were used with 
our datasets in order to build our best-fit prediction models. Our results suggest that our prediction 
models are able to determine the class of the authentication requests while considering both the 
uncertainty and ambiguity in the IoT system.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we identify the research gap and introduce the research problem. We also 
propose the related research questions. In accordance with the research questions, we present the 
main claim made by this work. Finally, we present an overview and the structure of this thesis in 
detail.  
 
1.1 Thesis Motivation 
 
The Internet of Things (IoT), which is defined as the “worldwide network of interconnected 
objects” [1], extends connectivity from human-to-machine to machine-to-machine 
communication. It also extends the platform to multiple domains including e-health. The IoT-
based e-health market will reach $136.8 billion worldwide by 2021. There are 3.7 million medical 
devices in use all over the world that are connected to the Internet and monitor various parts of the 
human body to inform healthcare decisions [2]. Among several challenges for e-health in the 
context of IoT, security is one of the most important. This is because a security breach in this 
domain often directly puts the lives of patients in danger, for example if patients’ healthcare 
records or devices are exposed or modified. 
IoT offers large-scale integration of heterogeneous networks and devices, which, apart from the 
obvious opportunities, introduces great security and privacy challenges. These challenges are not 
new as they have been well studied in the relevant literature in different IoT domains (such as e-
health, smart cities, smart grids) [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. Of the various security challenges in IoT, 
access control is a crucial and ongoing challenge [8].  
This thesis is motivated by the growing number of access scenarios in IoT in which  
indeterminacy factors need to be handled in order to maximize the tradeoff between “availability” 
and “Confidentiality-Integrity”. This holds true as the need for sharing resources in “agile” and 
“collaborative” projects between “ephemeral” parties is on the rise in IoT domains. Such a 
resource sharing in different IoT domains (e.g., e-health, smart grids, smart cities) is inevitable 
[9], [10]. For example, resource sharing in grid environments through virtual organizations (VOs) 
creates added value by improving performance with less investment. Besides advantages, it also 
presents disadvantages such  as permission misuse and insider threats against VOs [9]. The same 
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threats can occure in smart cities where traffic information is shared or in V2V communication 
where two or more vehicles share their resources (e.g., information about their locations) [10]. 
Moreover, technical challenges at the physicl and data link layers of IoT enabling technologies 
(RFID, WSN etc.) may exaggerate inditerminacy factors in access scenarios. These challenges 
matter If a real-time access decision depends on information that is delivered at a delay or suffers 
from latency [11].  
In all these circumstances, “incomplete information” about the consequence of the access 
request or “ imprecise information” about the subject (requester) may lead to a state in which 
making access decision based on deterministic policy does not help the above-mentioned tradeoff.   
The focus of this research is to introduce “indeterminacy”, a new and neglected challenge in 
IoT that affects the authentication phase of access control. Indeterminacy in IoT comes into play 
when an access decision needs to be made based on incomplete or imprecise information. In other 
words, indeterminacy is introduced in authentication when the information available about an 
authentication request is not sufficient or not precise enough to be used to make a correct access 
decision.  
Both traditional and emerging access control models cannot precisely manage the tradeoff 
between availability and confidentiality-integrity in access scenarios including indeterminate 
factors. Moreover, resilient access control paradigms suffer from drawbacks that make them less 
effective as security measures.  
To address this challenge, We propose a method to predict the future of an authentication 
request as well as the future of the subject who requests for authntication. Our method which 
benefits from machine learning suggest using data-driven prediction models to handle 
indeterminacy factors (uncertainty, ambiguity) in every authentication request.   
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
This work is motivated by the following research questions:  
• What is indeterminacy in authentication and how does it affect access control 
decisions? 
• Are existing access control methods able to handle indeterminacy in authentication 
in IoT e-health?  
15 
 
• How can prediction models handle indeterminacy in authentication for e-health in 
IoT? 
 
The main claim of this research is that an indeterminacy-aware prediction model can handle 
indeterminacy factors in authentication for scalable, heterogeneous and dynamic environments. 
 
Derived from the above research questions, the aims and objectives of this research are as 
follows: 
 
Aims: 
 
1. Study indeterminacy in authentication in e-health in the context of IoT. 
2. Evaluate the resilience of current access control methods in terms of dealing with 
indeterminacy in authentication.  
3. Propose an indeterminacy-aware prediction model for the e-health domain in the 
context of IoT. 
 
Objectives: 
 
1. A review of the current state of the art (Aims 1, 2). 
2. Investigate the requirements for authentication in e-health in the context of IoT 
(Aim 2). 
3. Define the components of indeterminacy in the authentication phase of access 
control (Aim 2). 
4. Investigate whether existing access control models deal with the defined 
components of indeterminacy in the authentication phase (Aim 2). 
5. Develop, validate and evaluate an indeterminacy-aware prediction model for 
authentication for IoT in e-health (Aim 3). 
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1.3 Thesis Overview 
 
This thesis is made up of seven chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 situate the thesis and provide the 
necessary literature for it. Chapter 4 presents the process of synthesizing datasets for the thesis. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present the process of building and evaluating indeterminacy-aware prediction 
models. Finally, in Chapter 7, we review the thesis. Figure 1.1 depicts the roadmap of this work. 
 
 
Figure 1. 1: Thesis roadmap 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the current state of the art of access control in IoT. The chapter begins by 
reviewing access control models, protocols, language and approaches. In particular it reviews the 
authentication mechanisms included in them. It also takes a step back and reviews the preliminary 
concepts in access control. Because indeterminacy in authentication as introduced by this work is 
a new concept, in this chapter we first survey the concept and relevant studies, and then we review 
prevalent resilient access control models, including risk-aware and trust-based models. We also 
evaluate the current state of the art against the criteria defined by this work. 
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Chapter 3 introduces the methodology used within this thesis. According to the introduced 
challenges in the field of authentication, an automated, resilient and scalable authentication model 
is vital for IoT. To address this need, we propose a machine-learning-based prediction model, 
which will be discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 discusses the process of synthesizing datasets that were used for both training and 
the robust testing of our indeterminacy-aware authentication model. One of the big obstacles in 
conducting machine-learning-based research in the field of authentication is the lack of publicly 
available datasets. As a result, we generated datasets consisting with the required attributes in this 
work. This chapter presents the process of generating such datasets, with which we built the 
prediction models presented in Chapters 5 and 6. In this chapter, we also analyse the only publicly 
available dataset, called LANL, to evaluate our findings. 
Chapter 5 shows the process of building prediction models for authentication. We explain all 
the classification algorithms applied in this work. Before introducing these algorithms, this chapter 
reviews the preliminary concepts and evaluation criteria used in our methodology. 
Chapter 6 introduces our indeterminacy-aware prediction model on top of the prediction models 
presented in Chapter 5. In the course of this chapter, we consider the historical profile of users in 
terms of past successful authentication in addition to other attributes. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, we used classification algorithms to train and build our models. We expected that 
enriching our datasets with a new data attribute would enable us to build more accurate prediction 
models. 
Chapter 7 concludes this research and proposes future work to extend the contribution made. 
 
1.5 Publications Arising from the work of the Thesis 
 
Table 1.1 shows all the publications arising from this research, grouped by the corresponding 
chapters of the thesis. 
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Springer 
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2. Literature Review 
 
In this chapter we review the current state of the art of access control in IoT. The chapter begins 
by reviewing access control models, protocols, language and approaches. In particular, we review 
the authentication mechanisms included in them. We take a step back and review the preliminary 
concepts in access control.  
Because indeterminacy in authentication introduced by this work is a new concept, we first 
survey the concept and relevant studies, and then we review prevalent resilient access control 
models, including risk-aware and trust-based models. We also evaluate the current state of the art 
against the criteria defined by the new challenges introduced by this work. 
 
2.1 An Introduction to Access Control in IoT 
 
Access control is a mechanism that ensures that system resources can be used only by 
authorized entities based on a policy (RFC 4949 Internet Security Glossary  [12]). An entity may 
be a user, program or process. Access control consists of the following functions  [13]: 
• Authentication, defined as a verification process to check whether the credentials of an entity 
are valid. In some texts, identification has been introduced as the process of identity 
verification, which should be completed before the authentication process.  
• Authorization, defined as a process of granting an entity the rights to access and use a 
resource.  
• Auditing, defined as the process of reviewing the access control system records and activities 
to detect any security breach. Auditing is necessary to ensure that the defined access policies 
are compliant with the operational security of the system. 
An access control system has three basic elements  [14]: 1) the subject, which is an entity that 
wants to access an object; 2) the object, which is a resource and a target of access requests by 
subjects; and 3) an access rights policy, which defines the way in which an object can be accessed 
by subjects. Any access control system should meet the main security objectives, known as CIA: 
confidentiality, by preventing unauthorized access to resources; integrity, by preventing resources 
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being modified without the required permission; and availability, by ensuring that the resource can 
be accessed and used on demand only by authorized subjects. Furthermore, an access control 
system may have some of the following characteristics, which are often used to evaluate the access 
control system  [15]: 
1. Delegation, which is the act of granting an access right (in full or in part) from one subject 
to another in the system.  
2. Revocation, namely the act of removing from a subject the access right to a resource. 
3. Granularity, i.e., the level of detail that can be used for making access decisions. If the 
required details are explicit and limited, then the type of granularity is referred to as coarse-
grained. In contrast, fine-grained access control needs more detail, such as subject or object 
attributes, in order to make a decision about the access and govern it.  
4. Flexibility, which is the ability of the access control system to adapt itself to different 
situations and to govern both planned and spontaneous interactions between subjects and 
objects. 
5. Scalability, i.e., the ability of an access control system to be extensible in terms of the 
number of subjects, objects and access rights policies. Another dimension of scalability is the 
ability of an access control system to extend its structure and scope of operation. 
6. Lightweight, which reflects the computational complexity or volume of network traffic that 
an access control mechanism imposes on the system. 
7. Heterogeneity, which is defined as the ability of the access control system to be used in 
different domains, platforms, networks and technologies.  
8. Context-awareness, namely the ability of the access control system to use contextual 
attributes of the environment, such as time and location, to make an access decision.  
In the field of IoT, any access control system must be scalable, heterogeneous, lightweight and 
context-aware because of the characteristics of IoT itself. 
We did a survey on the most widely used access control models (both traditional and emerging). 
We also investigated both resilient and non-resilient access control paradigms proposed in the 
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literature. According to the literature, resilient paradigms can be divided into three main categories: 
Break-The-Glass (BTG), Optimistic and the Risk-Aware. Moreover, the most widely used 
authentication/authorization protocols were analyzed against criteria discussed in 2.1.2. XACML 
as a standard for fine-grained and attribute-based access control policy language was also surveyed 
and discussed in this chapter. Figure 2.1 depicts a classification based on the surveyed models, 
paradigms protocols and the standard. The main motivation for such a survey was  to investigate 
whether they are applicable to IoT. 
 
 
Figure 2. 1: A classification of access control models, paradigms, protocols and the standard 
2.1.1 Access Control Models  
 
Since Lampson’s access matrix was introduced in the late 1960s, a number of access control 
models have been proposed. This Subsection briefly describes traditional access control models 
before moving on to emerging access control models. In a number of texts, Discretionary Access 
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Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC), Biba, BLP, Clark-Wilson, Chinese Wall and 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) have been classified as traditional access control models, 
while Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) is considered a “relatively recent” access control 
model  [16]. This work refers to ABAC and other models that have been proposed since ABAC, 
such as Access Control Based on Usage Control (UCON) and Organizational-Based Access 
Control (OrBAC), as emerging access control models. It also discusses their adaptability in a 
scalable, heterogeneous and dynamic environment such as IoT.  
The traditional access control models comprise the following: 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC): In DAC the access policy for any object is defined 
based on the discretion of the object’s owner  [17]. The earliest implementation of DAC was the 
Access Control List (ACL), proposed in 1971. Modern operating systems such as Windows utilize 
this ACL-based approach. Contrary to Mandatory Access Control (MAC), in DAC a subject with 
certain access permissions is able to revoke its access rights and delegate them to another subject  
[18].  
 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC): In MAC, which was proposed in 1973, the access policy 
is enforced by the system and access to a resource is granted only if the security clearance of the 
subject is greater than the security level of the object. A subject that has the clearance necessary 
to access the object cannot delegate its access to another subject or make any change in the access 
policy. In this model, the multilevel security (MLS) structure is defined by the system  [19]. 
Although traditional MAC protects the confidentiality of information, it cannot protect the 
integrity of information since subjects with lower clearance can modify the objects that are 
accessible by subjects with higher clearance  [19]. To address this problem, the Bell-LaPadula 
(BLP) model embodies two major principles: a) no-read-up, meaning that resources can be read 
only by subjects with clearance greater than or equal to the resource’s classification, and b) no-
write-down, meaning that resources can be written only by subjects with clearance less than or 
equal to the resource’s classification. In contrast to DAC, another major drawback of MAC is that 
a subject cannot revoke its access rights or delegate them to another subject  [20]. Security-
Enhanced Linux (SELinux) and Mandatory Integrity Control are two examples of the use of MAC.  
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Bell-LaPadula (BLP): The BLP model was proposed in 1973 to focus on the confidentiality 
of data. For this reason, BLP enforces two main security policies known as no-read-up and no-
write-down. No-read-up ensures that read access is granted if the security level of the subject must 
dominate the security classification of the object. No-write-down is defined for both “append” and 
“write” operations. In the former, no-write-down ensures that the security level of objects must 
dominate the security level of the subject. For the latter, it ensures that the security levels of 
subjects and objects are equal. BLP supports both MAC, by determining the access rights from the 
security levels associated with subjects and objects, and DAC, by governing access rights based 
on the access matrix.  
The Biba model  [21] was proposed in 1977 to ensure the integrity of data. For this purpose, 
Biba rules control the transfer of data between integrity levels. To meet this goal, subjects cannot 
read objects at lower integrity levels, which is known as the no-read-down policy. Also, subjects 
at lower integrity levels cannot get write access to the objects at higher integrity levels, which is 
known as the no-write-up policy. 
The Clark-Wilson model  [22] was proposed in 1989 to protect integrity, and it uses programs 
as a layer between users and data items. Users are authorized to execute a specific set of programs, 
and data items can be accessed only via those programs. The focus of this model is on the security 
requirements of commercial applications.  
The Chinese Wall access control model was proposed in 1989 to avoid conflicts of interest 
when dealing with different subjects  [23]. Conflicts arise when companies are in competition and 
want to access the same objects, or have accessed them in the past. The model can address the 
“conflict of interest” for both MAC and DAC. The Chinese Wall policy combines commercial 
discretion with legally enforceable mandatory controls. 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): Ferraiolo et al.  [24] proposed RBAC in 1992 to address 
the management complexity of DAC and MAC  [25]. In RBAC, access is regulated based on the 
roles of the individuals within an organization. In other words, individuals performing specific 
roles can request access to specific resources that are necessary for this role. RBAC supports 
scalability and granularity and enforces the principle of least privilege  [26]. According to the 
principle of least privilege, a subject should operate using the minimum set of privileges necessary 
to complete the task. Enforcing this principle mitigates the damage of unintended errors. 
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Furthermore, RBAC supports separation of duties by ensuring that at least two different 
individuals are responsible for carrying out the various steps of any critical task  [27].  
The emerging access control models comprise the following: 
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC): In the ABAC model, when a subject requests 
access to an object, the decision will be made based on the subject’s attributes, the object’s 
attributes and the environment’s attributes  [28]. ABAC is widely used in the current Internet 
because it supports fine-grained access policies  [29].  
Capability-Based Access Control (CapBAC): CapBAC was introduced by Dennis  [30] and 
governs access requests based on tokens. The subject must have a valid token to request access to 
a resource and the token must be tamper-proof. In this chapter, we classify those capability-based 
access control models as “emerging access control” that they benefit from using lightweight 
encryption algorithms such as elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) to create Attribute-Based 
Encryption (ABE) access control models. In CapBAC, the subject needs to show the resource 
owner its token prior to performing corresponding resource request operations. This model has 
been used in several large-scale projects such as IoT@WORK.1 
Access Control based on Usage Control (UCON): In this model, an access decision is made 
using three factors  [31]: a) authorization rules, which define the access policy based on the subject 
and object attributes, not only prior to the access but also during the access; b) obligations, which 
are responsible for verifying mandatory requirements for a subject before or during access; and c) 
conditions, which evaluate the current environment or system status. The most important aspect 
of this model is that if the access attributes change while the access is granted, and this change 
leads to a security breach, then the granted access is revoked, and the usage is cancelled. This 
happens because the subject and object attributes are mutable. Mutable attributes can change as a 
consequence of an instance of access [32]. 
Organizational-Based Access Control Model (OrBAC): OrBAC, proposed by Kalam et al.  
[33], extends the RBAC model in such a way that organization is considered as a new dimension. 
Contrary to DAC, MAC and RBAC, in this model policies are not restricted to static access rules, 
 
1 www.probe-it.eu 
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but also include contextual rules related to access permissions, prohibitions, obligations and 
recommendations.  
We consider that, of the inherent characteristics of IoT, scalability, heterogeneity, 
interoperability, dynamism and resource sharing exaggerate the security challenges related to the 
field of access control. This holds true for the following reasons:  
Scalability stems from the exponential growth in IoT that also results in an increased network 
connectivity requirement. According to Gartner, the number of Internet-connected devices will 
reach 20–50 billion by 2020 [34]. This exacerbates the security challenges in IoT by requiring 
more effort and resources from security controls (such as access control mechanisms) to address 
them [35].  
Heterogeneity and interoperability in IoT derive from the different technologies and networks 
(such as radio-frequency identification (RFID), wireless sensor networks (WSN) and Global 
System for Mobile (GSM) that exist in IoT. Thus, enabling seamless and secure integration of 
these different platforms is a challenge, as the degree of complexity increases dramatically when 
different technologies are merged to form a complex network. Similarly, interoperability brings 
new challenges to the field of data access control [36]. For example, in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) 
communication, moving from one geographical domain (e.g., the UK) to another (e.g., France) 
can cause data access problems, due to the interoperability issues between inter-domain public key 
infrastructures (PKIs) [37]. 
Dynamism in IoT stems from the fact that the interconnected things need to interact with each 
other in a real-time manner. Therefore, the need for an appropriate response to rapid changes in 
the physical world that are caused by these interactions poses new technological challenges, not 
only for access control but also for any context-aware services [38]. 
The above-mentioned access control models have been introduced to address a number of 
challenges in technological paradigms that preceded the IoT. We consider four assessment criteria 
to evaluate access control models. These criteria are considered according to the discussions on 
the access control in IoT from literature  [9],  [15] and chosen based on their impacts on the 
performance of the access control system in IoT access scenarios:  
 
• Dynamism: If the access decision must change, because of changes in the subject, object or 
environmental attributes, after the access is granted, then the access control system is classified 
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as dynamic. But if the changes do not affect the access decision, then the access control system 
is static. Considering dynamism in IoT access control models is important, because of the rapid 
changes in contextual parameters that occur in this paradigm. 
• Scalability: Scalability in access control must be evaluated according to three dimensions; that 
is, an access control has a) subject/object (entities) scalability if increasing the number of 
entities does not lead to an overhead in processing time or workload; b) policy rules scalability 
if increasing the number of access rules does not lead to overhead in terms of processing time 
or workload; and c) extensibility if it has the ability to extend its structure to cover more 
subsystems and domains. extensibility can be achieved through building a decentralized 
structure rather than a centralized structure in scalable environments such as IoT. 
• Heterogeneity/Interoperability: In IoT, entities have dependencies and their workflows are 
tightly convergent, which increases complexity. For this reason, any access control breach in 
IoT can be more disruptive than in traditional networks  [39]. Furthermore, as IoT is composed 
of different platforms, enabling technologies and domains, designing an access control model 
to regulate access inter-/intra-domains or technologies is a must. 
• Context-Awareness: This refers to the ability of the access control system to use contextual 
attributes to make an access decision. Considering contextual parameters in an access decision 
brings flexibility in terms of tracking subject, object and environmental changes if these 
changes have impacts on the decision.  
The above evaluation criteria uncover limitations in the models (both traditional and emerging), 
making them inapplicable to IoT. As summarized in Table 2.1, the traditional access control 
models do not support the above-mentioned criteria and thus cannot fit into IoT. With regard to 
the emerging access control models, RBAC does not satisfy the interoperability criterion  [40], as 
it cannot support the definition of roles among heterogeneous networks with different platforms 
and domains. Furthermore, due to the inherent scalability of IoT, defining a vast number of roles 
and associated permission rules is impossible and leads to “role explosion”.  
Nor does RBAC take contextual parameters into account during access decisions. Despite the 
advantages of ABAC, i.e., fine-grained access control, ease of use in a collaborative environment 
and flexibility, IoT adaptability of ABAC is hindered due to overhead. Specifically, applying 
ABAC in IoT is limited by computational overhead because its authorization process has high 
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complexity, as a result of the consideration of attributes of subject, object and environment in the 
access decision. Thus, applying ABAC in a highly dynamic, real-time environment such as IoT is 
infeasible because of the computational complexity that arises from the number of rules that 
rapidly increase with entities and contextual attributes, which may change frequently  [41],  [42],  
[43]. 
CapBAC is a coarse-grained access control model and does not consider contextual attributes, 
and therefore it cannot satisfy the flexibility criterion. Moreover, even when applying lightweight 
cryptography algorithms, such as ECC, using CapBAC brings overhead to the system in scalable 
scenarios. Another concern about CapBAC is the distribution of tokens in heterogeneous networks 
that are not straightforward. Also, the model fails the interoperability criterion as the model cannot 
be applied in a heterogeneous environment. The reason is that each domain has a dedicated public 
key infrastructure (PKI) and there is a trust issue in inter-domain interaction between these PKIs  
[44]. UCON has the same limitations as ABAC in terms of scalability and extensibility. Finally, 
OrBAC suffers from the same limitation regarding policy rules scalability as RBAC, as well as 
failing the interoperability criterion. The above evaluation, which is summarized in Table 2.1, 
highlights the need for a new model of access control that supports the above-mentioned 
characteristics for IoT domains. 
Table 2.1: Evaluation of traditional and emerging access control models 
 Criteria 
 
Models 
Scalability Heterogeneity 
Interoperability 
Dynamism Context-
Awareness Entities Policy rules Extensibility 
DAC - -  - - - 
MAC - - - - - - 
RBAC  - - - - - 
CapBAC -  - - - - 
ABAC - -     
UCON - - -  -  
OrBAC    - - - 
 
The literature includes a number of proposed access control models that are based on an 
extension of the above models. The proposed methods have tried to address the limitations of the 
reference models stated in Table 1. Jindou et al.  [45] proposed an access control model based on 
RBAC for the Web of Things (WoT). This model gathers information from users’ profiles on 
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social media platforms such as Facebook to create access policies. This, however, opens up a new 
type of trust and privacy challenges for all participants in the access control model. Barka et al.  
[46] integrated RBAC and WoT to build an access control model with a centralized architecture. 
Access decisions are made by the Access Control Decision Facility (ACDF) based on an RBAC 
policy. Because of its centralized structure, the model cannot cope with a distributed environment 
such as WoT. Liu et al.  [47] have adapted the RBAC model to IoT using the Elliptic Curve 
Cryptosystem (ECC). In this method, IoT devices should be registered to a nearby trustworthy 
access point or gateway (termed as a Registration Authority). Furthermore, the authentication 
protocol suggested in this method is based on OpenID protocol.  
Waleed et al.  [48] proposed an access control model based on ABAC that incorporates trust 
and privacy into access policy to make it reliable in a collaborative environment. This model 
supports the privacy of subjects by authorizing certain access requests so that the purposes of 
access for both the subject and the object are the same. The limitations of the method include the 
following: a) if the contextual parameters have changed during the access time, the access decision 
is nonetheless consistent, and b) the proposed approach cannot be applied to distributed 
architecture, including P2P platforms. Kaiwen et al.  [42] proposed a hybrid access control model 
based on RBAC and ABAC that can resolve the large-scale dynamic problem of IoT users. This 
model pre-assigns roles for entities (nodes/users) based on their property expressions. The model 
also presents a property rule policy language and a solution to the conflict with the redundancy 
policy. Kaiwen et al.  [41] used the WeChat App as an example to illustrate the feasibility of this 
model. This model simplifies the complexity of traditional ABAC in rights allocation and policy 
management. However, it cannot deal with policy conflict and redundancy processing as the model 
still needs the administrator to manage roles and access policy. Harsha et al.  [49] proposed an 
access control method based on ABAC for use in healthcare. The focus of this work is on providing 
both multilevel controlled access delegation and on-demand attribute revocation. Pussewalage et 
al. [49] suggested using assignment tokens and digital signatures to handle delegation and 
revocation. The complexity of using the token-based approach in conjunction with ABAC was not 
investigated by the authors. Furthermore, the structure of token distribution and validation schemes 
was not tested against forged intra-domain authorities, which may issue fake attributes and tokens. 
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Guoping et al.  [50] proposed a method based on the extension of UCON. This method governs 
access by evaluating the degree of trust in the subject against the trust values of the object and the 
environment. If the trust value of the subject is in the range of the determined threshold for the 
requested object, then the access will be granted. The authors showed that their model works 
theoretically, but it is unclear whether it can work in a real-world scenario. Anggorojati et al.  [51] 
proposed an access delegation method based on the context-aware CapBAC and identification. In 
this model, context information was added to CapBAC as a new dimension. This method used the 
concept of the federation in the Web for IoT by mapping identity to “thing”. Mahalle  [52] 
proposed a novel method for authentication and access control based on the approach proposed by 
Gong  [53]. In this method, verification of communication is done via its capability access. In other 
words, if any entity wants to communicate with another entity, communication is established after 
verifying the capability of the requesting entity. The proposed model uses a public key approach 
and is compatible with the lightweight, mobile, distributed and computationally limited nature of 
IoT. In this work, scalability, granularity and delegation were introduced as the main advantages 
of this method but the computational overhead of applying the model was not examined. 
Moreover, the interoperability of the proposed method in a heterogeneous environment such as 
IoT is still recognized as an ongoing challenge. Gusmeroli et al.  [54] proposed another model 
based on CapBAC that uses a centralized approach for governing access control. The bottleneck 
for this method is that the majority of IoT devices have constrained resources and the overhead of 
the proposed method was not studied in this work. Yeh et al.  [55] proposed a CapBAC-oriented 
access control framework for the e-healthcare domain. This method supports both fine-grained 
access control and revocation. The execution time for the encryption algorithms included in this 
method was compared with similar work to show its efficiency in terms of computational 
complexity. Although the proposed approach was proved theoretically, no experiment was 
conducted to show its efficiency in practice.  
Li et al.  [56] proposed a method that permits a user in a domain (e.g. smart city, smart grid) to 
send a message to a sensor in a domain that uses identity-based cryptography. The most important 
characteristic of this method is that it supports communication between heterogeneous 
environments. Furthermore, they showed that the computational cost of the sensor node in their 
method is reduced and energy consumption is consequently reduced. Patel et al.  [57] proposed an 
energy-efficient access control method for IoT using elliptic-curve cryptography. The proposed 
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method was evaluated using the AVISPA2 tool against attacks such as man-in-the-middle, reply 
attack and DoS. Even though the proposed method mitigated all these attacks successfully, one 
limitation of this work is that the method’s efficiency was not considered. Ouaddah et al.  [58] 
proposed a model based on an extension of OrBAC, which focuses on low power consumption. 
To meet this goal, part of the processing burden of the Policy Decision Point (PDP) was transferred 
to end-point devices to make the centralized structure more flexible. However, the overhead of the 
proposed method in terms of computational complexity and energy consumption was not proven 
experimentally. Moreover, the interoperability of the proposed scheme has not been studied.  
Sciancalepore et al.  [59] proposed an access control framework based on OAuth 2.0, which 
consists of a WSN, client, gateway and authorization server. The authorization server passes the 
access request to the resource owner and generates the access token for the subject to which the 
access is granted. One of the challenges in this method is that direct communication between 
entities (without the presence of a gateway) is not possible due to the role of the gateway. The 
following conclusions arise from the study of the literature: 
• In the approaches designed as an extension of RBAC, scalabilty in IoT was studied. 
Moreover, the interoperability issue was addressed through a Web-based interface (WoT).  
• CapBAC-based approaches, even those using lightweight encryption algorithms (e.g., 
ECC), suffer from computational overhead in a scalable environment (e.g., cloud, IoT). 
Moreover, applying certificate-based authentication brings new challenges in terms of 
certificate validation and management in a heterogeneous environment such as IoT. In other 
words, moving from one domain into another makes interoperability a major concern for 
certificate validation. 
 
• Although ABAC-based approaches bring flexibility by considering contexual parameters, 
managing a number of attributes in a hybrid model (with roles assigned and managed in RBAC) 
or (by using public key encryption, e.g., in ABE) introduces overhead and interoperability issues 
in IoT. 
 
 
2 http://www.avispa-project.org 
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Table 2.2 summarizes the evaluation results for the methods proposed based on the extension 
of the access control models.  
The literature on e-health in IoT data has so far focused on two challenges that stem from the 
above-mentioned characteristics in IoT: i) data interchange between medical parties, and ii) 
wireless medical sensor communications [60]. Medical data interchange affects access control 
because of heterogeneity and interoperability issues in the IoT environment [61]. WSN is a key 
enabling technology in the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) [62] and the offered wireless 
capability can be advantageous to patients and medical staff but at the same time pose threats to 
medical domains [63]. The security of individual wireless devices and applications from malicious 
access is also vitally important, in order to prevent falsification of information and impersonation 
with potentially fatal results [64].  
 
Table 2.2: Analysis of proposed access control methods for IoT 
 Criteria 
 
Method 
Scalability Heterogeneity 
Interoperability 
Dynamism Context-
Awareness Entities Policy rules Extensibility 
[45]  -  - -  
[46] - -  - -  
[47]  -   - - 
[48]  -  -   
[41],  [42]   - - -  
[49] - - - -   
[50] - -  -   
[51] - -  - -  
[52]  -   - - 
[54] - - - - -  
[55] -  - -   
[56]  -   - - 
[57]  - - - - - 
[58]    - - - 
[59]  -   - - 
 
2.1.2 Access Control Protocols and Standards 
 
This Subsection first introduces the most widely used access control standards and protocols, 
followed by a discussion of their applicability in IoT. OAuth, OpenID, SAML, RADIUS, LDAP 
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and Kerberos are investigated. These protocols and standards are widely used in different domains. 
OAuth is used by companies like Amazon, Google, Facebook etc.in order to allow the users share 
their account information with third party applications. OpenID as another open protocol has more 
than 1 billion accounts on the Internet3. RADIUS, LDAP and Kerberos are widely used in active 
directory (both Windows and Linux) and database access for the sake of identification and access 
management. 
   In order to evaluate the protocols involved in access control the following criteria, which are 
proposed in RFC 2989 and RFC 4962, are used: 
1. Overhead: IoT devices are resource-constrained and thus any proposed access control 
protocol for IoT must be lightweight. To evaluate overhead, two different parameters are 
considered: a) communication overhead, which can be measured by the number of messages 
exchanged in a data access scenario per access request, and b) lightness of data exchange 
format, which affects the amount of control traffic required per access. Increased overhead may 
result in power consumption. For this reason, some works have suggested using more efficient 
protocols for communicating over IoT, such as LoRA  [65].  
2. Security of data-in-transit: The confidentiality of credentials that are sent over the network 
should be ensured. Otherwise, the protocol is prone to breaches of confidentiality of (credential) 
data-in-transit.  
3. Architecture: The structure of access control protocols can be centralized or decentralized. 
As services in the IoT environment are decentralized and distributed, centralized architecture for 
access control protocol does not work efficiently if the protocol is deployed in a heterogeneous 
environment.  
The aforementioned criteria will be used to evaluate whether the following protocols fit IoT:  
 
Open Authorization (OAuth). OAuth4 is an open protocol used to establish a secure 
authorization over the Web. This protocol does not offer an authentication service. OAuth provides 
a method for clients to access server resources on behalf of a resource owner. It also allows end-
 
3 See https://trends.builtwith.com/docinfo/OpenID 
4 https://oauth.net/ 
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users to authorize third-party access to their server resources without sharing their credentials, 
using user–agent redirections [66]. To date, over one billion OAuth-based user accounts exist (e.g., 
as used in Facebook, Google and Microsoft user accounts).  
OpenID. OpenID5 is a Web-oriented single sign-on protocol that is widely used by well-known 
companies such as PayPal and Amazon [67]. OpenID lets applications and site developers 
authenticate users without storing or managing credentials. Its most recent version, i.e., OpenID 
Connect, is designed on top of OAuth 2.0 to provide authentication. This version of OpenID 
supports optional mechanisms for robust signing and encryption.  
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML). SAML is an XML-oriented and open 
protocol developed by OASIS. It exchanges user authentication and authorization data among 
security domains. SAML 2.0 is the latest version of SAML. It has four components: 1) assertions, 
which express how identities are represented; 2) protocols; 3) bindings, which describe how 
SAML messages are transported over HTTP or other lower-level protocols; and 4) profiles, which 
consist of the participating bindings in a use case [68]. The assertion is the main component of 
SAML. There are three types of assertion in SAML: i) the authentication assertion validates the 
identity of the user; ii) the attribute assertion holds specific characteristics about the user; and iii) 
the authorization assertion indicates what kind of actions are authorized for each user. 
Remote Authentication Dial-in User Service (RADIUS).6 RADIUS is an authentication 
network protocol that works in client/server network architecture to provide centralized access to 
networks (RFC 6929). The RADIUS server performs authentication, authorization and accounting 
(AAA) for users after it receives requests from the client. Authentication and authorization in 
RADIUS are bonded together. When the client device requests authentication from the server, the 
server replies with both authentication and authorization attributes. The security of the RADIUS 
protocol is based on MD5. RADIUS uses multifactor authentication. RADIUS uses User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP) over Internet Protocol (IP) with best-effort for delivery authentication services on 
the network. Moreover, RADIUS encrypts only the password, meaning that sensitive data on the 
 
5 http://openid.net/ 
6 For more information, refer to RFC 2865 and RFC 6929.  
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user is sent in plain text over the network. Therefore, RADIUS is not recommended for a trusted 
environment. 
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP).7 LDAP is a centralized and remote 
authentication network protocol that is used for authentication and authorization  [69]. It uses a 
lightweight version of the X.500 networking standard. LDAP encrypts all data exchanged between 
a client and server using Transport Layer Security (TLS). It can allow for single sign-on services 
in the network. Moreover, LDAP uses Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) over IP to form 
reliable communication over the network. Finally, LDAP, by itself, does not support multifactor 
authentication.  
Kerberos.8 Kerberos is a network authentication protocol developed by Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) to provide access to university resources in the 1980s. Kerberos 
authenticates clients to services in a distributed system. In the authentication phase, instead of a 
password a ciphertext known as a “token” is sent over the network. The token is generated by a 
third party known as a Key Distribution Centre (KDC). Mutual authentication, which is done using 
tokens, enables clients or servers to communicate with each other.  
In addition to these de facto protocols, a number of studies have suggested new protocols. 
Braeken et al.  [70] proposed a key agreement scheme based on symmetric encryption for IoT. The 
approach handles the verification of authentication for communications in which entities do not 
have prior trust relations. These protocols suffer from vulnerabilities. Jurcut et al.  [71] proposed 
an approach to detect exploitable vulnerabilities in authentication protocols. The proposed method 
used a novel logic-based technique to describe circumstances under which a weakness in 
authentication protocols can be exploited.  
Table 2.3 summarizes the comparative study between the above-mentioned authentication 
protocols based on the aggregated attributes that have been discussed in the literature review. 
  
 
7 https://ldap.com/ 
8 https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/ 
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Table 2.3: Summary of widely deployed authentication protocols 
Spec OAuth OpenID SAML RADIUS LDAP Kerberos 
Latest Version / 
Year 
2.0 / 2012 OpenID 
Connect / 
2017 
2.0 / 2005  
2013 
(RFC 6929) 
 
LDAP V3 
1995 
 
Kerberos 5 
2018 
Authentication  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Authorization Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Communication 
Overhead 
Low 
communicati
on overhead 
due to the 
use of JSON 
format 
Low 
communicatio
n overhead 
due to the use 
of JSON 
format 
High 
overhead due 
to XML 
parsing 
 
Low in terms 
of  
server 
processing 
overhead  
 
 
 
Low 
communicatio
n overhead 
due to using 
ASN 1.0, 
which is 
lighter than 
JSON 
It imposes 
overhead in 
terms of 
control traffic 
and KDC 
administratio
n in a 
scalable 
environment 
Architecture Decentralize
d 
Decentralized Centralized Centralized Centralized Centralized 
Security of 
Credential Data-
in-Transit 
Confidential Confidential Confidential Only 
passwords 
are 
encrypted 
Confidential Username is 
sent in plain 
text, but 
passwords 
remain 
confidential 
 
 
2.1.3 Access Control Language 
 
Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML). XACML is a de facto standard 
and language to express ABAC-based access control policies, which is based on XML  [72]. It is 
developed by OASIS.9 It uses policy language to define access policies and request/response 
language to describe access request queries and responses. 
XACML has been widely used in modelling authorization part of the ABAC based access 
control. XACML can reflect the power of ABAC like scalability in authorization phase. As 
mentioned in Subsection 2.1.1 (Table 2.1), ABAC offers greater efficiency, flexibility and 
scalability than traditional access control methods. According to the findings of this research, there 
are at least four reasons for using XACML in modelling authorization phase: 
 
• XACML is a standard that has been reviewed by a wide community of experts and users. 
 
9 https://www.oasis-open.org/ 
36 
 
• It offers a comprehensive framework to build policies and provides an expressive language 
that supports a diverse collection of data types, functions and combining algorithms that can 
be easily extended.  
• XACML is sufficiently generic to be deployed in any environment. It makes policy 
management easier.  
• It can be utilized in distributed contexts, which means that a policy can refer to other policies. 
In other words, XACML can combine the results from different policies into a single 
decision. 
 
2.1.4 Resilient Access Control Approaches 
 
Traditional access control approaches operate based on a set of static policy rules that govern 
access. In these approaches, access is granted if the corresponding rules are fired. Each rule 
consists of parameters to handle a condition in the predicted access scenario. The values of these 
parameters should be available if the rule needs to be fired. In such a system, if some of the rule 
parameters are missing then the system cannot handle the access scenario. As discussed earlier, 
scalable and heterogeneous environments such as IoT consist of data access scenarios in which 
making access decisions (e.g., authentication) based on the available information is not feasible 
because of a lack of information. In such a non-resilient access control system, the output leads to 
the access request being rejected. Therefore, a new paradigm is needed to make precise access 
decisions based on incomplete information and bring resilience to access decision-making. This 
type of access control is called “resilient access control”. Three paradigms have been proposed to 
achieve this goal  [73],  [74]: i) Break-The-Glass (BTG) Access Control; ii) Optimistic Access 
Control; and iii) Risk-Aware Access Control (RAAC). 
2.1.4.1 Break-The-Glass (BTG) Access Control 
 
Ferreira  [75] proposed BTG to allow policy overrides. The aim of this model is to allow 
unanticipated access to be provided in unexpected situations. The main application of this method 
is in emergency situations in the healthcare system  [76]. One of the most important problems with 
BTG relates to the scalability of policy overriding. Increasing the number of instances of policy 
overriding in a scalable environment such as IoT means that access monitoring and detection of 
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misuse become impossible  [77]. Another concern about BTG arises from interoperability in 
heterogeneous environments. Specifically, in a heterogeneous environment consisting of different 
networks and platforms, one entity may be assigned an overriding policy to handle emergency 
conditions and at the same time be denied by an overriding policy from another domain. These 
conflicts highlight the vital need to accurately determine the overall decision  [39].  
 
2.1.4.2 Optimistic Access Control 
 
In cases such as emergency healthcare services, the capability of an access control system to 
provide openness and availability is more necessary than confidentiality  [78]. In this context, 
Optimistic Access Control has been proposed, and it assumes that most access requests will be 
legitimate. An optimistic approach permits the subject to exceed its normal access rights. 
Therefore, an additional control layer to protect the asset from misuse is recommended for 
Optimistic Access Control. This approach suffers from a lack of scalability in terms of policy rules. 
This holds true as implementing defence layers in a scalable environment needs additional 
resources and causes computational complexity. Optimistic Access Control also suffers from a 
lack of interoperability in heterogeneous environments, as defining exceptions for access scenarios 
that fall between two or more domains with conflicting interests is not straightforward  [73]. 
 
2.1.4.3 Risk-Aware Access Control (RAAC) 
 
The closest concept to uncertainty is “risk”. On one hand, risk is defined as a measure of the 
extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event and is typically a 
function of i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or event occurred, and ii) 
the likelihood of occurrence  [79]. On the other hand, uncertainty is defined as a lack of information 
about the likelihood of an event occurring. Therefore, “likelihood of event occurring” is common 
between these two concepts. 
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RAAC was proposed to assess the risk of the authentication request (in the authentication phase) 
or the risk of an action made by the subject using a permission rule (in the authorization phase) to 
determine whether access to a resource should be granted or the action should be permitted  [80]. 
 
Risk assessment is defined as the process of identifying, estimating and prioritizing risks to 
organizational assets and operations (NIST SP-800). It enables the resource owner to obtain a view 
of existing security risks and their impacts. Risk assessment is composed of risk analysis and risk 
evaluation (ISO/IEC 27001): 
 
• Risk analysis, one pillar of risk assessment, is responsible for identifying valuable assets 
and their associated vulnerabilities. It also uncovers the threats that may take advantage of 
those vulnerabilities. Estimating the damage that may be caused by these risks is the last 
part of the risk analysis process. 
• Risk evaluation, another pillar of risk assessment, is defined as the process of rating risk 
exposures against criteria in order to determine the significance of each risk (ISO/IEC 
27001). The risk evaluation process also prioritizes the identified risks based on their 
probability of occurrence and their impacts. 
Risk assessment approaches can be classified into three categories  [81]:  
• Quantitative: This method uses objective measurement to calculate risk based on 
probability theory and statistical approaches. The output of such calculations can be 
expressed in an analytical form composed of percentages and probability values. The major 
drawback with the quantitative approach is that its calculations are lengthy and time-
consuming and depend on the quality and detail of information collected (e.g., information 
about the value of assets, or sufficient information about the history of incidents)  [82]. 
• Qualitative: This method is based on a non-numerical assessment in which predefined 
classes (threats, vulnerabilities and the likelihood of occurrence of threats) and associated 
values are used to assess risk. The values in these classes are expressed by linguistic 
variables (e.g., low, high, medium) or using range variables (e.g., from 1 to 5). Although 
qualitative approaches are widely used because of their simplicity, these methods suffer 
from a lack of measurable detail to support cost-effective decision-making. Another 
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drawback of qualitative approaches is that they are prone to error in comparison with 
quantitative approaches  [83]. The reason is that the assessment is based on the knowledge 
and experience of the experts involved in the process. The third problem with qualitative 
approaches is that values that are assigned to either range or linguistic variables are not 
comprehensive enough to precisely reflect the risks of the system  [81]. 
• Hybrid: In order to avoid the drawbacks of using each of the above-mentioned risk 
assessment approaches, a combination of them can be used in a hybrid framework. In this 
way, assessors benefit from the simplicity and speed of qualitative methods and the 
precision of quantitative methods for more critical assets. 
Recently, a new taxonomy has been proposed for risk assessment methods  [81] that divides 
them into three categories based on how they analyse risk: i) asset-driven: all methods that start 
risk assessment by identifying and evaluating the assets fall into this category; as a second step, 
they evaluate the risks associated with the assets identified from the first step; ii) service-driven: 
in this category, services are identified first and then risks associated with these services are 
evaluated; and iii) business-driven: in this class of risk assessment methods, business goals and 
associated processes should be identified first, and then the risks related to those business goals 
are assessed.  
 
Another taxonomy for risk assessment methods is based on risk measurement. Risk-measuring 
methods fall into two categories  [81]: i) non-propagated, where risk is measured regardless of its 
propagation impacts on the other risk parameters, and ii) propagated, where dependencies among 
the resources and their impacts on each other are taken into consideration to measure the risk.  
Measuring risk in a propagated scheme enables the prediction of potential damage costs in a 
more accurate way than in non-propagated schemes. However, accurate information is needed 
about the dependencies among various resources (e.g., assets, processes) in the system. 
 
The main task in RAAC is to quantify the level of risk based on the risk–benefit calculation. 
There are four types of risk–benefit calculations for access control  [84], [85]: i) risk that focuses 
on information leaks that occur when a subject is granted access; ii) risk that focuses on the cost 
of resource unavailability for a system when access to a resource is denied; iii) the benefit obtained 
when an access is granted. The benefit comes from reducing the risk by giving the access; and iv) 
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the benefit of denying access that focuses on decreasing the chance of information leak occurred 
by denying access. One of the main challenges in RAAC is quantifying and calculating risk. RAAC 
models use different risk metrics that calculate the value of risk in access control systems, such as 
action severity, object sensitivity and benefit of access  [86],  [87]. There are five classes for 
calculating the risk  [88]: 
 
• Class A: The risk is calculated based on three parameters: 1) likelihood of the threat (LT), 
2) vulnerability of the asset (V), and 3) impact of the threat (IT): score of the risk=LT × V 
× IT. 
• Class B: The risk is calculated based on the security requirements of the asset. In this 
method the vulnerability related to the asset (V) and the impact of the threat (IT) are 
involved in the calculation of the risk: score of the risk=V × IT. 
• Class C: The risk is calculated in conjunction with financial loss considerations. To meet 
this goal, likelihood of the threat (LT) and the average financial loss caused by the threat 
(FT) are taken into consideration: score of the risk=LT × FT. 
• Class D: In this class, the risk is calculated only for critical assets. The method of 
calculating the score of the risk for critical assets is the same as in Class B. 
• Class E: The concepts of threat and vulnerability are combined to create a new concept 
called “incident”. The score of the risk for this class is calculated using the likelihood of 
the incident (LI) and the impact of the incident (II): score of the risk: LI × II. 
 
According to  [89], RAAC methods can be divided into two types, non-adaptive and adaptive. 
In non-adaptive methods, the calculated risk value for each access request remains unchanged 
even if any of the risk factor values change during the access session. This means that the access 
control mechanism cannot respond to change in the risk parameters after granting access. In 
contrast, in the adaptive approach the calculated risk value for each access request may change 
with changes in the risk factor values or the detection of abnormal behaviour. Therefore, adaptive 
RAAC continuously monitors activities to detect any suspicious events after access is granted. 
In this section, we surveyed both traditional and emerging access control models, protocols, 
and standards to investigate whether they are applicable into scalable, dynamic, heterogenous and 
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context-aware environments like IoT. In the next section, we will focus on two neglected facets of 
indeterminacy (uncertainty and ambiguity) in authentication to see whether state-of-the-art 
methods can handle these challenges.      
 
2.2 Indeterminacy in Authentication 
 
Indeterminacy has not received the attention that it deserves as a challenge in IoT, compared to 
other challenges that are well studied in the relevant literature, such as scalability, heterogeneity, 
interoperability and dynamism  [3], [4],  [5],  [6],  [7]. However, as this work stresses, 
indeterminacy should be considered when making access control decisions in IoT. Otherwise, if a 
decision is based on deterministic rules regardless of the indeterminacy concept it can lead to a 
binary decision (Access/Deny), which does not fit into a dynamic environment such as IoT.  
We consider that a subset of the above-mentioned inherent IoT characteristics exaggerate the 
indeterminacy in access control. Specifically, dynamism may result in indeterminacy because real-
time tracking of the rapid changes (joining, disjoining, displacement of entities) is not easily 
achieved in a scalable environment such as IoT. Therefore, the lack of information caused by the 
inability to track these changes results in indeterminacy. Scalability can increase dynamism in such 
a way that having sufficiently complete information to make access decisions is impossible. 
Network and service dependency in a heterogeneous environment such as IoT can cause delay and 
latency in network delivery. If a real-time access decision depends on information that is delivered 
at a delay or suffers from latency, the decision will suffer from indeterminacy in access control. 
Finally, the inherent heterogeneity of IoT introduces different sources of data communication loss. 
For example, data may be lost in RFID for the following reasons [90]: 1) missing readings caused 
by tag collision, metal/liquid effects; 2) data inconsistency caused by reading data from various 
readers simultaneously; and 3) ghost data caused by frequency reflection in the reading area. The 
incompleteness and imprecision inherent in the above-mentioned sources are considered the main 
causes of indeterminacy [11].  
According to Novák et al.  [91], there are at least two facets for indeterminacy: uncertainty and 
ambiguity. In the context of authentication, we consider that uncertainty is caused by a lack of 
information about the likelihood of an incident occurring. Also, ambiguity is caused by a lack of 
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precision in the information required to make a decision. In the rest of this section, uncertainty and 
ambiguity in access control are discussed. 
 
2.2.1 Uncertainty 
 
For many years the term “randomness” was used to describe probabilistic phenomena. Knight 
and Keynes started using the term “uncertainty” for the first time in 1921 and 1936 respectively. 
They made great progress to break the monopoly of probability theory  [92]. Since then, 
uncertainty has attracted attention in various diciplines (e.g., economics, management). As 
mentioned earlier, uncertainty is caused by a lack of information about the occurrence of an event. 
In other words, uncertainty refers to a state in which the following question cannot be answered in 
a deterministic way: What event will occur? According to Zeng et al. [93], three types of 
uncertainty exist: 
• Aleatory uncertainty: an observed phenomenon that occurs randomly and is therefore 
impossible to predict 
• Epistemic uncertainty: a lack of information and knowledge about the properties and 
conditions of the phenomenon  
• Inconsistent uncertainty: conflicting testimonies. The notion of inconsistency here 
describes the case where there is “too much” information available but this information is 
logically inconsistent. 
 
In the context of a system, uncertainty leads to a situation in which an analyst cannot describe 
or foresee an event in the system because of a lack of information about it. Therefore, the main 
motivation for measuring uncertainty is decision-making  [94]. The relevant literature includes 
five main approaches to measuring uncertainty: i) probability theory, ii) information theory, iii) 
evidence theory  [95],  [96], iv) possibility theory  [97], and v) uncertainty theory  [98]. We review 
these five theories below: 
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2.2.1.1. Probability Theory (1657) 
 
Traditionally, probability theory  [99] has been used to analyse uncertainty. Probability is a 
single-valued measure of uncertainty, in the sense that uncertainty about the occurrence of an 
event, A, is represented by a single number, P(A). As with different notions of uncertainty, 
different interpretations of probabilities exist. Two interpretations of probability are widespread in 
the field of risk analysis: a) the relative frequency interpretation (or classic probability). and b) the 
subjective or Bayesian interpretation. 
Classic probability. In this interpretation, the probability is defined as the number of times an 
event, A, occurs during experimental trials divided by the total number of trials conducted. This 
process generates a fraction of successes, the “true” probability: P(A). This pure type of probability 
is used to address aleatory uncertainty. The probability, P(A), is defined as follows  [100]:  
if A ∈ Ω, then 0 ≤ P(A) ≤ 1; 
P(Ω)=1; 
if A1, A2, …Ai, … is a sequence of disjoint events from Ω, then P(∪iAi)=Σi P(Ai); 
P(A)=1 − P(Ā)  
Subjective probability (Bayesian interpretation, 1774)  [101]. In this interpretation, the 
probability of an event, A, represents the degree of belief about the occurrence of event A. The 
subjective interpretation of probability is useful where the probability is a purely epistemic-based 
expression of uncertainty, based on the assigner’s background knowledge. In other words, within 
the Bayesian view, randomness itself is not considered a type of uncertainty. It is seen as a basis 
for expressing epistemic-based uncertainty. Subjective probability relies on the background 
knowledge (assuming K) that forms the basis of the assignment. To show the dependency on K, 
the conditional probability is defined as follows:  
𝑃(𝐴|𝐾) =
𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐾)
P(K)
 
Another important method for calculating conditional probabilities is given by the Bayes 
formula: 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐾) =
𝑃(𝐾|𝐴)𝑃(𝐴)
P(K|A)P(A) + 𝑃(𝐾|Ā)𝑃(Ā)
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Imprecise probability (1920)  [102] refers to the likelihood of an event with two probability 
values: lower probability, P(A), and upper probability, P̄(A), giving rise to a probability interval 
[P(A), P̄(A)], where 
0 ≤ P(A) ≤ P̄(A) ≤ 1. 
ΔP(A)=P̄(A) − P(A) 
 
Single-valued probability is a special case of imprecise probability, where both the lower and 
upper probabilities coincide, and is used to handle aleatory uncertainty. 
 
2.2.1.2. Information Theory (Shannon Entropy, 1948) 
 
Entropy measures the uncertainty inherent in the distribution of random variables. Consider a 
process with n possible outcomes (1, 2,…, n) with probabilities p1, p2,…, pn, respectively. The 
value of the entropy, H(p), for the whole process is defined as follows:  
H(p)=H (p1,…, pn)= − ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
, where H(p)=[0, 1] 
The value of entropy indicates the degree of uncertainty in the system. As the entropy increases, 
so does the uncertainty of a system. Joint entropy and conditional entropy are extensions that 
measure the uncertainty in the joint distribution of a pair of random variables and the uncertainty 
in the conditional distribution of a pair of random variables, respectively. The entropy of two or 
more processes can be measured using joint entropy. Given two random variables, X, Y, with joint 
probability, P(X,Y), the joint entropy is calculated as follows: 
H(X,Y)= − ∑  𝑥∈𝑋 ∑  𝑦∈𝑌 p(x,y)log2p(x,y) 
The conditional entropy H(Y |X) for the given random variables (X, Y) is defined as follows: 
H(Y|X)=∑  𝑥∈𝑋  p(x)H(Y |X=x) 
Entropy can measure aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in the system by demonstrating the 
degree of randomness in the system. 
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2.2.1.3. Evidence Theory (Dempster–Shafer Theory, 1975) 
 
The motivation for evidence theory is to represent and address situations where there is more 
information than in the case of a probability interval but less than there is in the case of  a single 
specific probability distribution  [95],  [96]. This theory consists of two important measuring 
functions: i) the belief measure, Bel(A), associated with preconceived notions, and ii) the 
plausibility measure, Pl(A), associated with plausible information. The belief measure represents 
the degree of belief, based on the available evidence. A fundamental property of the belief function 
is that 
Bel(A) + Bel(Ā) ≤ 1 
Therefore, the sum of belief in the occurrence of event A and belief in the non-occurrence of 
event A is less than or equal to one. In other words, the difference 1 − Bel(A) + Bel(Ā) is called 
ignorance. When ignorance is 0, the available evidence justifies a probabilistic description of the 
uncertainty. The plausibility measure can be interpreted as the total evidence that any element such 
as Y belongs not only to A or any of its subsets, as with  Bel(A), but also to any set that overlaps 
with A. As a result, a fundamental property of the plausibility function is as follows: 
Pl(A) + Pl(Ā) ≥ 1 
As depicted in Figure 2.3, the relationships between plausibility and the belief measure are as 
follows: 
(A)=1 − Bel(Ā) 
Bel(A)=1 − Pl(Ā) 
The representation of uncertainty based on the above two measures falls under the framework 
of evidence theory proposed by Shafer in 1976. Whereas in probability theory, a single probability 
distribution function (PDF) is introduced to define the probabilities of any event, represented as a 
subset of the sample space, in evidence theory there are two measures of the likelihood, belief and 
plausibility. Also, probability theory imposes more restrictive conditions on likelihood because of 
this fact that the probabilities of the occurrence and non-occurrence of an event must add up to 
one. Evidence theory allows epistemic uncertainty and aleatory uncertainty to be addressed 
separately by a single framework. Indeed, the belief and plausibility functions provide the 
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mathematical tools to process information that is at the same time random and imprecise in nature. 
These two functions also allow different beliefs from various sources to be combined even though 
these beliefs are inconsistent. Therefore, evidence theory can also address inconsistent uncertainty. 
Figure 2.2 provides a visual interpretation of evidence theory. As depicted in Figure 2.2, the sum 
of belief and disbelief of an event occurring is not equal to 1 and the gap between these two is 
known as ignorance. This is the main difference between this theory and probability theory.  
 
Figure 2. 2: Graphical representation of evidence theory 
 
2.2.1.4. Possibility Theory (1978) 
 
Possibility theory is a special branch of evidence theory  [97]. Contrary to probability theory, it 
uses two functions, possibility and necessity, to describe uncertainty. The possibility function (Pos) 
has the following characteristics: 
Pos(Ø)=0 
Pos(Ω)=1, where Ω is the universe of discourse 
Pos(U ∪ V)=  Max (Pos(U), Pos(V)), where U and V are disjoint subsets 
On the other hand, based on possibility theory, the necessity function, Nec(), is defined as 
follows: 
Nec(U)=1 – Pos(?̅?) 
Nec(U ∩ V)=Min (Nec(U), Nec(V)), U and V are disjoint subsets 
As illustrated above, possibility theory is based on a pair of two measures, possibility and 
necessity, which are special forms of belief and plausibility measures from evidence theory. On 
the other hand, probability theory can be interpreted in such a way that the belief and plausibility 
measures coincide. The most significant difference between possibility theory and probability 
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theory is in the representation of total ignorance. Possibility theory and evidence theory represent 
total ignorance in the same way, using a unitary possibility distribution for the entire universe of 
discourse. In contrary to these two theories, probability theory uses a single distribution to 
represent the total ignorance. 
 
2.2.1.5. Uncertainty Theory (2007) 
 
Uncertainty theory was founded by Liu in 2007 and has subsequently been studied by many 
researchers  [98]. This theory was proposed to model uncertainty based on belief degrees. Belief 
degrees cannot be treated as a subjective probability because this may lead to counterintuitive 
results. This problem derives from the fact that humans usually over-anticipate unlikely events, 
and therefore this makes the belief degree deviate far from frequency  [103],  [104]. Another 
difference between probability theory and uncertainty theory is that probability theory is a 
“product” mathematical system, whereas uncertainty theory is a “minimum” mathematical system. 
This difference implies that random variables and uncertain variables follow different operational 
laws. In other words, probability theory is a branch of mathematics for modelling frequencies, 
while uncertainty theory is a branch of mathematics for modelling belief degrees. According to 
Liu  [105], in comparison with possibility theory, both uncertainty theory and possibility theory 
try to model belief degrees, where the former uses the uncertainty measure (belief degree), while 
the latter uses the possibility measure. Therefore, in the field of belief degrees the two theories are 
competitors.  
There is no silver bullet to tackle uncertainty. Each of the five theories described previously has 
strengths and limitations.  
 
2.2.1.6 Uncertainty in Authentication 
 
To define uncertainty in authentication, it is essential to differentiate between its effects in the 
authentication and authorization phases of access control. It should be noted that, as discussed in 
Section 2, an instance of access control typically includes three phases: authentication (which 
encompasses identification), authorization and auditing. Auditing deals with the analysis of the 
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other two phases to detect security violations, and thus we consider that uncertainty cannot be 
considered in this phase. In this work we define uncertainty for authentication.  
Uncertainty in authentication stems from the incompleteness of information regarding the 
likelihood of whether the acceptance of an authentication request leads to an incident. For instance, 
assume that “Alice” attempts to authenticate to a system. We also assume that authenticating her 
endangers the system (the access would expose an asset to a threat) with a probability of 60%. We 
present a formal definition for uncertainty in authentication as follows: 
Definition: Given a set of authentication requests: R={r1,r2,r3,…,rn}, a set of possible access 
decisions: D={Access, Deny}, an access decision function: F:R→D, and a set of possible 
outcomes for any access decision: O={Safe, Incident}, the uncertainty of an authentication request 
is defined by the following conditional probability: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Ambiguity  
 
 
The terms “uncertainty” and “ambiguity” are used interchangeably in a number of studies  
[106],  [107]. More importantly, the approaches proposed to address them are also used 
interchangeably. This stems from the fact that currently there is no clarity in the differentiation 
between these two concepts.  
Aristotle was the first scholar to address ambiguity, which is caused by imprecise information  
[108]. The theories discussed in Subsection 2.2.1 fail to predict a system with imprecise or vaguely 
formulated information. This imprecise information may arise for several reasons, such as the 
complexity of the system  [109]. We deal with ambiguity when the answer to the following 
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question is not clear: What is the occurring event? To model and present the ambiguity, the fuzzy 
set theory was proposed by Zadeh  [110]. With regard to access control, we define ambiguity in 
authentication in the following Subsection.  
2.2.2.1 Ambiguity in authentication  
 
Ambiguity in authentication stems from a lack of precision in the information on the subject 
requesting to authenticate in the system. In other words, it aims to answer the question “to what 
extent can we trust the subject in order to authenticate it?”.  
Traditionally, ambiguity has been evaluated with the use of trust analysis. There are several 
works in the literature on handling trust in access control. Nathalie Baracaldo et al.  [111] proposed 
a method based on the extension of RBAC to handle trust in access control. To meet this goal, they 
assigned a trust level to each user based on his past behaviour in the context of the usage. In this 
method, trust is treated as a binary concept (0: totally untrusted and 1:totally trusted). Alessandro 
Armando et al. [112] proposed a model to handle authentication requests by balancing trust and 
risk. In this work, trust was defined as the level of confidence that the resource controller has on 
the access requester. The method suggested using credential-based analysis in order to handle the 
trust. For this reason, the value of trust is computed based on some attributes like user role, age of 
the user, and geographic location where a request created. The authentication request is accepted 
by this method if and only if the value for the incoming request is larger or equal to the value of 
the risk. Indrajit Ray et al. [113] proposed a formal trust-based access control based on the 
extension of RBAC. In contrary to [112], this method did not define trust as a binary concept. In 
order to measure trust, three types of trust were defined by this work: 1- user trust level (a value 
between 0 and 1 which the larger value means that it is less risky to grant access to that user), 2- 
role trust level that indicated the minimum trust value required for a user to be assigned to the 
corresponding role and 3- permission trust level which indicated the minimum trust value required 
by a role to be assigned a specific permission. In such a system, the role is authorized for 
permission if and only if its trust level is greater than the trust level of the permission. Mahdi 
Ghafoorian et al. [114] proposed a trust based RBAC model to govern access in the cloud. The 
suggested method considers three key elements to compute trust including resource owner, user 
(who need to access to the resource) and role. In this method, owner shares their resource based 
on the trust levels and reputation of the role. Therefore, users can access to the resource if their 
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trust level is above the trust threshold determined for the corresponding role. Authors considered 
two types of trust: direct trust and indirect trust. In direct trust, the value of trust for each user is 
calculated based on the feedbacks derived from history of the user’s interactions. For measuring 
the indirect trust, the method benefits from a recommender system. Kamran Awan et al. [115] 
proposed a hierarchical architecture to handle trust in cross-domain communication network. In 
this method, nodes in the network can communicate with each other after evaluating their trust 
levels. In doing so, trustee and trustor need to know whether they belong to the same domain. If 
both reside on the same domain then the trustor sends the trustee information to the community 
server in order to evaluate its trust degree. Community server computes the trust level of the trustee 
based on three parameters including compatibility, honesty and competence. If trustee belongs to 
different community then the community server will query domain server about its trust level. 
Domain server was considered by this method to handle cross-domain communications. Ashish 
Singh et al. [116] suggested a trust-based access control based on the extension of Identity Based 
Access Control. In order to compute the level of user trust, the authors suggested using beta 
reputation approach. In the proposed method, the degree of trust for the user is computed by 
considering a number of parameters like time of access request, past behaviour of the user in the 
system and the location of the user.  Parikshit Mahalle et al. [117] proposed a fuzzy based approach 
to handle trust in access control for IoT. In this work, trust was defined as a subjective and 
contextual value related to the user behaviour (trustee). Three parameters were defined by this 
work as the components of trust: Experience which is a track record of previous interactions related 
to the trustee, Knowledge about the trustee, and recommendation which is a summation of 
feedbacks from other users about the trustee. For each of the mentioned parameter, three linguistic 
terms (e.g. good, average and bad) were assigned. Moreover, corresponding fuzzy memberships 
were defined for the parameters. Final decision in the proposed method is made based on the result 
of the de-fuzzification process.  
Farhana Jabeen et al. [118] reviewed trust and reputation in healthcare domain. According to 
this research, trust in healthcare can be classified into two branches namely as soft trust and hard 
trust. In the former, trust relationships are based on non-cryptographic mechanisms but in the latter, 
trust relationships among entities are based on cryptographic mechanisms. For the soft trust, degree 
of trust may change over time based on the trustee behavior.  
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Sadegh Dorri et al  [9], and Ava Ahadipour et al. [119] classified trust analysis into two classes: 
i) credential-based trust analysis, and ii) behavioural-based trust analysis. In credential-based 
trust analysis, trust is established by verifying certain credentials. In credential verification, trust 
is established and access rights to different resources are granted, based on the access policy. This 
class of trust analysis is widely used in access control systems with static and predefined policies. 
Behavioural-based trust analysis uses the past behaviour as direct experience from the subjects to 
predict how the subject will behave in future.  
lessons learned from the literature; we come into the following conclusion about trust analysis: 
• Soft trust analysis can be done using one of the following methods: 1- direct analysis can 
be achieved through direct experience while 2- indirect analysis consists of trustworthy 
peer experience collected during the period. 3- Soft trust analysis can also be done based 
on the combination of direct and indirect methods in a hybrid structure. Soft trust analysis 
has less overhead in comparison to hard trust analysis therefore, choosing soft method is 
recommended for IoT scenarios.  
• Trust in IoT domains (e.g. E-Health) has a number of characteristics like 1- Asymmetry: 
Entity (A) trusts another entity (B), but not the other way around. 2- Partial Transitivity: 
Trust may or may not be transitive.  3- Context-sensitive: Trust establishment must be 
context sensitive. 4- Dynamic: Trust may change over time.  
• Trust metrics can vary from one domain to another. In the context of access control, the 
following metrics have been used in the literature  [120],  [121],  [122],  [123]: a) number 
of authentication/authorization failures, b) subject anonymity, c) frequency of access 
requests, and d) degree of trustworthiness for subject and object. 
 According to the above considerations we choose soft trust method through conducting direct 
trust analysis (e.g. behavioral-based analysis). In doing so, we keep track of authentication history 
for all users and compute the value of trust based on the history. For a newcomer from which we 
do not have history profile, we can either assign a default value (e.g. 0.5) as trust score or assign 
the average value of trust in the system to it. 
In authentication, behavioural-based analysis takes the history profile of successful and 
unsuccessful access requests for a given subject as a metric to calculate its trust value. Reputation-
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based and recommendation-based trust are the subsets of this class of trust analysis that use 
cumulative knowledge about the past behaviour of a subject  [124]. 
Assume that “Alice” attempts to authenticate, and, according to her access history, she has 
successfully authenticated seven times in the past, out of her 10 attempts. If the average number 
of authentication successes in the system is 60% or more, then Alice is classified as a “trusted” 
subject. 
In the next Subsection, we will review the literature on resilient access control methods to find 
out whether proposed methods can address uncertainty and ambiguity in authentication. 
2.2.3 Proposed Resilient Access Control Methods in IoT 
 
A state-of-the-art review was conducted to answer the following research question: Can 
resilient access control methods handle indeterminacy in IoT? At the end of this Subsection, Table 
2.4 summarizes the reviewed literature on resilient methods and indicates whether the proposed 
approaches handle uncertainty and ambiguity. Bijon et al.  [125] incorporated the concept of risk 
awareness in RBAC. The role in the introduced RBAC model will be activated only if the total 
risk of its active roles does not exceed a given threshold. Furthermore, the threshold is determined 
dynamically in an adaptive manner. Baracaldo et al. [126] used trust and risk concepts in RBAC 
to deal with insiders. In this method, each user is assigned a trust level and each access permission 
is associated with a risk value. The risk of each role is calculated by the total risk of all direct and 
indirect permissions enabled by its activation. In this method, a role is activated if the user meets 
the minimum trust level required for that role. The value of the trust is determined based on the 
amount of risk exposed by activating the role. Dimmock et al.  [127] proposed a method to enhance 
RBAC with trust and risk. To meet this goal, trust and cost evaluation measures are added to the 
OASIS policy language. This method introduces a risk evaluation expression language to calculate 
the risk based on the given values and make an access decision based on that calculation. Chen et 
al.  [128] proposed an extension of the RBAC model to deal with the concept of risk in two 
dimensions: mitigation of loss and evaluation of likelihood. Evaluation of likelihood is 
accomplished by investigating the appropriateness of permission for a role and the trustworthiness 
and competency of the subjects. Mitigation of the loss is handled by assigning obligations to users 
to mitigate risks and deny requests with risks greater than a permission-specific threshold. Dos 
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Santos et al.  [129] proposed an RAAC method for the cloud. In this method, if the subject of 
access is in the same cloud federation as the object, ABAC policies are enforced by the cloud 
service provider offering the object. Otherwise, risk policies are evaluated against the attributes of 
the subject and access is granted only if the risk is below a determined threshold. Dos Santos et al. 
improved their approach  [130] and enriched their method by applying RAAC, not only for intra-
cloud access decisions, but also for inter-cloud access decisions. Ricardo et al.  [131] proposed a 
risk-aware framework to enforce RAAC policies in the cloud. This work is based on the extension 
of XACML and aggregates various risk factors to calculate the final value of the risk. Risk itself 
is measured based on the impact that access can cause. The calculated value is compared to a 
threshold to make an access decision. Atlam et al.  [132] developed an adaptive RAAC model for 
IoT. This model accepts real-time attributes including user context, resource sensitivity, action 
severity and risk history as inputs and estimates the overall risk value associated with each access 
request. The major concern about this work is that the authors did not validate their proposed 
model. Dorri et al.  [133] proposed an access control framework for the grid environment to address 
the misuse of resources in VOs. This method offers both risk and trust analysis in authorization to 
assess the subject’s actions. The trust model uses feedback to calculate the user’s trust degree in a 
probabilistic approach. On the other hand, the risk model is utility-based and uses the user’s trust 
degree to calculate the probability of fulfilment of obligations. The proposed model was evaluated 
using simulation. The results show that it is scalable in terms of the number of entities, the number 
of policy rules and extensibility. 
 
Table 2.4: Analysis of resilient methods proposed in the literature 
 Criteria 
 
Method 
Scalability Heterogeneity 
Interoperability 
Dynamism Context-
Awareness 
Indeterminacy-Awareness 
in Authentication 
Entities Policy 
rules 
Extensibility Uncertainty Ambiguity 
[125] -  - -   - - 
[111],  
[126] 
-  - -   - - 
[127] -  - -   -  
[128]  - - - - - - - 
[129]     -   - 
[130],  
[131] 
 -      - 
[132]  - -     - 
[133]       - - 
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2.2.4 Findings on Resilient Access Control Methods 
 
There are a number of widely used standards and methodologies for risk assessment, such as 
NIST-SP800,10 ISO/IEC 27005:201111 and IEC 62443-2-1.12 Each describes a specific method for 
risk identification, evaluation, prioritization and mitigation. The adaptability of these risk 
assessment standards and methodologies in the IoT environment is controversial. Nurse et al.  
[134] argued that if IoT-related characteristics, such as scalability, heterogeneity and dynamism, 
are taken into consideration, the current risk assessment approaches are inadequate for IoT for the 
following reasons: 
• Limitation of periodic assessment for the IoT environment: The current risk-based 
approaches are based on periodic assessment, and therefore cannot identify and evaluate 
significant changes in a highly dynamic system such as IoT, where there is a high degree 
of variability in system scale, dynamism and coupling. 
• Lack of knowledge of IoT entities: Most of the current risk assessment approaches are 
based on knowledge of assets, threats, attack probabilities and potential impacts of threats. 
However, achieving sufficient knowledge of these parameters in IoT is extremely 
challenging due to the scalable and dependable environment of IoT.  
• Interoperability and dependency challenges: Current risk assessment approaches are 
unable to assess all the processes associated with the assets and the inter/intra-connections 
that allow them to couple and operate; these introduce new areas of risk, which cannot be 
handled with current risk assessment methods.  
Furthermore, most existing RAAC approaches rely on manual processes and thus are unable to 
provide a high degree of automation in risk assessment  [135],  [136],  [137]. This lack of 
automation in risk assessment leads to the requirement for manual configuration from analysts, 
which is costly, error-prone, and vulnerable to social engineering attacks. Moreover, related work 
on RAAC that provides conceptual frameworks  [138] or focuses only on domain-specific 
 
10 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-30r1.pdf 
11 https://www.iso.org/standard/56742.html 
12 https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/7030 
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solutions cannot be reused in other knowledge domains, and supports only restricted outcomes 
(i.e., permit or deny)  [139]. Therefore, these approaches suffer from a lack of generalizability. 
2.3 Chapter Summary  
 
In this chapter, we have reviewed the current state-of-the art in related work contributing to the 
access control and the concept of indeterminacy in authentication. Summary points from this 
review are as follows.  
• DAC, MAC, RBAC, ABAC, CapBAC, UCON and OrBAC were evaluated against the 
following criteria: scalability (in terms of entity, policy rules and extensibility), dynamism, 
heterogeneity/interoperability and context-awareness. According to the literature, none of 
these models can fully applicable to IoT but ABAC shows promising performance in terms 
of scalability (extensibility), dynamism, heterogeneity/interoperability, and context-
awareness in comparison with other models.  
•  Aforementioned access control models benefit from deterministic set of policies that make 
them incapable of handling indeterminate access scenarios. 
• Indeterminacy in authentication is defined as a state in which an authentication decision 
should be made based on “incomplete” and “imprecise” information. 
• Indeterminacy has two facets: “Uncertainty” and “ambiguity (Trust)”.  
• Uncertainty stems from the incompleteness of information regarding the likelihood of 
whether the acceptance of an authentication request leads to an incident. 
• There are five theories in the literature for uncertainty handling including: probability 
theory, Information theory, evidence theory, possibility theory and uncertainty theory. 
These theories were discussed, and subjective probability theory was chosen to define and 
handle uncertainty in authentication due to the challenges of IoT scenarios like scalability 
and the need for less complexity. 
• Ambiguity in authentication stems from a lack of precision in the information on the 
subject requesting to authenticate in the system. It is handled by “Trust” analysis methods. 
• Soft trust analysis is applicable into IoT domains due to its less overhead in comparison 
with hard trust methods. 
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• Any trust-based analysis in the field of IoT may have the following characteristics: 
Asymmetry, Partial transitive, context-sensitive and dynamic.     
• Current risk assessment standards and methodologies have limitations in evaluating “risk” 
in IoT environment due to the following reasons: 1- Limitation of periodic assessment for 
the IoT environment 2- Lack of knowledge of IoT entities and 3- Interoperability and 
dependency challenges. 
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3.  Methodology  
 
In this chapter we introduce the methodology used within this thesis. According to the 
introduced challenges in the field of authentication, an automated, resilient and scalable 
authentication model is vital for IoT. To address this need, we propose a machine-learning-based 
prediction model, which will be discussed in this chapter. We also consider considerations of the 
match funder in our methodology in order to build our prediction model working in e-health 
domain.  
3.1 Overview 
 
As discussed in Section 2, there are at least two facets of indeterminacy, including uncertainty 
and ambiguity [140]. Uncertainty in authentication stems from the incompleteness of information 
on the likelihood of whether the acceptance of an authentication request will lead to an incident. 
Authentication is affected by another element of indeterminacy called ambiguity. Ambiguity in 
authentication stems from a lack of precision in the information on the subject requesting to 
authenticate in the system. In other words, it aims to answer the question “to what extent can we 
trust the subject in order to authenticate it?”. To handle indeterminacy in authentication, we 
propose a machine-learning-based prediction model. This model is based on the extension of 
ABAC and works with three contextual parameters: time, location and credentials.  
Our methodology consists of two parts. First, we built our uncertainty-aware prediction models 
using the mentioned attributes. Then, we applied behavioural-based analysis using the history 
profile of the user to improve the accuracy of our prediction models. Figure 3.1 shows the scheme 
of our methodology.  
The rest of this section will introduce our proposed architecture and discuss the process of 
building prediction models.  
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Figure 3. 1: Indeterminacy handling scheme in authentication 
 
3.2 Architecture  
 
We show the architecture of our methodology in Figure 3.2. As depicted, this architecture 
benefits from two building blocks: an “uncertainty-aware prediction engine” and an “ambiguity-
aware prediction engine” to handle indeterminacy in authentication. The data flow model of the 
architecture is as follows:  
 
1) A subject sends its authentication request to the Authentication Service Point (ASP). ASP 
is the interface between the system and the subject to forward the request and return the 
decision.  
 
2) ASP sends the request to the Indeterminacy Estimation Point (IEP), which is responsible 
for requesting both uncertainty and ambiguity (trust) engines to calculate the uncertainty 
and ambiguity (trust) values associated with the authentication request. 
 
3) IEP sends a request to the uncertainty-aware prediction engine to calculate the total value 
of the uncertainty associated with the authentication request.  
4) The uncertainty engine returns the calculated value to IEP. 
5) IEP sends a request to the trust engine to calculate the ambiguity (trust) value associated 
with the authentication request. 
6) The ambiguity engine returns the calculated “trust “value for the ambiguity. 
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7) IEP calculates the value of indeterminacy based on the uncertainty and ambiguity values 
and sends it to ASP. 
8) ASP returns the authentication decision based on the value of indeterminacy value to the 
user. 
 
Figure 3. 2: Proposed architecture for the indeterminacy-aware authentication 
 
3.3 The Process of Building an Indeterminacy-Aware Authentication Model 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the steps involved in building our prediction models. We explain the steps 
below.  
 
Figure 3. 3: Methodological steps 
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3.3.1 Attribute Selection 
 
Since the model is an extension of the ABAC model, determining the attributes is the first task. 
Attributes for this model are the characteristics of the authentication request, such as time of the 
request, location/IP of the subject and the credentials of the subject. These attributes were chosen 
based on the literature. We discussed the attributes with match-funder in order to meet its 
requirements (for the e-health domain and for human–machine interaction). Chapter 4 discusses 
this step. 
 
3.3.2 Dataset Synthesis 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the authentication datasets consisting of the required attributes 
are not publicly available. As a result, in order to synthesize data samples for the attributes, each 
of attribute had to be represented by PDFs. To do this, each attribute had to be studied separately 
from two perspectives: a) determining the PDFs that reflect the likelihood of occurrence of the 
selected attribute, and b) determining the corresponding PDF for the probable impact of incidents 
caused by that attribute. Then, the generated values needed to be aggregated in order to build our 
dataset. Labelling the dataset was the last crucial task of this step. The dataset was labelled 
(Access/Deny) to be used by the supervised algorithms. Labelling was done using authentication 
policy and a fusion technique. The fusion technique was selected in accordance with the lessons 
learned from the review of uncertainty-related theories (i.e., probability, evidence, belief and 
uncertainty theories) in Chapter 2. The process of dataset synthesis is discussed in Chapter 4.  
One of the considerations is determining the period of authentication history retention when we 
are dealing with real dataset.  Identifying the period of retention for the authentication history 
depends on the type of the authentication system. In general, authentication history may be used 
for the sake of auditing purposes but in an authentication system in which a data-driven prediction 
model works at the heart of the system, determining such a period depends on the period of re-
training. When the system hit by model drifting, re-training model with old data does not result in 
more accurate model. Therefore, the old history can be substituted with the latest dataset by which 
the prediction model was trained.  
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3.3.3 Uncertainty-Aware Model Building 
 
After preparing a dataset consisting of three attributes (time, location and credentials), we 
needed to apply supervised algorithms to build our prediction models. Authentication is a matter 
of classification, and authentication requests were classified into the “Access” or “Deny” class. 
Thus, classification algorithms could be applied to the dataset in order to build the prediction 
models. The output of this step was uncertainty-aware prediction models. The prediction models 
were validated using the cross-validation method to avoid overfitting/underfitting. Chapter 5 
presents the process of building uncertainty-aware prediction models. 
3.3.4 Ambiguity-Aware Model Building 
 
Besides the attributes that were chosen to build the uncertainty-aware prediction models, at this 
stage of the research one attribute seemed the most appropriate for use in trust analysis, i.e., the 
history of authentication requests for any subject. The reason for selecting it was that it has been 
widely used in trust-based analysis in the relevant literature. We envisaged that to perform trust-
based analysis the ambiguity-aware prediction engine should retain the authentication history for 
each subject. The new data needed to be added to our dataset as a new attribute and the 
classification algorithms were applied to the new dataset. Our hypothesis was that adding new 
attributes to the dataset would increase the performance of the prediction models. Chapter 6 
provides details on building ambiguity-aware prediction models and compares the performance of 
the models with the performance of the prediction models developed in Chapter 5. 
 
3.3.5 Validation 
 
According to the architecture depicted in Figure 3.2, proposed method is composed of two data-
driven prediction models. These models are developed using classification algorithms. Prediction 
models are prone to two types of defects: 1- Bias and 2- Variance. Bias comes from the difference 
between the estimated performance of the model and its performance on unseen data and the 
variance which determines how much the performance of the model vary when the experiment is 
repeated.   
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In order to validate these models, cross-validation method was used to evaluate the 
generalizability of the prediction models. In this way, the dataset was divided into training and 
testing parts. The performance of the prediction models trained by the training part was tested by 
the testing part of the dataset.  
Moreover, developed model will be evaluated using new datasets to investigate their 
performance in action.  
These models will be also deployed on a testbed consisting of IoT entities (e.g. Raspberry Pi 
machines) in order to evaluate the performance of the system. 
3.3.6 Model Selection 
 
As discussed in the first step, a number of attributes were chosen to build the dataset. Involving 
more attributes in the dataset resulted in a more complex prediction model. One of the objectives 
was to reduce the number of attributes without losing the accuracy of the model. This was done 
using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). BIC measures the relative model quality and 
assigns a score based on that measurement. BIC penalizes complexity in a model, where 
complexity refers to the number of parameters in the model. The model with the lowest BIC score 
is preferred. Furthermore, prediction models can be compared using a number of criteria in terms 
of performance (i.e., accuracy, precision, recall, F1). In short, the final prediction model must have 
the highest performance and the lowest complexity. The best-fit model was selected at the end of 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, we have explained our research methodology for this dissertation. According to 
our methodology, we want to handle both uncertainty and ambiguity in authentication for scalable, 
heterogenous and dynamic environment. In doing so, we first need to synthesize our dataset due 
to lack of publicly available dataset for authentication. We chose three attributes for our dataset 
based on our findings and match-funder considerations. Selected attributes are time, location, and 
credential (username and password).  
63 
 
Our methodology benefits from supervised machine learning algorithms (classifiers) in order 
to build our data-driven prediction models. The models can determine the class of authentication 
requests (Access/Deny) by handling uncertainty and ambiguity.  
To promote understanding of the readers, we have defined an exemplar (RASA). The exemplar 
reflects real characteristics of our research problem. We have also introduced validation methods 
which will be used to validate our results. 
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4. Dataset Synthesis  
 
Datasets are used for both training and the robust testing of our indeterminacy-aware 
authentication model. One of the big obstacles in conducting machine-learning-based research in 
the field of authentication is the lack of publicly available datasets. As a result, in this work we 
generated datasets consisting of the required attributes. To better understand our methodology, we 
start this chapter by introducing an exemplar.  Then we present the process of generating such 
datasets by which we built our prediction models as described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. We also 
analysed the only publicly available dataset, called LANL, to evaluate our findings.  
 
4.1 E-Health Exemplar – RASA 
 
To support the research approach, we introduce an exemplar. This exemplar helps to promote 
the understanding of research contributions among readers.  
This exemplar is designed based on the specifications derived from match-funder (RASA 
company) infrastructure. We call this exemplar “RASA” in this work.   
RASA decides to share data from part of its medical sensors with 60 of researchers. Users can 
access to the data through an aggregated node (gateway). The access is provided through WLAN 
(WiFi connection) provided on-site. WiFi routers are enhanced with WiFi location tracking system 
which can determine the location of the users and their mobilities.  
Researchers are eligible to access to the data on-site. The site of RASA is located in a place 
represented by a map of area 2,000 m × 2,000 m. Figure 4.1 shows the location map of RASA.  
Three points of interest (PoIs) inside the area were defined. These are three buildings that the 
researchers are using during work hours. The first building (PoI_1) is the main building and most 
of the researcher are located in this building. We expect to have most of the authentication requests 
from this building. The building is located in X=200m and Y=200m on the map. The second 
building (PoI_2) is the seminar/meeting building. The researchers use this building for the 
meetings, seminars and workshops. We expect to have second-highest number of authentication 
requests from this building. The building is located in X= 600m and Y=1000m on the map. The 
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third building (PoI_3) is library and we expect the third highest number of authentications from 
this building. The building is located in X=1400 and Y=1400 on the map. Researchers may send 
their authentication requests from each of these points of interest or they may send their request 
on the move between these points. Therefore, authentication system must be able to consider and 
handle requests for both fixed and mobile users. 
 
Figure 4. 1: Location map of the RASA 
 
Researchers are using shared data during work hours (9-17). In some cases, they may request 
to access data before 9 and/or after 17 but we expect to have the most access requests during work 
hours.  
Researchers are assigned and identified by ID (1 to 60). They are also assigned a pair of 
username and password individually.  
Indeterminacy-aware authentication system needs to be designed and deployed on aggregated 
node (gateway). It must make an indeterminacy-aware authentication decision for each request 
based on the time of the request, location in which the user sends its request and the credential 
provided by the user.   
We need to synthesize Datasets for this exemplar. The size of the dataset should reflect the 
scalability of the problem. Moreover, different degree of mobility needs to be considered in 
generating data samples in order to reflect the dynamism of the environment. This exemplar also 
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is composed of different network technologies like wireless sensor network (WSN) and wireless 
Lan and Ethernet (for fixed users). Such a heterogeneity makes this exemplar more realistic.  
4.2 Threat Model  
 
We can consider adversaries against the authentication systems discussed in our exemplar 
(Subsection 4.1) from two perspectives: user side, and authentication system side. 
From user side: 
1- ID related threat:  
• Attacker may spoof user’s ID to send authentication request to the system. 
2- Time related threat:  
• Users may send authentication request before 9AM and/or after 5PM. 
3- Location related threat:  
• Users may send authentication request from a location far from PoIs. 
4- Credential related threats:  
• Users may share credential with ineligible persons deliberately (Threat of insiders). 
• Credential loss by user (e.g. users leave login credential in public place). 
Physical threat: 
• Physical threats against devices of users that lead to spoofing. 
Communication Channel threat: 
• Traffic between users and authentication system may be eavesdropped by attacker. 
From Authentication system side: 
• Authentication system running on aggregated node is threatened by DoS. (e.g. de-
authentication attack). 
Physical threat, DoS threat and channel related threats are out of the scope of this research. 
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4.3 Synthesizing Process 
 
As discussed in Subsection 3.3.1, ABAC was selected as the reference model. As a result, we 
need to choose attributes as the authentication parameters for our data-driven model. According to 
the exemplar discussed in Subsection 4.1, credentials (username and password) are assigned to the 
users. Furthermore, as discussed in RASA exemplar, each user is assigned and identified by an ID. 
In addition to these parameters, match-funder asked for spatio-temporal parameters to be involved 
in the authentication process.  
According to the literature the chosen attributes must have the following characteristics [141]: 
• be atomic-valued, i.e., have a single-value attribute 
• be a non-entity attribute (the attribute does not include another entity as its value) 
• be a contextual attribute  
• be independent (the attribute does not have any intersection with the other attributes). 
As a result,  based on the scope and assumptions of the proposed model discussed in Chapter 
3, and the considerations discussed in Subsection 4.1, the required dataset needs to have the 
following attributes: i) ID of the user, ii) time of the request, iii) location of the request, and iv) 
credentials provided by the user.  
The process of generating values for each of the above attributes started by determining their 
corresponding PDFs. In real-world scenarios, these attributes are derived from stochastic processes 
and therefore they follow a PDF or a mixture of PDFs. Finding the best PDF to describe the 
behaviour of these attributes helped us to synthesize a dataset similar to a real-world dataset. In 
doing so, we used PDFs based on similar works in the state of the art. The next step of constructing 
our datasets was assigning uncertainty values (UVs) to the generated data samples. We followed 
a logic for such an assigning to construct our datasets consisting of UVs. The final dataset can be 
depicted as an uncertainty matrix, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4. 2: Uncertainty matrix consisting of UVs 
In this work, the size of the datasets was determined to be 5,000. In other words, we assumed 
that the datasets consisted of 5,000 authentication requests for which the above-mentioned 
attributes needed to be synthesized. The size of the dataset should be determined in such a way 
that it avoids overfitting or underfitting (discussed in Chapter 5) and also reflects the scalability of 
the scenario in terms of entity. In the rest of this chapter, the process of generating data samples 
for these attributes is discussed. 
4.3.1 User ID 
 
As mentioned in exemplar (RASA), we assumed that 60 users were participating in our 
authentication scenario (IDs are identified by numbers:1,2,…,60). In order to find the 
corresponding PDFs, relevant studies were considered. The pattern of online activities was 
comprehensively studied in the literature. The most highly cited works are as follows: Lada et al. 
[142] analysed the activity of the online users. They found that access requests follow power law 
distribution (Zipf’s law). In another study, Chao Wang et al. [143] analysed two datasets and 
concluded that users in video on demand (VoD) systems can be distinguished by their individual 
access requests, according to the drift power law distribution. Gutierrez et al. [144] studied user 
behaviour on social media (e.g., Twitter) and found that it follows a power law PDF with respect 
to the number of unique users participating in the conversation. Cha et al. [145] confirmed that the 
activity (access to the resources) of users on popular social media services such as YouTube 
follows power law PDFs.  
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According to the above studies, we used power law PDF in order to generate data samples for 
our users in all datasets. In doing so, we implemented power law PDF in MATLAB version 2018a. 
The formula of the corresponding PDFs is as follows: 
P(x)=Cx-α (1) 
where α is a constant parameter of the distribution known as the exponent or scaling parameter. 
The scaling parameter typically lies in the range 2 < α < 3. Moreover, C in the above function is 
the normalization constant. Table 4.1 statistically summarizes the generated data. The heading of 
the table indicates the ID of the users and the white column shows the frequency of their 
authentication requests in the synthesized dataset.  
 Table 4.1: Statistical analysis of generated data samples for the users in a dataset 
 ser ID No. of Authentication Requests User ID No. of Authentication Requests 
1 361 31 55 
2 314 32 57 
3 283 33 40 
4 234 34 55 
5 247 35 47 
6 194 36 42 
7 185 37 46 
8 151 38 51 
9 124 39 29 
10 135 40 38 
11 128 41 41 
12 133 42 51 
13 115 43 36 
14 99 44 28 
15 102 45 31 
16 109 46 38 
17 93 47 36 
18 81 48 42 
19 88 49 35 
20 78 50 33 
21 80 51 26 
22 74 52 39 
23 65 53 42 
24 60 54 23 
25 58 55 38 
26 53 56 27 
27 46 57 30 
28 59 58 30 
29 57 59 21 
30 61 60 26 
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By plotting the generated data using a clustered column chart (Figure 4.2), a typical diagram 
of power law distribution is achieved. 
 
Figure 4. 3: Visualizing generated data samples using a clustered column chart 
 
We synthesized three set of users for our three datasets (low-, medium- and high-mobility 
datasets). 
4.3.2 Time 
 
The pattern for the time of authentication requests depends on the business model of the service 
in which the authentication process is embedded. For services that are deployed to be accessible 
24 hours a day, seven days a week (e.g., email services) generally no restriction is defined for the 
sake of access in terms of time. In such services, the timing of the authentication requests follows 
uniform distribution.  
As discussed in our exemplar (Subsection 4.1), we defined an authentication scenario in the 
field of e-health. In order to make the scenario more challenging in terms of dataset synthesizing, 
we considered a service that is mostly demanded during a specific time period, such as working 
hours (e.g., 9 am to 5 pm), so we had to take those time preferences into consideration and find 
the corresponding PDFs. According to our assumption for this case study, the majority of users 
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send authentication requests during work hours (9 am to 5 pm) and the number of requests before 
9 am and after 5 am gradually falls. We also supposed that the number of requests between 12 pm 
and 1 pm decreases due to breaks/lunchtime.  
Based on the above-mentioned considerations, we broke the times of the authentication requests 
up into 11 time slots. We also assigned weights in terms of probability values to these time slots. 
These weights reflect the likelihood that authentication slots will be made during each of these 
time slots. The logic behind these values is based on the business model of the case study. For 
example, the probability of receiving an authentication request from 9 am to 12 pm or 1 pm to 
5 pm is higher than during the other time slots. We have also checked these values against the 
history of access provided by match funder. 
In order to generate the values for the timing of authentication requests, we applied two PDFs. 
First, multinomial distribution was used to randomly choose the time slot from which a request 
comes. In the process, we used the assigned weights that were discussed earlier. Next, a uniform 
distribution was similarly applied to randomly generate the time of the request within the 
nominated time slot. The multinomial PDF was applied in MATLAB using the mnrnd() function 
and the uniform distribution was also applied using the randi() function in MATLAB. 
We also defined and assigned a UV for each time slot. In doing so, we determined values in 
such a way that authentication requests made during work hours were supposed to be less prone 
to security incidents than any request made outside work hours, and therefore the value of 
uncertainty is lower during work hours. UVs for requests outside work hours increased gradually. 
We also assumed the lowest values of uncertainty for all authentication requests during work hours 
because of the potential threat of insiders. Finally, UVs for the generated request times were 
assigned based on the records in Table 4.2. 
For different authentication scenarios, time slots, weights (probability of the time slots) and 
UVs may differ. Our methodology is assumption independent so the prediction models that will 
be discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 can learn the differences between and predict the classes 
of the authentication requests for different times, locations and credential patterns.  
 
 
72 
 
 
Table 4.2: Defined time slots and associated probabilities and UVs 
Time Slot Weight (Probability) Uncertainty Value 
[1–5) 0.005 0.80 
[5–7) 0.006 0.75 
[7–8) 0.01 0.60 
[8–9) 0.04 0.50 
[9–12) 0.35 0.10 
[12–13) 0.10 0.20 
[13–17) 0.40 0.10 
[17–18) 0.06 0.40 
[18–19) 0.02 0.50 
[19–23) 0.007 0.70 
[23–1) 0.002 0.90 
 
4.3.3 Location 
 
There is increasing need to consider mobility in authentication because the number of security 
and privacy incidents they cause is rapidly increasing [146]. For this reason, our approach 
considers the location the authentication request comes from to make more accurate authentication 
decisions. Therefore, it can handle the uncertainty of mobile users as well as fixed users in 
authentication.  
The mobility of users has been well studied in the literature. Ekman et al. [147] analysed the 
mobility of users and revealed that it follows a Gaussian PDF. Chandrasekaran et al. [148] applied 
a mixture of Gaussian PDFs to model the mobility of users. Keränen et al. [149] discussed how 
the mobility of users follows a Gaussian random walk model. Shin et al. [150] proposed a location-
based access control system. This work used Gaussian distribution to model user mobility. Sistla 
et al. [151] proposed a data model for mobile objects with uncertain location using a Gaussian 
PDF. In accordance with these highly cited works, we chose a Gaussian distribution to generate 
data samples for the location of the authentication requests.  
The location defined for the scenario was in our exemplar (Figure 4.1) which is represented in 
a map of area 2,000 m × 2,000 m. The map was defined by match funder based on its campus 
located in E-Health city. We defined three points of interest (PoIs) inside the area. Figure 4.3 
shows the map and corresponding PoIs. The task was to generate data samples that specify the 
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location of mobile users in a two-dimensional grid (X: longitude, and Y: latitude). In order to 
generate the samples, we applied a mixture of Gaussian PDFs. 
Considering three PoIs makes our case study more challenging. The number of PoIs may vary 
from one case study to another. According to the assumptions, our PDF consisted of three Gaussian 
factors (because of our three PoIs), each of which has a weight, and each PDF belongs to one PoI 
respectively: 
GT=αG1 + βG2 + γG3 (2) 
We expected most of the authentication requests to be sent from or around PoI_1. Data samples 
for the first PoI were generated using G1. Therefore, the magnitude of the α coefficient was chosen 
to reflect this fact. Next, βG2 generated the second-highest number of requests for the users from 
and around PoI_2 so the magnitude of β was chosen in such a way that it is lower than α while 
γG3 should generate the smallest number of authentication requests associated with the location, 
and the magnitude of γ was determined as the lowest value to generate the least amount of location 
data samples which be sent from or around the PoI_3, so that  
α > β > γ (3) 
We generated our data samples for both mobile and fixed users along with the map presented 
in Figure 4.3 using a mixture of Gaussian PDFs.  
Gaussian PDF is as follows: 
 (4) 
where µ is the mean of the distribution and σ is the standard deviation (σ2 is the variance). In 
order to generate data samples, we needed to determine the values of µ and σ based on the 
following considerations: 
• The values of µ for each factor of the mixture of Gaussian PDFs (Formula 2) are 
determined based on the location of the PoI in the map. We assumed that all PoIs are 
located in the centre of their cells, and the size of each cell is 400 m × 400 m. For 
example, the values of µ for the first PoI are µx=200 and µy=200.  
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• As discussed earlier, one of the contributions of this work is to track the effect of 
mobility on the performance of the prediction models. In doing so, we need to synthesize 
different datasets in terms of mobility to investigate our hypothesis. Thus, we generated 
data samples for three datasets by changing the value of sigma (σ) in Gaussian PDFs in 
such a way that the bell-shaped curve of each Gaussian PDF becomes gradually flatter 
and wider. As it moves towards a flat bell-shaped curve, the degree of mobility 
increases. 
• These values were used to generate random values in both dimensions X and Y. We call 
these datasets low-mobility, medium-mobility and high-mobility datasets.  
Table 4.3 shows the values for three Gaussian PDFs that reflect the above-mentioned 
considerations.  
Table 4.3: Parameters for three Gaussian PDFs based on three degrees of mobility 
 
After we generated data samples in terms of location, UVs related to these samples needed to 
be assigned. Therefore, we defined five different uncertainty areas (UAs) for each PoI. Each UA 
covers an area around the PoI and indicates our uncertainty about the authentication requests that 
come from that area. In order to define UAs for each PoI, five circles were drawn with the PoI 
point as the centre and with (2n+1) × r as the radius (n=0,1,2,3… and r=200m). The number of 
circles and the length of the radius could have varied from one case study to another. Figure 4.4 
(a, b and c) shows UAs for three PoIs.  
According to our mixture of Gaussian PDFs, UVs must be calculated using the following 
formula: 
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UV(X)=α × (UV assigned by PoI_1 to X) + β × (UV assigned by PoI_2 to X) + γ × (UV assigned 
by PoI_3 to X) (5) 
The value allocated by each given PoI in the formula is determined by the UA on which the 
point rests. As can be seen, the formula has three factors based on our mixture of Gaussian PDFs.  
 
a. UAs defined for PoI_1 
 
b. UAs defined for PoI_2 
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c. UAs defined for PoI_3 
Figure 4. 4: UAs and associated UVs defined for three PoIs 
 
α, β and γ in Formula 5 were discussed earlier. The UVs that are assigned to the UAs are shown 
in Figure 4.5. According to our threat model discussed in Subsection 4.2, distances that are closer 
to the PoI have lower UVs so circles that are closer to each PoI has lower UVs.  
 
Figure 4. 5: UVs assigned to UAs (indicated by colour) 
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As an example, assume that one of our data samples, X, is located in a spot on the map shown 
in Figure 4.6. Using Formula 5 and the values listed in Figure 4.5, the UV for this sample is 
calculated as follows (α=0.65, β=0.20 and γ=0.15): 
• UV assigned by PoI_1 to X=0.5, according to Figure 4.4.a X falls in Yellow UA of 
PoI_1 
• UV assigned by PoI_2 to X=0.4, according to Figure 4.4.b X falls in Dusty Beige UA 
of PoI_2 
• UV assigned by PoI_3 to X=0.4, according to Figure 4.4.c X falls in Dusty Beige UA 
of PoI_3 
 
Therefore, UV(X)=(0.65 × 0.5) + (0.2 × 0.4) + (0.15 × 0.4)=0.465 
 
Figure 4. 6: An example of calculating a UV for a data sample (X) 
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4.3.4 Credentials 
 
The most common forms of credential are username and password. We considered this 
information as the credentials in this research. To generate data samples and the associated UVs, 
the corresponding PDFs needed to be identified.  
In all authentication processes using usernames and passwords, three possibilities may occur: 
i) both username and password provided by the user are correct, ii) only the username is correct, 
and iii) both username and password are incorrect. Data samples for these three possible states can 
be generated using a multinomial PDF. Therefore, the outcome of the multinomial distribution 
consists of three states. In order to initialize the parameters of the multinomial distribution we 
needed to determine the weights for the above-mentioned states. Generally, most users enter their 
usernames and passwords correctly. If not, they usually enter their usernames correctly but enter 
their passwords incorrectly. This was considered when assigning probability values (as weights) 
and associated UVs. We assigned the lowest UV to those users who correctly entered their 
usernames and passwords, because of the threat of insiders. In cases of the wrong password being 
entered, the assigned UV is less than in cases in which users enter both username and password 
incorrectly. Handling authentication using the uncertainty-aware approach helps to develop 
resilient authentication methods. Table 4.4 lists the weights and UVs for three states.  
 
Table 4.4: Assigned uncertainty values for three states of credentials 
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4.3.5 Authentication Decision  
 
After generating the UVs for each attribute in the matrix shown in Figure 4.1, the final UV was 
calculated for each request in order to make an authentication decision. The final value for each 
authentication request was calculated by averaging the UVs of time, location and credentials. 
Generally, credentials are the most important authentication attribute, in comparison with time and 
location. Therefore, we added weights to the generated UVs to show the priority and importance 
of the attributes. According to the adversary model discussed in Subsection 4.2, credential loss or 
sharing credential with ineligible users put security of data in danger. As a result, credential related 
threats have severe consequences in comparison to time and location related adversaries. For this 
reason, we assign the highest value as “weight” to credential.  Furthermore, based on the threat 
model, requesting access from a location far from designated PoIs, is more dangerous than 
requesting access out of work hours. Therefore, we assign second highest value as “weight” to 
location. The assigned weights are as follows: time=2, location=3 and credentials=5. The 
magnitude of these weights may vary based on the research priorities.  
Then, we calculated the weighted arithmetic mean by averaging weighted UVs per 
authentication request. Finally, to label the dataset we used the final UV for each request as the 
probability for binomial distribution to determine the class of the result: {0: Deny and 1: Access}. 
Figure 4.7 depicts the reconstructed version of the matrix shown in Figure 4.1. As can be seen, 
“authentication decision” was added to label the dataset.  
 
Figure 4. 7: Labelled uncertainty matrix 
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4.4 Los Alamos National Lab (LANL) 
 
When a real data is sensitive (e.g. authentication data), synthetic data can be generated to 
replace real data. A synthesized dataset is generated by considering these properties: 
• The number of attributes and the size of the dataset should be arbitrary. 
• It should be random, and it should be generated using a wide variety of statistical 
distribution to base this data upon.  
• To be used by classification algorithms, the degree of class separation should be 
adjustable to make the learning problem easy or hard 
• Random noise should be interjected in a controlled manner 
 
Synthesized dataset considering aforementioned properties may even suffer from a number of 
limitations like bias and generalization issues. In order to validate our synthesized dataset, to 
determine whether it behaves like a real dataset in action, we choose LANL [152] as our 
benchmark. LANL provided a public dataset consisting of user-computer authentication 
associations in time. The dataset contains authentication events on a separate line in the form of 
“time, user, computer”, delimited by commas. The number of users in the dataset is 11,362 and 
the number of resources is 22,284. The number of authentication events captured by the dataset is 
708,304,516 for nine months.  
We analysed the distribution of users in this dataset. Figure 4.8 shows the results of our analysis 
in the form of a diagram. As shown, the involvement of users in authentication events follows 
power law distribution.  
This finding helps to confirm the correctness of our methodology to synthesize data samples 
for “users” in our dataset.  We also analysed “time” attribute of LANL authentication dataset for 
two random months (June and September). The results indicated that “time” attribute follows 
Gaussian distribution. This finding confirms our methodology for generating data samples for time 
of the requests.  
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Figure 4. 8: Distribution of authentication requests in LANL 
 
4.5 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter presented the exemplar (RASA) as our case study in this dissertation. We also 
determined adversary model for the exemplar. We described how the dataset is generated 
according to specifications of our exemplar. We discussed the process of synthesizing data samples 
for all of our attributes in the dataset.  We also analysed a public authentication dataset (LANL) to 
make sure that our methodology in generating data samples for the attributes is correct.  
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5. Uncertainty-Aware Prediction Model for Authentication 
 
This chapter presents the process of building prediction models for authentication. As described 
in Chapter 3, machine-learning algorithms were used to build our data-driven models. In this 
chapter, we explain all the classification algorithms applied in this work. Before introducing these 
algorithms, it is necessary to review the preliminary concepts and evaluation criteria that are used 
in our methodology.  
 
5.1 Preliminary Concepts 
 
Machine learning is a part of artificial intelligence (AI) paradigms that greatly overlaps with 
statistics. Samuel  [153] defined machine learning as a “field of study that gives computers the 
ability to learn without being explicitly programmed” in 1959. A more precise definition for 
machine learning was provided by Mitchell. He described machine learning as a program that 
enables computers to program themselves by learning from past experiences [154]. He addressed 
three main aspects of machine learning – learning, past experiences and performance – in his 
definition [155]: “A computer program is said to learn from experience E with respect to some 
task T and some performance measure P, if its performance on T, as measured by P, improves with 
experience E”.  
There are four types of machine-learning approaches [156]: supervised, unsupervised, semi-
supervised and reinforcement learning.  
In supervised learning methods, a machine-learning algorithm is applied to a labelled dataset to 
analyse data. In the process, a model is trained on that dataset, and afterwards the model is able to 
predict the class of the new data samples. Supervised learning methods can be divided into 
classification and regression algorithms. Classification algorithms are decision tree, random forest, 
k-nearest neighbours (K-NN), Naïve Bayes, neural networks, voting classifier and boosting 
classifiers. Regression algorithms are support vector machine and logistic regression. These 
classifiers are commonly used in intrusion detection systems (IDS), malware detection and 
intrusion prevention systems (IPS) [157], [158], [159].  
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From a learning perspective, unsupervised learning methods are not trained with labelled 
datasets. They partition data into a finite set of groups in which data samples have the highest inner 
similarity and outer dissimilarity. In these methods, partitioning is conducted without any prior 
knowledge. Clustering algorithms (e.g., k-means), association rules and outlier detection (e.g., 
behavior-based approach) methods are known as unsupervised learning paradigms. Unsupervised 
learning algorithms, as well as supervised algorithms, are applied in the field of cybersecurity to 
detect anomalies [160]. Unsupervised algorithms have advantages over supervised ones [161]:  
• These methods have better performance in detecting unknown anomalies.  
• These algorithms are less time-consuming and resource-intensive because they do not 
require labelling dataset that will be used for training. 
One of the main drawbacks of using unsupervised algorithms in cybersecurity applications is 
their high FP rate.  
Semi-supervised learning algorithms may be trained by a dataset that includes both labelled and 
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labelling is time-consuming and/or extracting relevant attributes from the dataset is difficult [162]. 
Graph-based algorithms and low-density separation are examples of semi-supervised techniques. 
Semi-supervised algorithms are applied in the field of cybersecurity to build IDS [163], [164].  
Reinforcement learning has different mechanism in comparison with the mentioned 
approaches. The basic idea behind reinforcement learning is learning from the interaction. 
Reinforcement learning consists of three elements [165]:  
• A policy that defines the behavior of the learning agent (learner) at a given time.  
• A reward signal that defines the goal of the learning problem. At any given time in the 
process of learning, a single number is given to the learner as a reward for its action.  
• Value functions that determine the total number of rewards a learner can expect to 
accumulate. Therefore, values specify the prediction of the rewards.  
In this type of learning, the learner is not told which action to take but must instead find out 
which action may lead to the greatest reward. Therefore, unlike in supervised and unsupervised 
learning methods, the focus in reinforcement learning is on maximizing the reward signal.  
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Q-learning, state–action–reward–state–action and deep Q networks are among the 
reinforcement learning algorithms. Cyber-attack detection in “smart grids” is the widest 
application of such algorithms [166], [167], [168]. 
As depicted in Figure 5.1, the process of building a data-driven prediction model consists of 
four phases: preprocessing, learning, validation and prediction. 
 
Figure 5. 1: The process of building a prediction model using supervised algorithms 
 
In the preprocessing phase, data should be ready in the form and the shape necessary for the 
optimal performance of the learning process. Feature extraction, scaling, feature selection, 
dimensionality reduction and sampling are among the activities of this phase. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, our synthesized dataset is generated with all these considerations in mind. The dataset 
also needs to be labelled if the problem is a type of classification. One of the important tasks of 
this phase is to randomly divide the labelled dataset into a training dataset and a test dataset. The 
training dataset is used to train and optimize the machine-learning model in the learning phase and 
the test dataset is used to evaluate the trained model in the evaluation phase. 
After the preparation a proper dataset is prepared, different machine-learning algorithms (e.g., 
classifiers) are applied to the training dataset to build a model. It is necessary to apply different 
algorithms in the learning phase in order to select the best-performing model. Two problems that 
may occur in the learning phase: overfitting and underfitting. Overfitting occurs when a model 
performs well on the training dataset but cannot generalize well to the testing dataset. On the other 
hand, underfitting deals with the situation in which a model cannot capture the pattern in the 
training dataset and therefore is incapable of predicting well on the testing dataset. These problems 
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degrade the performance of the final prediction model. In order to limit these challenges, cross-
validation can be used. The goal of cross-validation is to define a dataset to test the model in the 
training phase in order to limit problems such as overfitting and underfitting and get an insight into 
how the model will generalize to an independent dataset.  
After the fitted model in the learning phase is chosen, the model should be evaluated using the 
testing dataset to estimate the performance of the model in dealing with unseen data. The 
evaluation phase gives an estimation of the generalization error. Afterwards, the evaluated model 
is called the prediction model and is ready to accept a new dataset to predict the label.  
A number of primary measures exist that can be used for comparing the models created in the 
learning phase, including accuracy, precision, recall and F1. Before introducing these criteria, a 
set of measures should be introduced: 
• true positive (TP): A positive sample that is correctly classified by the model 
• false negative (FN): A positive sample that is misclassified by the model 
• false positive (FP): A negative sample that is misclassified by the model  
• true negative (TN): A negative sample that is correctly classified by the model 
 
Based on the above metrics, the following measures can be calculated: 
• accuracy: (TP+TN)/(TP+TN+FP+FN) 
• precision: TP/(TP+FP) 
• recall or true positive rate: TP/(TP+FN) 
• F1: (2*TP)/(2*TP+FN+FP) – it calculates the harmonic mean of the precision and recall  
• True Negative Rate (TNR): TN/(TN+FN)  
• False Negative Rate (FNR): FN/(TP+FN) 
• False Positive Rate (FPR): FP/(FP+TN) 
 
According to the metrics discussed, two other measures can be defined: confusion matrices 
and Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC). 
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As shown in Figure 5.2, a confusion matrix demonstrates the performance of the model by 
showing the relationship between the actual labels and the predicted ones.  
 
  
Figure 5. 2: The structure of a confusion matrix 
ROC visualizes the TPR against the FPR to depict relative trade-offs between TP (known as 
benefits) and FP (known as costs) [169]. In a ROC diagram, the diagonal line (y=x) shows the 
border of random guesses of the class label. Any classifier curve that appears in the lower-right 
triangle has lower performance than the random guesses. The curves that appear in the upper-left 
triangle have better performance in terms of accuracy. The size of the area under the curve (AUC) 
in the ROC diagram matters. The bigger it is, the better the performance.  
In cybersecurity literature, the above metrics are used to give insight into the performance of 
the prediction models. The most commonly used metrics in assessment are accuracy, precision, 
recall and F1. 
Access control in general and authentication in particular are classification problems. It is 
usually defined as a problem with (discrete) binary outputs (Access/Deny). For this reason, 
mentioned classification and regression algorithms are the choices for building prediction models 
in the field of authentication. As we demonstrate in the rest of this chapter, we applied all 
classification algorithms in order to build our prediction model. This gave us the opportunity to 
compare them and choose the most efficient and accurate algorithm with which to build our 
prediction model. 
 
 
 
5.2 Prediction Models 
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We applied 10 classification algorithms to our training dataset and measured the performance 
of the prediction models using the metrics discussed. All classifiers were applied to three datasets 
(low-mobility, medium-mobility and high mobility) to track the changes in their performance. In 
order to validate the data model, a cross-validation process was used by each of the applied 
classifiers. As discussed earlier, cross-validation is a widely used method of evaluating the 
generalizability of proposed models [170]. In this way, 10% of the dataset was assigned to the test 
split (10-fold cross-validation). In order to increase the chance of finding the best-fit model and to 
improve the generalizability of the generated model, we also used the shuffling feature when 
dividing the dataset into the training and testing parts.  
 
5.2.1 Decision Tree 
 
A decision tree is a classification method that makes a set of hierarchical decisions on the 
feature values formed in a tree-like structure. Any decision splits the tree based on a criterion in 
such a way that the training data are divided into two or more branches. The goal is to find the best 
split criterion by which the number of class variables in each branch of the tree is reduced as much 
as possible [171]. There are three classical algorithms for decision trees, including ID3, C4.5 and 
CART (classification and regression trees). These algorithms use two splitting criteria called as 
“Entropy” and “Gini”. Of these three classical algorithms, we applied the CART algorithm to build 
our data model. CART has advantages over the other algorithms in terms of reducing overfitting 
and the ability to handle incomplete data [172]. It also builds models for regression as well as 
classification. CART uses the Gini criterion for splitting. An optimized version of CART that has 
been implemented by the scikit-learn library is used in this work. Table 5.1 shows the performance 
of the models created using the decision tree algorithm (CART).  
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According to the results, and as expected, the accuracy goes down from 77.56% to 55.87% as 
the mobility changes from low to medium. The accuracy of the prediction model in the high-
mobility environment is slightly lower than that in the medium-mobility environment. The highest 
precision is obtained by the model developed using the low-mobility dataset, with a value of 88%. 
Moreover, ROC curve analysis confirms this finding in a visual manner. Figure 5.3 shows the 
micro-average ROC curves of the “Access” class for these three models. As shown in Figure 5.3, 
the maximum AUC belongs to the prediction model that was built using the low-mobility dataset 
(AUC=0.63). The second-highest value of the AUC is for the prediction model trained by the 
medium-mobility training dataset. 
Table 5.1: Performance of the prediction model trained by three datasets (decision tree) 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 
a. Low mobility  
 
 Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 77.56% (1.85%) 
0 0.35 0 0.39 0 0.37 
1 0.88 1 0.86 1 0.87 
Medium Mobility 55.87% (2.39%) 
0 0.72 0 0.66 0 0.69 
1 0.40 1 0.47 1 0.43 
High Mobility 54.29% (2.06%) 
0 0.67 0 0.67 0 0.67 
1 0.44 1 0.44 1 0.44 
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b. Medium mobility 
 
c. High mobility 
Figure 5. 3: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the decision-tree-based models 
 
5.2.2 Random Forest 
 
A random forest is a classifier that has gained popularity because of its performance and 
scalability characteristics [173]. Random forests use a number of decision trees to build a more 
robust data model that is less susceptible to overfitting. In this work we used a random forest 
classifier from the scikit-learn library to train and build our data model. The depth of the classifier 
was changed during the experiments in order to improve the accuracy of the model and find the 
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best-fit model. According to the results, accuracy stopped improving for depth values of more than 
2.  
 Table 5.2 shows that the best performance was achieved by the random forest algorithm using 
our three datasets.  
Table 5.2: Performance of the prediction model trained by the low-mobility dataset (random forest) 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
As expected, the performance of the random forest algorithm is better than that of the decision 
tree algorithm for all of our three datasets. The best accuracy was achieved in the low-mobility 
environment (82.20%). Precision, recall and F1 for the “Access” class could not be determined 
because of the noise effect. For this reason, we applied ROC analysis to gain insight into the 
performance of our models in situations in which noise affects the measurement. As with our 
models created by the decision tree, the accuracy of the models created by the random forest 
classifier dropped from 82.20% in the low-mobility environment to 64.43% in the medium-
mobility environment. 
Figure 5.4 shows the micro-average ROC curves for the “Access” class related to the three 
models created by our datasets.  
 
Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 82.20% (1.07%) 
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.37 
1 0.84 1 0.10 1 0.91 
Medium Mobility 64.43% (2.63%) 
0 0.67 0 1.00 0 0.81 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
High Mobility 61.69% (2.24%) 
0 0.63 0 1.00 0 0.77 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
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a. Low mobility 
 
b. Medium mobility 
 
c. High mobility 
Figure 5. 4: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the random-forest-based models 
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As shown in the above figure, the AUC decreased from 0.88 in the low-mobility environment 
to 0.72 in the high-mobility environment. This confirms the trend of decreasing accuracy shown 
in Table 5.2. 
5.2.3 Support Vector Machine (SVM)  
 
The support vector machine (SVM) is one of the most robust and widely used binary 
classification algorithms. The goal of the SVM optimization program is to determine the separating 
hyperplane that maximizes the distance between the closest training samples to it (the support 
vectors) [174]. This reduces the misclassification error while maximizing the generalization 
capability for test datasets. In addition, when the training set is non-linearly separable, as is the 
case in this study, SVM is combined with the kernel trick to expand the space implicitly and 
facilitate the linear separability for the two classes (i.e., Access and Deny) [174]. We applied the 
support vector classification algorithm from the scikit-learn library in order to build our prediction 
model. 
Table 5.3: Performance of the prediction models trained by three datasets (SVM) 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 
Table 5.3 shows the performance of the models created by the SVM algorithm using our three 
datasets. According to the results, SVM shows the same performance as the random forest 
classifier in the low-mobility environment in terms of accuracy (82.20%) but it shows a slightly 
lower performance than the random forest in the medium-mobility and high-mobility 
environments. Figure 5.5 shows the ROC analysis for the SVM-based models.  
 Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 82.20% (1.07%) 
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
1 0.84 1 0.10 1 0.91 
Medium Mobility 64.27% (2.48%) 
0 0.67 0 0.99 0 0.80 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
High Mobility 60.89% (2.00%) 
0 0.62 0 0.97 0 0.76 
1 0.11 1 0.01 1 0.01 
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a. Low mobility 
 
b. Medium mobility 
 
c. High mobility 
Figure 5. 5: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the SVM-based models 
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As presented by the micro-average ROC curves, the AUC decreased gradually from 0.88 in the 
low-mobility environment to 0.71 in the high-mobility environment. In other words, the ROC 
curves became flatter so the performance of the models decreased. 
 
5.2.4 Logistic Regression 
 
Logistic regression is an analytic method for classification problems. It is able to model 
scenarios with two or more possible discrete outcomes. It uses a probabilistic classifier and maps 
the feature variables to a class-membership probability. The most common form of logistic 
regression builds data-driven models with binary outcomes (i.e., Access/Deny). In this work we 
used a logistic regression classifier with binary outcomes. 
Table 5.4 shows the performance of the prediction models created by the logistic regression 
algorithm for three datasets. The highest performance was achieved in the low-mobility 
environment, with 79.94%. In addition to this, as with the above-mentioned classifiers, the 
accuracy value goes down when the mobility in the environment increases. Figure 5.6 shows the 
ROC analysis of the prediction models developed by the logistic regression algorithm. 
 
Table 5.4: Performance of the prediction models trained by three datasets (logistic regression) 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 79.94% (1.69%) 
0 0.30 0 0.19 0 0.23 
1 0.86 1 0.92 1 0.89 
Medium Mobility 57.81% (2.13%)  
0 0.70 0 0.77 0 0.73 
1 0.39 1 0.30 1 0.34 
High Mobility 55.37% (1.81%) 
0 0.64 0 0.72 0 0.68 
1 0.40 1 0.32 1 0.36 
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a. Low mobility 
 
b. Medium mobility 
 
c. High mobility 
Figure 5. 6: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the logistic-regression-based models 
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The largest AUC is for the model created using the low-mobility dataset (AUC=0.85). The 
AUC values for the models created using the medium- and high-mobility datasets are 0.71 and 
0.68 respectively. 
5.2.5 Naïve Bayes 
 
The Naïve Bayes classifier is the simplest form of a Bayesian network. It is termed “naïve” 
because it assumes that all attributes are conditionally independent. In spite of this controversial 
assumption, which is used to simplify the process of modelling, Naïve Bayes is a fast classifier 
and has great performance in practice for many domains [173]. We applied the Gaussian Naïve 
Bayes classifier implemented in the scikit-learn library. The performance of the models created by 
the Naïve Bayes algorithm using our datasets is shown in Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5: Performance of the prediction models trained by three datasets (Naïve Bayes) 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 
According to the results, the highest accuracy was achieved with the model created using the 
low-mobility dataset (80.42%). The accuracy dropped to 56.31% in the medium-mobility 
environment. Figure 5.7 depicts the ROC curves for the models created by the Naïve Bayes 
algorithm. As shown in the figures, the maximum AUC is for the model trained and created using 
the low-mobility dataset, with AUC=0.85. Furthermore, the micro-average ROC curves for the 
models created using the medium- and high-mobility datasets are flatter than the first curve. Thus, 
these two models have lower TP and higher FP rates than the similar criteria of the first curve. 
 
 Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 80.42% (2.00%) 
0 0.36 0 0.30 0 0.33 
1 0.87 1 0.90 1 0.89 
Medium Mobility 56.31% (2.60%) 
0 0.71 0 0.74 0 0.72 
1 0.41 1 0.37 1 0.39 
High Mobility 53.49% (2.64%) 
0 0.64 0 0.61 0 0.63 
1 0.39 1 0.41 1 0.40 
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a. Low mobility 
 
b. Medium mobility 
 
c. High mobility 
Figure 5. 7: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the models created by the Naïve Bayesian algorithm 
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5.2.6 K-Nearest Neighbours (K-NN) 
 
K-NN is an instance-based learning (IBL) classifier. IBL algorithms assume that similar 
instances have the same class labels. For this reason, these algorithms determine the closest K 
training samples and choose the dominant class label among them as the relevant class [175]. K-
NN classifiers have several advantages [176]. The most important advantage is their simplicity. 
Moreover, these algorithms are noise-tolerant, and they have relatively low update cost. In this 
work, we applied all three IBL algorithms from the scikit-learn library – “Brute Force”, “K-D 
Tree” and “Ball Tree” – in order to build our prediction model with them and compare the results. 
Building our prediction models using these IBL algorithms enabled us to find the best-fit model. 
Table 5.6 shows the performance of the prediction models built using the three datasets.  
Table 5.6: Performance of the prediction models trained by three datasets (K-NN) 
 
Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 77.68% (1.17%) 
0 0.17 0 0.09 0 0.12 
1 0.84 1 0.92 1 0.88 
Medium Mobility 55.87% (2.44%) 
0 0.64 0 0.63 0 0.63 
1 0.27 1 0.28 1 0.27 
High Mobility 53.63% (2.04%) 
0 0.62 0 0.70 0 0.66 
1 0.36 1 0.28 1 0.32 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
According to the results, K-NN shows lower performance in terms of accuracy, precision, recall 
and F1 in comparison with the above-mentioned models. The highest value of accuracy is 77.68%, 
in the low-mobility environment. ROC curve analysis confirms the results (Figure 5.8). As shown 
below, the maximum AUC is achieved in the low-mobility environment with the value of 0.84. 
One of the findings is that the performance of the model built for the high-mobility environment 
is better than the performance of the model trained by the medium-mobility dataset. This can be 
inferred by comparing the values of the AUC in these two environments. 
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a. Low mobility 
 
b. Medium mobility 
 
c. High mobility 
Figure 5. 8: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the models created by K-NN algorithms 
100 
 
5.2.7 Boosting Algorithms 
 
The idea behind the boosting approach is to lower the bias of the classifiers by focusing on the 
misclassification samples. For this reason, each training data sample is assigned a weight and 
different classifiers are trained with these weighted samples. In this method, future models are 
based on the previous ones, so it is assumed that errors from misclassified samples arise from the 
bias of the classifiers. Therefore, as a result of increasing the weights of misclassified samples and 
applying new classifiers, the bias decreases [177]. We applied two popular boosting algorithms: 
AdaBoost and gradient boost classifiers. 
The AdaBoost algorithm is a popular machine-learning algorithm used to build strong 
classifiers by combining weak classifiers (tree-based classifiers). When a vast number of weak 
classifiers are employed, the rate of misclassification is reduced significantly [178]. Gradient boost 
algorithms are another type of boosting method and consist of a set of CART algorithms. Like 
AdaBoost, gradient boost is built incrementally by adding new trees and minimizing the 
misclassification error of the previous model [179].  
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show the performance of the models built using gradient boost and AdaBoost 
classifiers.  
Table 5.7: Performance of the prediction models trained by three datasets (gradient boost) 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 
 
Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 82.20% (1.07%) 
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
1 0.84 1 1.00 1 0.91 
Medium Mobility 64.43% (2.63%) 
0 0.67 0 1.00 0 0.81 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
High Mobility 61.69% (2.24%) 
0 0.63 0 1.00 0 0.77 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
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Table 5.8: Performance of the prediction models trained by three datasets (AdaBoost) 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 
Table 5.7 shows the performance of the model created by the gradient boost algorithm. The 
accuracy of the model trained by the low-mobility dataset is 82.20%. Moreover, the models built 
for medium- and high-mobility environments have shown the best performance in comparison 
with the other algorithms so far. Figure 5.9 demonstrates the ROC curves for models built using 
the gradient boost and AdaBoost algorithms.  
  
a. Gradient boost (left) and AdaBoost (right) – low-mobility dataset 
 
Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 85.50% (1.32%) 
0 0.69 0 0.30 0 0.42 
1 0.88 1 0.97 1 0.92 
Medium Mobility 60.33% (1.64%) 
0 0.69 0 0.79 0 0.74 
1 0.39 1 0.27 1 0.32 
High Mobility 57.15% (2.10%) 
0 0.63 0 0.75 0 0.69 
1 0.39 1 0.26 1 0.31 
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b. Gradient boost (left) and AdaBoost (right) – medium-mobility dataset 
  
c. Gradient boost (left) and AdaBoost (right) – high-mobility dataset 
Figure 5. 9: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the models created by gradient boost and AdaBoost 
As shown in Figure 5.9.a, the maximum AUC is for the AdaBoost model, with a value of 0.90 
in the low-mobility environment, whereas the gradient boost model shows better performance in 
the medium- and high-mobility environments in terms of AUC values. Moreover, in all models, 
AdaBoost was superior in terms of predicting the “Deny” class.  
5.2.8 Voting Classifier 
 
Voting classifiers can be classified into “soft vote” and “hard vote”. In a soft vote algorithm, 
different classifiers are aggregated to predict the class label (Access/Deny) based on the average 
probabilities predicted by each classifier, whereas the voting classifier in hard vote mode predicts 
the class label based on the majority of the labels predicted by each individual classifier [180]. We 
applied both soft and hard vote modes in this work and reported the best-fit model for each dataset. 
Table 5.9 shows the performance of the models built using voting classifiers.  
103 
 
Table 5.9: Performance of the prediction models trained by three datasets (voting classifiers) 
 
Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 84.58% (1.22%) 
0 0.77 0 0.12 0 0.22 
1 0.86 1 0.99 1 0.92 
Medium Mobility 61.07% (2.36%) 
0 0.70 0 0.90 0 0.79 
1 0.48 1 0.20 1 0.28 
High Mobility 57.83% (2.21%) 
0 0.64 0 0.83 0 0.72 
1 0.42 1 0.21 1 0.28 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 
The best accuracy is achieved with the model developed by the low-mobility dataset, with a 
value of 84.58%. In addition, the soft vote algorithm showed better performance than the hard 
vote algorithm in the experiments. The ROC analysis in Figure 5.10 shows that the maximum 
AUC was achieved in the low-mobility environment, with a value of 0.89. 
 
a. Low mobility 
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b. Medium mobility 
 
c. High mobility 
Figure 5. 10: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the models created by voting classifiers 
5.2.9 Neural Networks 
 
5.2.9.1 Perceptron 
 
The simplest form of neural network architecture is called a perceptron. The architecture 
consists of two layers, input and output, and each layer consists of one or more nodes called 
neurons. The number of neurons in the input layer is the same as the number of features. The 
number of neurons in the output layer depends on the number of class labels. Each input node is 
connected to the output node using a weighted connection followed by a non-linear activation 
function (AF), which can be represented for binary output by a sign function [181]. The 
computation of the perceptron follows the following formula: 
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 Zi= Sign(∑(W̅.X̅I + bi)) – (4.1) 
where W̅=(w1,w2…wn) is the set of n input weights and X̅i=(xi1, …,xin) is the feature (input) 
dataset. The training of a neural network is conducted by maximizing the classification accuracy 
by computing the weights. Finally, the weights are held fixed and the accuracy is evaluated by 
testing datasets, usually via cross-validation [182]. Weights optimization during training is 
performed iteratively through multiple epochs using one of the available Afs.  
5.2.9.2 Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) 
 
In contrast to the perceptron, the MLP has one or more layers between input and output layers 
called “hidden layers”. Figure 5.11 shows the architecture of the perceptron and the MLP. 
Determining the number of hidden layers and the number of neurons per layer is performed by 
considering a trade-off between complexity and cross-validated performance, because adding 
more hidden layers may increase the computational cost for building models. 
 
 
Figure 5. 11: (a) Perceptron and (b) MLP architectures 
 
In this work we built our models using four Afs, including 1) sigmoid function, 2) hyperbolic 
tangent function (tanh), 3) rectified linear unit (ReLU), and 4) identity function, and compared the 
cross-validated performance.  
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Tables 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 show the details of the results. As can be seen, the rows in these 
tables show the architecture (perceptron or MLP) and the type of AF for which the best-fit models 
were achieved in the experiments. Moreover, the first column of each of these tables shows the 
configuration of the neural networks in terms of the number of neurons in each layer. Our models 
were trained using a perceptron (no hidden layer), one hidden layer (with 10, 20, 30, 40 neurons), 
two hidden layers (with 10, 20, 30, 40 neurons) and three hidden layers (with 10, 20, 30, 40 
neurons). We have conducted a number of experiments using more neurons and layers but the 
performance of the models did not change. We also built and tested our prediction models using 
10-fold cross-validation for all prediction models. According to these considerations, the 
experiments were conducted 480 times per dataset. The calculation is as follows: 
12 (configuration) * 4 (AF) * 10 (10-fold cross-validation)=480 
Table 5.10: Performance of neural network models trained by the low-mobility dataset 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
Furthermore, the number of epochs is set to 500. This means that the model in each 
configuration was trained by 500 cycles using the whole training dataset to find the optimal 
weights and achieve better performance.  
 Configuration Accuracy Rate Precision Recall F1 
Single Layer 
No Hidden Layer 
(AF=‘identity’) 
3-2 80.08% (1.80%) 
0 0.30 0 0.16 0 0.21 
1 0.85 1 0.93 1 0.89 
One Hidden Layer 
(AF=‘reLU’) 
3-10-2 75.03% (1.35%) 
0 0.21 0 0.25 0 0.23 
1 0.85 1 0.82 1 0.83 
3-20-2 76.30% (1.79%) 
0 0.23 0 0.15 0 0.18 
1 0.85 1 0.90 1 0.87 
3-30-2  77.34% (1.69%) 
0 0.15 0 0.10 0 0.12 
1 0.84 1 0.89 1 0.86 
3-40-2 79.02% (1.40%) 
0 0.18 0 0.09 0 0.12 
1 0.84 1 0.92 1 0.88 
Two Hidden Layers 
(AF=‘tanh’) 
3-6-4-2 71.79% (2.04%) 
0 0.18 0 0.24 0 0.20 
1 0.84 1 0.79 1 0.79 
3-12-8-2 73.93% (2.17%) 
0 0.18 0 0.16 0 0.17 
1 0.84 1 0.86 1 0.85 
3-22-8-2 75.88% (2.21%) 
0 0.13 0 0.12 0 0.13 
1 0.84 1 0.85 1 0.84 
3-30-10-2 76.82% (2.37%) 
0 0.25 0 0.16 0 0.20 
1 0.85 1 0.91 1 0.88 
 
Three Hidden Layers 
(AF=‘tanh’) 
3-5-3-2-2 69.75% (3.98%) 
0 0.18 0 0.23 0 0.20 
1 0.84 1 0.80 1 0.82 
3-10-6-4-2 72.33% (1.95%) 
0 0.21 0 0.28 0 0.24 
1 0.85 1 0.81 1 0.83 
3-15-10-5-2 73.63% (1.67%) 
0 0.13 0 0.11 0 0.12 
1 0.84 1 0.86 1 0.85 
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According to Table 5.10, the best performance was achieved by the perceptron, with 80.08%. 
Furthermore, as more hidden layers are added, the accuracy of the models gradually decreases. 
Moreover, in each MLP architecture (one hidden layer, two hidden layers and three hidden layers), 
adding more neurons gradually increases the accuracy of the models.  
Table 5.11 shows the performance results for the neural network models trained and developed 
using the medium-mobility dataset. The most accurate model was achieved in the absence of any 
hidden layers, with 58.07% accuracy. For the neural network models trained by the high-mobility 
dataset, the best performance was achieved by the perceptron, with 55.77% accuracy.  
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Table 5.11: Performance of neural network models trained by the medium-mobility dataset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 Configuration Accuracy Rate Precision Recall F1 
Single Layer 
No Hidden Layer 
(AF=‘identity’) 
3-2 
58.07% 
(2.29%) 
0 0.70 0 0.78 0 0.74 
1 0.40 1 0.31 1 0.35 
 
One Hidden Layer 
(AF=‘reLU’) 
3-10-2 
54.97% 
(2.53%) 
0 0.71 0 0.70 0 0.71 
1 0.40 1 0.42 1 0.41 
3-20-2 
55.13% 
(1.81%) 
0 0.69 0 0.64 0 0.66 
1 0.35 1 0.41 1 0.38 
3-30-2  
56.35% 
(2.49%) 
0 0.67 0 0.68 0 0.68 
1 0.32 1 0.31 1 0.31 
3-40-2 
56.41% 
(2.16%) 
0 0.71 0 0.74 0 0.72 
1 0.41 1 0.38 1 0.39 
 
Two Hidden Layers 
(AF=‘tanh’) 
3-6-4-2 
54.31% 
(1.69%) 
0 0.69 0 0.61 0 0.65 
1 0.35 1 0.44 1 0.39 
3-12-8-2 
56.23% 
(2.24%) 
0 0.69 0 0.67 0 0.68 
1 0.35 1 0.37 1 0.36 
3-22-8-2 
55.69% 
(2.25%) 
0 0.71 0 0.74 0 0.73 
1 0.42 1 0.39 1 0.41 
3-30-10-2 
56.91% 
(2.24%) 
0 0.70 0 0.76 0 0.73 
1 0.41 1 0.34 1 0.37 
 
 
Three Hidden Layers 
(AF=‘tanh’) 
3-5-3-2-2 
54.29% 
(1.72%) 
0 0.68 0 0.64 0 0.66 
1 0.34 1 0.39 1 0.36 
3-10-6-4-2 
53.73% 
(1.52%) 
0 0.69 0 0.71 0 0.70 
1 0.36 1 0.34 1 0.35 
3-15-10-5-2 
56.95% 
(2.32%) 
0 0.70 0 0.68 0 0.69 
1 0.38 1 0.40 1 0.39 
109 
 
Table 5.12: Performance of neural network models trained by the high-mobility dataset 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 Configuration Accuracy Rate Precision Recall F1 
Single Layer 
No Hidden Layer 
(AF=‘identity’) 
3-2 55.77% (1.61%) 
0 0.64 0 0.73 0 0.68 
1 0.40 1 0.31 1 0.35 
 
One Hidden Layer 
(AF=‘reLU’) 
3-10-2 54.99% (1.87%) 
0 0.65 0 0.64 0 0.65 
1 0.41 1 0.43 1 0.42 
3-20-2 53.37% (2.19%) 
0 0.65 0 0.61 0 0.63 
1 0.40 1 0.44 1 0.42 
3-30-2  54.15% (1.71%) 
0 0.65 0 0.70 0 0.67 
1 0.42 1 0.37 1 0.39 
3-40-2 55.53% (1.81%) 
0 0.65 0 0.64 0 0.65 
1 0.39 1 0.38 1 0.39 
 
Two Hidden Layers 
(AF=‘tanh’) 
3-6-4-2 52.95% (1.12%) 
0 0.61 0 0.58 0 0.60 
1 0.35 1 0.38 1 0.37 
3-12-8-2 53.59% (1.37%) 
0 0.66 0 0.67 0 0.67 
1 0.43 1 0.42 1 0.43 
3-22-8-2 55.53% (2.05%) 
0 0.66 0 0.68 0 0.67 
1 0.42 1 0.39 1 0.41 
3-30-10-2 54.35% (2.10%) 
0 0.64 0 0.62 0 0.63 
1 0.39 1 0.41 1 0.40 
 
 
Three Hidden Layers 
(AF=‘tanh’) 
3-5-3-2-2 52.37% (2.83%) 
0 0.63 0 0.59 0 0.61 
1 0.37 1 0.41 1 0.39 
3-10-6-4-2 52.71% (1.83%) 
0 0.63 0 0.59 0 0.61 
1 0.37 1 0.41 1 0.39 
3-15-10-5-2 53.21% (1.14%) 
0 0.63 0 0.61 0 0.62 
1 0.38 1 0.40 1 0.39 
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5.3 Discussion 
 
As discussed in Subsection 5.2, 10 classification algorithms were applied to three datasets to 
build prediction models for environments with different degrees of user mobility (i.e., low, 
medium and high). Table 5.13 shows the aggregated performance results. It summarizes the 
performance of prediction models for three different datasets labelled as high mobility (H), 
medium mobility (M) and low mobility (L). The results are given for both classes – 0: Deny and 
1: Access. 
Table 5.13: Aggregated performance of the prediction models 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
Models 
Accuracy Rate 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
L M H  L M H  L M H  L M H 
Decision Tree 77.56% 55.87% 54.29% 
0 0.35 0.72 0.67 0 0.39 0.66 0.67 0 0.37 0.69 0.67 
1 0.88 0.40 0.44 1 0.86 0.47 0.44 1 0.87 0.43 0.44 
SVM 82.20% 64.27% 60.89% 
0 0.00 0.67 0.62 0 0.00 0.99 0.97 0 0.00 0.80 0.76 
1 0.84 0.00 0.11 1 1.00 0.00 0.01 1 0.91 0.00 0.01 
Logistic 
Regression 
79.94%  57.81% 55.37%  
0 0.30 0.70 0.64 0 0.19 0.77 0.72 0 0.23 0.73 0.68 
1 0.86 0.39 0.40 1 0.92 0.30 0.32 1 0.89 0.34 0.36 
Naïve Bayes 80.42%  56.31%  53.49%  
0 0.36 0.71 0.64 0 0.30 0.74 0.61 0 0.33 0.72 0.63 
1 0.87 0.41 0.39 1 0.90 0.37 0.41 1 0.89 0.39 0.40 
AdaBoost 85.50%  60.33% 57.15%  
0 0.69 0.69 0.63 0 0.30 0.79 0.75 0 0.42 0.74 0.69 
1 0.88 0.39 0.39 1 0.97 0.27 0.26 1 0.92 0.32 0.31 
Random Forest 82.20%  64.43% 61.69%  
0 0.00 0.67 0.63 0 0.00 1.00 1.00 0 0.00 0.81 0.77 
1 0.84 0.00 0.00 1 0.10 0.00 0.00 1 0.91 0.00 0.00 
K-NN 77.68%  55.87% 53.63%  
0 0.17 0.64 0.62 0 0.09 0.63 0.70 0 0.12 0.63 0.66 
1 0.84 0.27 0.36 1 0.92 0.28 0.28 1 0.88 0.27 0.32 
ANN 80.08%  58.07% 55.51% 
0 0.30 0.70 0.64 0 0.16 0.78 0.73 0 0.21 0.74 0.68 
1 0.85 0.40 0.40 1 0.93 0.31 0.31 1 0.89 0.35 0.35 
Gradient Boost 82.20%  64.43% 61.69%  
0 0.00 0.67 0.63 0 0.00 1.00 1.00 0 0.00 0.81 0.77 
1 0.84 0.00 0.00 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.91 0.00 0.00 
Voting Classifier 84.58%  61.07% 57.83%  
0 0.77 0.70 0.64 0 0.12 0.90 0.83 0 0.22 0.79 0.72 
1 0.86 0.48 0.42 1 0.99 0.20 0.21 1 0.92 0.28 0.28 
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As shown in the above table, for all datasets the boosting classifiers (gradient boost and 
AdaBoost) showed the best performance in predicting the label of the testing data samples. 
Moreover, random forest showed the second-highest value for accuracy in the low-mobility 
environment, whereas it showed the best performance in the medium- and high-mobility 
environments.  
Figures 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14 show the aggregated ROC curve analysis for the “Access” label. 
As shown, AdaBoost has the maximum AUC in the low-mobility environment, with a value of 
0.64. Also in the low-mobility environment, its curve (green) dominates the other curves. 
 
Figure 5.12: ROC analysis for prediction models in the low-mobility environment 
 
 
Figure 5.13: ROC analysis for prediction models in the medium-mobility environment 
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Figure 5. 124: ROC analysis for prediction models in the high-mobility environment 
Figure 5.13 shows the aggregated ROC curves for the prediction models in the medium-
mobility environment. The gradient boost curve dominates the other curves and confirms its 
superiority with a higher TP rate and lower FP rate than the rest of the algorithms. For the high-
mobility environment, as depicted in Figure 5.14, the decision tree dominates the other curves and 
has the maximum AUC (0.55). However, the model created using the decision tree cannot be 
chosen as the best-fit model because a curve dominates in ROC space if and only if its precision 
dominates in precision space [183]. In this case we do not have precise precision values because 
of the associated noise.  
We also applied the Kruskal–Wallis test (Table 5.14) to investigate the effects of the number 
of hidden layers on the accuracy of the model for all datasets. According to the results, the Asymp. 
Sig. (p-value) is less than 0.05, and therefore the null assumption is rejected, and it shows that the 
means for different accuracy groups is not the same. Furthermore, we applied the Spearman test 
(Table 5.15) to analyse the correlation between the number of hidden layers and the accuracy of 
the model. The results indicate that the number of hidden layers has an impact on the accuracy of 
the model (Sig.=0.000 and sig. < 0.05) in each environment.  
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Table 5.14: Kruskal–Wallis test results, grouping variable: no. of hidden layers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.15: Spearman test results: correlation 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
One of the challenges in applying prediction models in the projects is determining the frequency 
of re-training models using new datasets. The main reason for re-training is that the performance 
of the prediction models is degrading over time which is called “model drift”. This happens due to 
the changes in the environment that violates the model’s assumptions. To detect model drift, the 
accuracy of the model needs to be monitored. The frequency of re-training may vary from one case 
study to another. Determining the frequency needs to measure a threshold of divergence of the 
accuracy between the model working online and the model working with training datasets.  
 
 
 
Hidden Layer Accuracy 
 
 
Spearman’s rho 
 
Hidden Layer 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 0.152** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.000 
N 2600 2600 
 
Accuracy 
Correlation Coefficient 0.152** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 . 
N 2600 2600 
Chi Square 258.440 
df 3 
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 
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5.4 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, we presented details of our prediction models developed for handling 
uncertainty. As discussed, ten classification algorithms were applied to create our prediction 
models. Furthermore, three datasets were used for the sake of training/test processes. These 
datasets were synthesized using methodology discussed in Chapter 4 for three degrees of mobility 
(high, medium and low).  
According to the cross-validated results, AdaBoost classifier showed the highest performance 
in terms of accuracy for low mobility environment with accuracy of 85.50%. The highest 
performance in medium mobility environment was reported for Boosting classifiers (both 
Adaboost and Gradient) with accuracy of 64.43%. In high mobility environment, Gradient Boost 
and random forest algorithms showed the highest accuracy (61.69%). 
We also studied the behavior of our models created by neural networks (both perceptron and 
MLP). We applied 12 configurations of neural networks including different number of hidden 
layers (up to 3 hidden layers) different number of neurons (up to 40 neurons) and different types 
of activation functions (4 AFs) to investigate the effects of these variants on the performance of 
the prediction models. The results showed that the number of hidden layers affects on the 
performance of the model.  
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6. Indeterminacy-Aware Prediction Model for Authentication 
 
In this chapter we describe how we built our indeterminacy-aware prediction model on top of 
the prediction models created in Chapter 5. In doing so, we consider the history profile of users in 
terms of past successful authentication, in addition to time, location and credential. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, we used classification algorithms to train and build our models. By 
enriching our datasets with a new data attribute, we expected to build more accurate prediction 
models.  
6.1 Trust-Based Analysis 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a need to propose new approaches to assess “trust” as the 
scalability, complexity, dynamism, heterogeneity, pervasiveness and automation of computer and 
communication systems increases in IoT. In traditional and emerging computer and 
communication systems, a number of approaches have addressed the advantages of considering 
“trust” in the field of access control [184], [185], [186], [113], [187], [188]. With reference to these 
studies, a taxonomy of trust-based analysis was given in Subsection 2.2.2.1. Based on this 
taxonomy, we used soft trust method by conducting behavioural-based analysis to assess the 
degree of trust for authentication requests and try to build our prediction model on top of that. In 
doing so, we kept a record of the access/deny history of each user in all of our datasets. Then, we 
used these data to measure the trust values for the users. Next, the trust values calculated were 
added to the datasets as a new attribute.  
We generated 60 users for each of the datasets. The process of synthesizing these users was 
comprehensively discussed in Chapter 4. Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 show the details of the behaviour 
of these users. The first column of each of these tables indicates the ID of the users. The second 
column shows the total number of authentication requests in the dataset. The third column indicates 
the total number of successful authentication attempts for each user. Finally, the last column shows 
the ratio of successful authentication attempts per users. The total trust score for each dataset can 
be calculated by the following formula: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
Total number of successful authentications
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠
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Table 6.1: History profile of users in the low-mobility dataset 
ID 
Total No. of 
Requests 
Total No. of Successful 
Authentications 
Authentication Rate 
1 352 279 0.792614 
2 314 258 0.821656 
3 298 248 0.832215 
4 228 197 0.864035 
5 229 190 0.829694 
6 173 147 0.849711 
7 180 153 0.85 
8 171 144 0.842105 
9 153 128 0.836601 
10 106 91 0.858491 
11 136 118 0.867647 
12 117 96 0.820513 
13 129 109 0.844961 
14 111 93 0.837838 
15 116 90 0.775862 
16 75 61 0.813333 
17 97 76 0.783505 
18 102 79 0.77451 
19 85 73 0.858824 
20 62 55 0.887097 
21 79 65 0.822785 
22 83 68 0.819277 
23 74 66 0.891892 
24 73 62 0.849315 
25 58 47 0.810345 
26 71 58 0.816901 
27 55 48 0.872727 
28 43 37 0.860465 
29 62 56 0.903226 
30 48 40 0.833333 
31 61 57 0.934426 
32 46 42 0.913043 
33 46 36 0.782609 
34 35 31 0.885714 
35 42 38 0.904762 
36 44 37 0.840909 
37 24 20 0.833333 
38 39 27 0.692308 
39 36 29 0.805556 
40 38 31 0.815789 
41 36 30 0.833333 
42 45 37 0.822222 
43 47 41 0.87234 
44 37 30 0.810811 
45 37 31 0.837838 
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46 38 27 0.710526 
47 32 29 0.90625 
48 45 36 0.8 
49 22 19 0.863636 
50 51 40 0.784314 
51 31 24 0.774194 
52 34 28 0.823529 
53 44 31 0.704545 
54 26 23 0.884615 
55 28 23 0.821429 
56 30 26 0.866667 
57 27 20 0.740741 
58 39 32 0.820513 
59 27 21 0.777778 
60 33 26 0.787879 
 
In the low-mobility dataset, 4,154 out of 5,000 authentication requests were authenticated. 
Thus, the total trust score for this dataset is as follows:  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
4154
5000
 
= 0.8308 
The above ratio can be used as the trust threshold for the low-mobility dataset based on the 
last 5,000 records. This value may change from one dataset to another based on changes in the 
user distribution, user mobility pattern and time of the authentication request.  
Table 6.2 shows details of the history profile of the users in the medium-mobility dataset, in 
which, 1,778 out of 5,000 requests were successfully authenticated. Therefore, the total trust 
score for this dataset is calculated as follows:  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
1778
5000
 
= 0.3556 
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Table 6.2: History profile of users in the medium-mobility dataset 
ID 
Total No. of 
Requests 
Total No. of Successful 
Authentications 
Authentication Rate 
1 408 147 0.360294 
2 324 111 0.342593 
3 271 94 0.346863 
4 250 94 0.376 
5 190 63 0.331579 
6 210 72 0.342857 
7 185 59 0.318919 
8 148 37 0.25 
9 156 60 0.384615 
10 151 50 0.331126 
11 139 48 0.345324 
12 106 39 0.367925 
13 114 41 0.359649 
14 97 39 0.402062 
15 90 33 0.366667 
16 98 32 0.326531 
17 82 31 0.378049 
18 98 38 0.387755 
19 101 40 0.39604 
20 74 26 0.351351 
21 64 22 0.34375 
22 73 25 0.342466 
23 60 18 0.3 
24 63 25 0.396825 
25 62 23 0.370968 
26 69 23 0.333333 
27 60 21 0.35 
28 57 18 0.315789 
29 54 22 0.407407 
30 65 26 0.4 
31 57 32 0.561404 
32 37 15 0.405405 
33 48 16 0.333333 
34 39 14 0.358974 
35 32 9 0.28125 
36 39 13 0.333333 
37 52 13 0.25 
38 53 19 0.358491 
39 41 14 0.341463 
40 41 18 0.439024 
41 44 15 0.340909 
42 36 10 0.277778 
43 34 13 0.382353 
44 33 12 0.363636 
45 29 11 0.37931 
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46 28 12 0.428571 
47 27 9 0.333333 
48 47 15 0.319149 
49 32 10 0.3125 
50 32 10 0.3125 
51 23 9 0.391304 
52 37 13 0.351351 
53 37 16 0.432432 
54 34 14 0.411765 
55 33 15 0.454545 
56 25 10 0.4 
57 29 10 0.344828 
58 30 10 0.333333 
59 24 7 0.291667 
60 28 17 0.607143 
 
Table 6.3 summarizes the history profile of users in the high-mobility dataset. Based on the 
statistics, 1,915 out of 5,000 were authenticated successfully. Thus, the total trust score for this 
dataset is as follows: 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
1915
5000
 
= 0.383 
 
The trust value for each user is determined by comparing its authentication rate with the total 
trust score (threshold). In the other words, if the authentication rate of the user is greater than the 
threshold of the dataset then the trust value for that user is set to 1, otherwise 0. For example, the 
authentication rates for user “25” in the three datasets are 0.810345, 0.370968 and 0.5 and the 
threshold values of these datasets are 0.8308, 0.3556 and 0.383 respectively. Therefore, the trust 
values for user “25” would be 0 (in the low-mobility dataset), 1 (in the medium-mobility dataset) 
and 1 (in the high-mobility dataset).  
According to the above-mentioned, a new column headed “trust” was added to all of our 
datasets. Therefore, the classification algorithms discussed in Chapter 5 will need to be trained in 
order to build new prediction models.  
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Table 6.3: History profile of users in the high-mobility dataset 
ID 
Total No. of 
Requests 
Total No. of Successful 
Authentications 
Authentication Rate 
1 386 139 0.360103627 
2 307 108 0.351791531 
3 292 103 0.352739726 
4 253 107 0.422924901 
5 210 83 0.395238095 
6 180 81 0.45 
7 165 58 0.351515152 
8 158 57 0.360759494 
9 148 56 0.378378378 
10 148 54 0.364864865 
11 125 47 0.376 
12 126 45 0.357142857 
13 120 52 0.433333333 
14 109 39 0.357798165 
15 97 41 0.422680412 
16 85 41 0.482352941 
17 80 28 0.35 
18 84 35 0.416666667 
19 81 27 0.333333333 
20 97 38 0.391752577 
21 73 30 0.410958904 
22 73 30 0.410958904 
23 67 27 0.402985075 
24 70 31 0.442857143 
25 58 24 0.413793103 
26 56 28 0.5 
27 62 22 0.35483871 
28 57 23 0.403508772 
29 57 22 0.385964912 
30 70 32 0.457142857 
31 56 24 0.428571429 
32 46 12 0.260869565 
33 44 18 0.409090909 
34 46 22 0.47826087 
35 53 19 0.358490566 
36 43 18 0.418604651 
37 49 22 0.448979592 
38 58 25 0.431034483 
39 30 8 0.266666667 
40 17 5 0.294117647 
41 57 20 0.350877193 
42 48 17 0.354166667 
43 38 19 0.5 
44 32 11 0.34375 
45 35 13 0.371428571 
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46 50 18 0.36 
47 23 8 0.347826087 
48 46 15 0.326086957 
49 24 12 0.5 
50 41 21 0.512195122 
51 30 7 0.233333333 
52 23 8 0.347826087 
53 21 5 0.238095238 
54 19 6 0.315789474 
55 23 8 0.347826087 
56 32 9 0.28125 
57 26 8 0.307692308 
58 29 12 0.413793103 
59 33 7 0.212121212 
60 34 10 0.294117647 
 
6.2 Indeterminacy-Aware Prediction Models 
 
In this subsection, we describe how we applied the 10 classification algorithms discussed in 
Chapter 5 to our new datasets and measured the performance of the new prediction models. As 
mentioned earlier, the new datasets contained “trust” values in addition to the “time”, “location” 
and “credentials” values. Moreover, a 10-fold cross-validation method was applied to evaluate the 
generalizability of the model.  
 
6.2.1 Decision Tree 
 
Table 6.4 shows the performance of the prediction models trained and built using the decision 
tree (CART algorithm). According to the results, the prediction models trained and built using the 
“trust” attribute perform better in terms of accuracy, precision and recall in comparison with those 
developed by datasets without “trust” values. Moreover, the performance of the prediction models 
is decreased by increasing mobility in the environment. The same trend was seen in uncertainty-
aware prediction models built using the decision tree algorithm. 
Figure 6.1 shows ROC curves for the “Access” class. As shown, the AUC values for the micro-
average curves in all prediction models are greater than the same values for the prediction models 
built by the previous datasets.  
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Table 6.4: Performance of the prediction model trained by the new datasets (decision tree) 
 
Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 78.92% (1.69%) 
0 0.36 0 0.34 0 0.35 
1 0.88 1 0.89 1 0.88 
Medium Mobility 
56.29% (2.62%) 
 
0 0.70 0 0.70 0 0.70 
1 0.38 1 0.38 1 0.38 
High Mobility 55.27% (2.52%) 
0 0.67 0 0.67 0 0.67 
1 0.44 1 0.44 1 0.44 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 
 
                               a. Low mobility                                                                        b. Medium mobility 
 
 
c. High mobility 
Figure 6. 1: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the decision-tree-based models 
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6.2.2 Random Forest 
 
Table 6.5 shows that the best performance was achieved by the random forest algorithm using 
the new datasets. According to the results, the accuracy of the prediction models trained by the 
new dataset is better than the accuracy of the models built by the uncertainty-aware dataset for the 
low-mobility environment. For the medium- and high-mobility datasets, the results are 
approximately the same as the previous models built in Chapter 5. Figure 6.2 depicts the ROC 
curve analysis of prediction models for the “Access” class. The AUC value of the prediction model 
trained by the low-mobility dataset is greater than the AUC of the same model built by the 
uncertainty-aware dataset. For medium- and high-mobility environments, the AUC values of the 
prediction models are the same as the AUC values of the uncertainty-aware prediction models. 
 
Table 6.5: Performance of the prediction model trained by the low-mobility dataset (random forest) 
 
Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 82.58% (1.17%) 
0 1.00 0 0.06 0 0.12 
1 0.85 1 1.00 1 0.92 
Medium Mobility 64.43% (2.63%) 
0 0.67 0 1.00 0 0.81 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
High Mobility 61.67% (2.23%) 
0 0.63 0 1.00 0 0.77 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
 0: Deny, 1: Access 
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a. Low mobility 
 
b. Medium mobility 
 
c. High mobility 
Figure 6. 2: a , b and c: ROC analysis for the random-forest-based models 
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6.2.3 Support Vector Machine (SVM)  
 
 Table 6.6 shows the performance of the models trained by the SVM algorithm using our new 
datasets. According to the results, in the low-mobility environment, SVM-based models show the 
same performance as the prediction models developed in Chapter 5. For medium- and high-
mobility environments, the models perform better in terms of accuracy, precision and recall. Figure 
6.3 shows the ROC analysis for the SVM-based models.  
Table 6.6: Performance of the prediction models trained by three datasets (SVM) 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
As can be seen in Figure 6.3, the AUC values for micro-average curves in the low-, medium- 
and high-mobility environments are slightly higher than the values measured in Chapter 5. 
 
a. Low mobility 
 
Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 82.20% (1.07%) 
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
1 0.84 1 1.00 1 0.91 
Medium Mobility 64.43% (2.63%) 
0 0.67 0 1.00 0 0.81 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
High Mobility 61.71% (2.20%) 
0 0.63 0 1.00 0 0.77 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
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b. Medium mobility 
 
c. High mobility 
Figure 6. 3: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the SVM-based models 
 
 
6.2.4 Logistic Regression 
 
According to the data, logistic regression showed dramatically better results with the new 
datasets. Table 6.7 shows the results achieved. For the low-mobility dataset, the accuracy of the 
new model is 86.90%, whereas the accuracy of the past logistic regression model was 79.94%. For 
medium- and high-mobility environments, the accuracy of the models increased by 6.62% and 
6.34% respectively.  
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Table 6.7: Performance of the prediction models trained by three datasets (logistic regression) 
 
Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 86.90% (0.99%) 
0 1.00 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.94 
Medium Mobility 64.43% (2.63%) 
0 0.67 0 1.00 0 0.81 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
High Mobility 61.71% (2.20%) 
0 0.63 0 1.00 0 0.77 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 
 
Figure 6.4 shows the ROC analysis of the prediction models developed by the logistic 
regression algorithm. As expected, the AUC values for the following models are greater than the 
values achieved by the datasets that were used in Chapter 5.  
 
 
a. Low mobility 
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b. Medium mobility 
 
c. High mobility 
Figure 6. 4: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the logistic-regression-based models 
 
6.2.5 Naïve Bayes 
 
As shown in Table 6.8, models developed by Naïve Bayes showed better accuracy in the 
medium- and high-mobility environments than the models trained by uncertainty-aware datasets. 
For the low-mobility environment, the accuracy of the new model is slightly lower than the 
accuracy of the past model, by 0.54%. The results are confirmed through ROC curve analysis for 
low- and high-mobility environments. Figure 6.5 demonstrates the ROC curves for these models. 
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Table 6.8: Performance of the prediction models trained by three datasets (Naïve Bayes) 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 
a. Low mobility 
 
b. Medium mobility 
 Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 79.40% (2.03%) 
0 0.38 0 0.33 0 0.35 
1 0.87 1 0.90 1 0.89 
Medium Mobility 59.13% (3.36%) 
0 0.67 0 0.79 0 0.73 
1 0.31 1 0.19 1 0.23 
High Mobility 58.09% (1.54%) 
0 0.66 0 0.70 0 0.68 
1 0.43 1 0.38 1 0.40 
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c. High mobility 
Figure 6. 5: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the models created by the Naïve Bayesian algorithm 
 
6.2.6 K-Nearest Neighbours (K-NN) 
 
As summarized in Table 6.9, prediction models developed by the K-NN algorithm perform 
better for all datasets than the K-NN models trained by uncertainty-aware datasets. Accuracy of 
the new models increases by at least 2%. Moreover, the precision of these models is better than 
the precision of the past K-NN models, reported in Chapter 5. 
Table 6.9: Performance of the prediction models trained by the three datasets (K-NN) 
 
Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 79.12% (2.10%) 
0 0.32 0 0.15 0 0.21 
1 0.85 1 0.94 1 0.89 
Medium Mobility 57.29% (2.02%) 
0 0.66 0 0.67 0 0.66 
1 0.28 1 0.27 1 0.28 
High Mobility 55.95% (1.90%) 
0 0.63 0 0.65 0 0.64 
1 0.37 1 0.34 1 0.36 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
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ROC curves for developed models are shown in Figure 6.6. According to the AUC values of 
micro-average ROC curves, the AUC for all models remained unchanged in comparison with the 
models presented in Chapter 5.  
 
a. Low mobility 
 
b. Medium mobility 
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c. High mobility 
Figure 6. 6: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the models created by the K-NN algorithms 
6.2.7 Boosting Algorithms 
 
We applied AdaBoost and gradient boost to our new datasets. Tables 6.10 and 6.11 show in 
detail the performance of the developed prediction models for these two classifiers.  
Table 6.10: Performance of the prediction models trained by the three datasets (gradient boost) 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 
Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 86.90% (1.06%) 
0 1.00 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.94 
Medium Mobility 64.39% (2.61%) 
0 0.67 0 1.00 0 0.81 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
High Mobility 61.59% (2.28%) 
0 0.63 0 1.00 0 0.77 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
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Table 6.11: Performance of the prediction models trained by the three datasets (AdaBoost) 
 
Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 86.76% (1.11%) 
0 0.96 0 0.29 0 0.44 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.94 
Medium Mobility 63.73% (2.23%) 
0 0.67 0 0.97 0 0.79 
1 0.17 1 0.01 1 0.02 
High Mobility 60.59% (2.24%) 
0 0.64 0 0.93 0 0.76 
1 0.46 1 0.10 1 0.17 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 
According to the prediction models developed by the gradient boost algorithm, the model 
trained by the new low-mobility dataset showed better performance than past models. Moreover, 
newly developed prediction models built by the AdaBoost algorithm showed better performance 
in all environments than past models. In contrast to the relevant models developed in Chapter 5, 
the new gradient boost models outperform the new AdaBoost models in terms of accuracy, 
precision, recall and F1. Figure 6.7 shows corresponding ROC curves for these two classifiers. 
  
a. Gradient boost (left) and AdaBoost (right) – low mobility  
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b. Gradient boost (left) and AdaBoost (right) – medium mobility  
  
c. Gradient boost (left) and AdaBoost (right) – high mobility  
Figure 6. 7: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the models created by gradient boost and AdaBoost 
Comparing the AUC values in Figure 6.7 with those in Figure 5.9 reveals that the AdaBoost 
classifier performs better with the new datasets than with the past datasets. For the new boosting 
models, gradient boost classifiers perform slightly better than the AdaBoost classifier in terms of 
AUC. 
6.2.8 Voting Classifier 
 
Similar to the models developed in Chapter 5, the soft mode voting algorithms showed better 
performance than the hard mode ones in building prediction models for new experiments. Table 
6.12 shows the performance of the models.  
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Table 6.12: Performance of the prediction models trained by the three datasets (voting classifier) 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
Among the new models, the one developed by the low-mobility dataset performs better than 
the same model in Chapter 5. The accuracy of this model increases by 2.34%. The ROC analysis 
shown in Figure 6.8 shows that the maximum AUC is achieved in the low-mobility environment, 
with a value of 0.91. 
 
a. Low mobility 
 
Accuracy 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
Low Mobility 86.90% (1.04%) 
0 1.00 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.94 
Medium Mobility 59.83% (2.76%) 
0 0.67 0 0.82 0 0.74 
1 0.33 1 0.18 1 0.23 
High Mobility 57.57% (2.25%) 
0 0.66 0 0.76 0 0.71 
1 0.46 1 0.33 1 0.39 
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b. Medium mobility 
 
 
 
c. High mobility 
Figure 6. 8: a, b and c: ROC analysis for the models created by voting classifier 
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6.2.9 Neural Networks 
 
We built our new models using all the built-in Afs implemented in the scikit-learn library, 
including 1) sigmoid function, 2) hyperbolic tangent function (tanh), 3) rectified linear unit 
(ReLU), and 4) identity function, and compared the cross-validated performance. Tables 6.13, 6.14 
and 6.15 summarise the results.  
As can be seen, the rows in these tables show the architecture (perceptron or MLP) and the type 
of AF for which the best-fit models were achieved in the experiments. Moreover, the first column 
of each of these tables shows the configuration of the neural networks in terms of the number of 
neurons in each layer. Our models were trained using a perceptron (no hidden layer), one hidden 
layer (with 10, 20, 30, 40 neurons), two hidden layers (with 10, 20, 30, 40 neurons) and three 
hidden layers (with 10, 20, 30, 40 neurons). We also built and tested our prediction models using 
10-fold cross-validation for all prediction models. According to these considerations, the 
experiments were conducted 480 times per dataset. The calculation is as follows: 
 
12 (configuration) * 4 (AF) * 10 (10-fold cross-validation)=480 
 
Furthermore, the number of epochs is set to 500. This means that the model in each 
configuration was trained by 500 cycles using the whole training dataset to find the optimal 
weights and achieve better performance.  
According to Table 6.13, the best performance is achieved by the MLP (consisting of one 
hidden layer and 20 neurons) with 86.92% accuracy. Thus, adding more hidden layers does not 
result in higher accuracy of the models. Overall, all new models have higher accuracy than the 
models developed in Chapter 5.  
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Table 6.13: Performance of the new neural network models trained by the low-mobility dataset 
 Configuration 
Accuracy 
Rate 
Precision Recall F1 
Single Layer 
No Hidden Layer 
(AF=‘identity’) 
4-2 
85.40% 
(1.25%) 
0 1.00 0 0.21 0 0.35 
1 0.87 1 1.00 1 0.93 
 
One Hidden Layer 
(AF=‘reLU’) 
4-10-2 
86.60% 
(1.02%) 
0 1.00 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.94 
4-20-2 
86.92% 
(1.03%) 
0 1.00 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.94 
4-30-2  
86.92% 
(1.03%) 
0 1.00 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.94 
4-40-2 
86.90% 
(1.04%) 
0 1.00 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.94 
 
Two Hidden Layers 
(AF=‘tanh’) 
4-6-4-2 
86.92% 
(1.03%) 
0 1.00 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.94 
4-12-8-2 
86.92% 
(1.03%) 
0 1.00 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.94 
4-22-8-2 
86.88% 
(1.04%) 
0 0.96 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.93 
4-30-10-2 
86.86% 
(1.04%) 
0 0.96 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.93 
 
 
Three Hidden Layers 
(AF=‘tanh’) 
4-5-3-2-2 
86.90% 
(1.03%) 
0 1.00 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.94 
4-10-6-4-2 
86.92% 
(1.03%) 
0 1.00 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.94 
4-15-10-5-2 
86.82% 
(1.00%) 
0 0.96 0 0.28 0 0.43 
1 0.88 1 1.00 1 0.93 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
Table 6.14 shows the performance results for the neural network models trained and developed 
using the new medium-mobility dataset. The most accurate model is achieved in the MLP 
architecture (consisting of two hidden layers with 10 neurons), with 64.49% accuracy. The highest 
value of accuracy increased by 6.42% in comparison with the accuracy of the models developed 
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in Chapter 5. Moreover, the lowest value of accuracy in the table increased by 9.25% in 
comparison with the values in Table 5.11. 
Table 6.14: Performance of the neural network models trained by the new medium-mobility dataset 
 Configuration Accuracy Rate Precision Recall F1 
Single Layer 
No Hidden Layer 
(AF=‘identity’) 
4-2 
64.43% 
(2.63%) 
0 0.67 0 1.00 0 0.81 
1 0.32 1 0.05 1 0.09 
 
One Hidden Layer 
(AF=‘reLU’) 
4-10-2 
64.45% 
(2.62%) 
0 0.67 0 1.00 0 0.81 
1 0.00 1 0.00 1 0.00 
4-20-2 
64.09% 
(2.54%) 
0 0.67 0 0.99 0 0.80 
1 0.34 1 0.09 1 0.04 
4-30-2  
63.41% 
(2.27%) 
0 0.67 0 0.96 0 0.79 
1 0.29 1 0.03 1 0.06 
4-40-2 
63.25% 
(2.18%) 
0 0.66 0 0.90 0 0.76 
1 0.23 1 0.06 1 0.10 
 
Two Hidden Layers 
(AF=‘tanh’) 
4-6-4-2 
64.49% 
(2.64%) 
0 0.67 0 0.99 0 0.80 
1 0.34 1 0.07 1 0.11 
4-12-8-2 
64.33% 
(2.67%) 
0 0.67 0 0.97 0 0.80 
1 0.25 1 0.02 1 0.03 
4-22-8-2 
63.65% 
(2.01%) 
0 0.67 0 0.99 0 0.80 
1 0.23 1 0.07 1 0.10 
4-30-10-2 
62.85% 
(2.22%) 
0 0.68 0 0.88 0 0.77 
1 0.37 1 0.15 1 0.21 
 
 
Three Hidden Layers 
(AF=‘tanh’) 
4-5-3-2-2 
64.37% 
(2.58%) 
0 0.67 0 0.99 0 0.80 
1 0.25 1 0.01 1 0.01 
4-10-6-4-2 
64.15% 
(2.62%) 
0 0.67 0 1.00 0 0.81 
1 0.24 1 0.03 1 0.02 
4-15-10-5-2 
63.89% 
(2.45%) 
0 0.66 0 0.88 0 0.75 
1 0.19 1 0.06 1 0.09 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
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In new models developed by the high-mobility dataset, the highest accuracy was achieved 
through the perceptron architecture, with accuracy of 61.67%, which shows an increase of 5.9% 
in comparison with the values in Table 5.12. Table 6.15 summarises the performance of these 
models. 
Table 6.15: Performance of the neural network models trained by the new high-mobility dataset 
 Configuration Accuracy Rate Precision Recall F1 
Single Layer 
No Hidden Layer 
(AF=‘identity’) 
4-2 
61.67% 
(2.27%) 
0 0.63 0 1.00 0 0.77 
1 0.34 1 0.05 1 0.06 
 
One Hidden Layer 
(AF=‘reLU’) 
4-10-2 
61.09% 
(1.58%) 
0 0.63 0 0.96 0 0.76 
1 0.33 1 0.04 1 0.07 
4-20-2 
60.81% 
(2.06%) 
0 0.63 0 0.96 0 0.75 
1 0.39 1 0.07 1 0.12 
4-30-2  
60.69% 
(1.78%) 
0 0.64 0 0.90 0 0.75 
1 0.47 1 0.15 1 0.23 
4-40-2 
60.75% 
(2.37%) 
0 0.64 0 0.89 0 0.75 
1 0.48 1 0.17 1 0.25 
 
Two Hidden Layers 
(AF=‘tanh’) 
4-6-4-2 
61.57% 
(2.02%) 
0 0.62 0 0.94 0 0.75 
1 0.25 1 0.03 1 0.06 
4-12-8-2 
61.09% 
(2.24%) 
0 0.63 0 0.94 0 0.75 
1 0.38 1 0.06 1 0.10 
4-22-8-2 
60.21% 
(2.72%) 
0 0.63 0 0.93 0 0.75 
1 0.35 1 0.06 1 0.11 
4-30-10-2 
59.63% 
(2.13%) 
0 0.64 0 0.85 0 0.73 
1 0.45 1 0.21 1 0.29 
 
 
Three Hidden Layers 
(AF=’tanh’) 
4-5-3-2-2 
61.37% 
(2.16%) 
0 0.63 0 1.00 0 0.77 
1 1.00 1 0.02 1 0.03 
4-10-6-4-2 
60.75% 
(2.17%) 
0 0.63 0 0.92 0 0.75 
1 0.38 1 0.08 1 0.13 
4-15-10-5-2 
59.45% 
(2.38%) 
0 0.64 0 0.89 0 0.74 
1 0.44 1 0.15 1 0.22 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
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6.3 Discussion 
 
As discussed in Subsection 6.2, 10 classification algorithms were applied to the new datasets. 
The datasets with which the prediction models were trained and built included a “trust” attribute 
in addition to “time”, “location” and “credentials”. According to the results, the performance of 
all the new prediction models trained by the low-mobility dataset increases. Moreover, the highest 
value of accuracy achieved in the low-mobility environment is 86.92%, which is higher than the 
highest accuracy obtained by past models by 1.42%. The highest accuracy of prediction models 
developed by the medium-mobility dataset is the same as that of the models developed in Chapter 
5 (64.43%). For the high-mobility environment, the best performance was achieved at 61.71% 
accuracy, which is higher than the best results obtained from the past models.  
Table 6.16 shows the aggregated performance results. It summarizes the performance of the 
prediction models trained and built by the new datasets labelled as high-mobility (H), medium-
mobility (M) and low-mobility (L) datasets. The results are given for both classes – 0: Deny and 
1: Access. 
Table 6.16: Aggregated performance of the prediction models 
Models 
Accuracy Rate 
(Cross-Validated) 
Precision Recall F1 
L M H  L M H  L M H  L M H 
Decision Tree 
78.92% 
(1.69%) 
56.29% 
(2.62%) 
55.27% 
(2.52%) 
0 0.36 0.70 0.67 0 0.34 0.70 0.67 0 0.35 0.70 0.67 
1 0.88 0.38 0.44 1 0.89 0.38 0.44 1 0.88 0.38 0.44 
SVM 
82.20% 
(1.07%) 
64.43% 
(2.63%) 
61.71% 
(2.20%) 
0 0.00 0.67 0.63 0 0.00 1.00 1.00 0 0.00 0.81 0.77 
1 0.84 0.00 0.00 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.91 0.00 0.00 
Logistic 
Regression 
86.90% 
(0.99%) 
64.43% 
(2.63%) 
61.71% 
(2.20%) 
0 1.00 0.67 0.63 0 0.28 1.00 1.00 0 0.43 0.81 0.77 
1 0.88 0.00 0.00 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.94 0.00 0.00 
Naïve Bayes 
79.40% 
(2.03%) 
59.13% 
(3.36%) 
58.09% 
(1.54%) 
0 0.38 0.67 0.66 0 0.33 0.79 0.70 0 0.35 0.73 0.68 
1 0.87 0.31 0.43 1 0.90 0.19 0.38 1 0.89 0.23 0.40 
AdaBoost 
86.76% 
(1.11%) 
63.73% 
(2.23%) 
60.59% 
(2.24%) 
0 0.96 0.67 0.64 0 0.29 0.97 0.93 0 0.44 0.79 0.76 
1 0.88 0.17 0.46 1 1.00 0.01 0.10 1 0.94 0.02 0.17 
Random Forest 
82.58% 
(1.17%) 
64.43% 
(2.63%) 
61.67% 
(2.23%) 
0 1.00 0.67 0.63 0 0.06 1.00 1.00 0 0.12 0.81 0.77 
1 0.85 0.00 0.00 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.92 0.00 0.00 
K-NN 0 0.32 0.66 0.63 0 0.15 0.67 0.65 0 0.21 0.66 0.64 
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79.12% 
(2.10%) 
57.29% 
(2.02%) 
55.95% 
(1.90%) 
1 0.85 0.28 0.37 1 0.94 0.27 0.34 1 0.89 0.28 0.36 
ANN 
86.92% 
(1.03%) 
64.49% 
(2.64%) 
61.67% 
(2.21%) 
0 1.00 0.67 0.63 0 0.28 0.99 1.00 0 0.43 0.80 0.77 
1 0.88 0.34 0.00 1 1.00 0.07 0.00 1 0.94 0.11 0.00 
Gradient Boost 
86.90% 
(1.06%) 
64.39% 
(2.61%) 
61.59% 
(2.28%) 
0 1.00 0.67 0.63 0 0.28 1.00 1.00 0 0.43 0.81 0.77 
1 0.88 0.00 0.00 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.94 0.00 0.00 
Voting Classifier 
86.90% 
(1.04%) 
59.83% 
(2.76%) 
57.57% 
(2.25%) 
0 1.00 0.67 0.66 0 0.28 0.82 0.76 0 0.43 0.74 0.71 
1 0.88 0.33 0.46 1 1.00 0.18 0.33 1 0.94 0.23 0.39 
0: Deny, 1: Access 
 
As shown in the above table, the models developed by ANN and logistic regression showed the 
highest performance for all environments. In other words, adding a new attribute (trust) to the 
datasets resulted in an increase in the performance of these two algorithms dramatically. 
Furthermore, models developed by SVM showed the same performance in the medium- and high-
mobility environments as the models developed by ANN and logistic regression.  
Figures 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11 show the aggregated ROC curve analysis for the “Access” label. As 
shown in Figure 6.9, for models with less than 0.5% difference in accuracy, the value of AUC is 
the same (0.64). Moreover, logistic regression achieved better performance in terms of a higher 
TP rate and a lower FP rate than ANN in the low-mobility environment. 
 
Figure 6.9: ROC analysis for prediction models in the low-mobility environment 
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Figure 6.10: ROC analysis for prediction models in the medium-mobility environment 
 
Figure 6. 11: ROC analysis for prediction models in the high-mobility environment 
 
Figure 6.10 shows the aggregated ROC curves for the prediction models in the medium-
mobility environment. Among the models in Table 6.16, ANN confirmed its superiority over the 
rest by its AUC value (0.50). Models with fairly similar performance, such as SVM and logistic 
regression, have the same AUC values as one another.  
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In the high-mobility environment, as shown in Figure 6.11, voting classifier (0.55), decision 
tree (0.55), Naïve Bayes (0.54) and AdaBoost (0.52) achieved the highest AUC values. The 
accuracy, precision, recall and F1 values of these three algorithms were much lower than those of 
the best model (i.e., logistic regression). Thus, their superiority cannot be confirmed: as stated in 
Chapter 5, a curve dominates in ROC space if and only if its precision dominates in precision space 
[183]. 
We also applied Kruskal–Wallis and Spearman tests to investigate the effects of the number of 
hidden layers on the accuracy of the models for all datasets. According to the results shown in 
Tables 6.17 and 6.18, the Asymp. Sig. (p-value) is less than 0.05 for the Kruskal–Wallis test, and 
therefore the null assumption is rejected. This shows that the mean values of different accuracy 
groups are not the same. Groups are defined based on the number of hidden layers. Furthermore, 
the results of the Spearman test indicate that the number of hidden layers has an impact on the 
accuracy of the model (Sig.=0.000 and Sig. < 0.05) in each environment.  
Table 6.17: Kruskal–Wallis test results, grouping variable: no. of hidden layers 
 
 
 
Table 6.18: Spearman test results: correlation 
Hidden Layer Accuracy 
 
 
Spearman’s rho 
 
Hidden Layer 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
1.000 0.54** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 0.000 
N 7800 7800 
 
Accuracy 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
0.54** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 . 
N 7800 7800 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Chi Square 139.405 
Df 3 
Asymp. Sig. 0.000 
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6.4 Chapter Summary  
 
In this chapter, we presented details of our prediction models developed for handling ambiguity. 
We synthesized a set of new datasets by adding a new attribute called “Trust”. These new datasets 
were synthesized using methodology discussed in Chapter 4 and 5 for three degrees of mobility 
(high, medium and low).  
As shown, ten classification algorithms were applied to create our prediction models. According 
to the cross-validated results, model developed by neural networks showed the highest 
performance in terms of accuracy for low mobility environment with accuracy of 86.92%. Neural 
networks also showed the highest performance in medium mobility environment with accuracy of 
86.90%. In high mobility environment, SVM and logistic regression algorithms showed the highest 
accuracy (61.71%). 
We also studied the behavior of our models created by neural networks (both perceptron and 
MLP). We applied 12 configurations of neural networks including different number of hidden 
layers (up to 3 hidden layers) different number of neurons (up to 40 neurons) and different types 
of activation functions (4 AFs) to investigate the effects of these variants on the performance of 
the prediction models. The results showed that the number of hidden layers affects on the 
performance of the model.  
In overall, by adding more attributes to the datasets, the accuracy of the models will increase 
and classifiers like ANN and logistic regression may show better performance in action.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we summarize the important findings of this research. We also review and 
analyse the thesis to determine whether the findings can answer the research questions proposed 
in Chapter 1. At the end of this chapter, we discuss the possible future direction of this research.   
7.1 Key Findings 
 
Starting with the literature review, we summarize the key findings in relation to our research 
questions. These findings came together to construct our methodology. 
7.1.1 Findings on IoT Adaptability of Access Control Models 
 
We evaluated traditional and emerging access control models against IoT adaptability criteria, 
as mentioned in Chapter 2. The reference models could not satisfy all the specification criteria that 
need to be deployed in a scalable, heterogeneous and dynamic environment such as IoT. More 
details were summarized in Table 2.1. According to our analysis in Subsection 2.1.2, ABAC shows 
promising performance in terms of scalability (extensibility), dynamism, 
heterogeneity/interoperability, and context-awareness in comparison with other models. 
Moreover, both the traditional and the emerging models relied on deterministic access policy 
rules for which they were unable to make precise access decisions in non-deterministic access 
scenarios. 
We also surveyed the state of the art for the methods proposed based on the extension of the 
traditional and emerging access control models in Subsection 2.1.4. As these methods inherit the 
disadvantages of the reference models, they suffer from a lack of one or more of the characteristics 
needed for the IoT environment.  
Authentication protocols were analysed against the criteria defined in RFC 2989 and RFC 4962 
too. According to the results mentioned in Subsection 2.1.2, four out of five authentication 
protocols suffer from a single point of failure in their implementation because of their centralized 
architecture. Maintaining the confidentiality of authentication data-at-rest and authentication data-
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in-transit is another major challenge. According to our findings, these protocols were designed 
based on deterministic rules and cannot handle access scenarios that include unpredicted elements. 
Resilient access control approaches were thoroughly studied in Subsection 2.2.4. According to 
our findings, the BTG and optimistic approaches are inappropriate for heterogeneous 
environments such as IoT. They also suffer from a lack of scalability in terms of access policy for 
such environments. 
RAAC approaches were considered a promising paradigm for handling unpredicted access 
scenarios. Based on the finding of this research in Subsection 2.2.4, the IoT adaptability of these 
approaches remains an ongoing challenge. These approaches generally suffer from one or more of 
the following challenges: i) limitations on periodic assessment for the IoT environment, ii) a lack 
of knowledge about IoT entities, and iii) interoperability and dependency challenges.  
 
7.1.2 Proposing Indeterminacy Factors for Authentication in IoT 
 
We defined uncertainty and ambiguity as two pillars of indeterminacy in authentication that 
presents new challenges. We stated the importance of these challenges and their relationship with 
characteristics inherited from the IoT environment.  
As defined in Subsection 2.2.1.1, uncertainty stems from the incompleteness of information 
regarding the likelihood of whether the acceptance of an authentication request leads to an incident. 
A formal definition was given based on subjective probability. Five uncertainty handling theories 
including probability theory, information theory, evidence theory, possibility theory and 
uncertainty theory existing in the literature were studied and their suitability for different types of 
uncertainty was analysed in Subsection 2.2.1. Of these theories, subjective (conditional) 
probability was chosen to measure uncertainty in authentication for a couple of reasons: lower 
complexity, scalability and enough data samples in authentication scenarios.  
Ambiguity in authentication was also defined by this research and the relevant literature was 
studied in Subsection 2.2.2.1. Ambiguity can be handled through trust-based analysis. Based on 
the findings of Subsection 2.2.2.1, soft trust method is the choice for handling trust in IoT. As a 
result, behavioural-based analysis as a method of direct trust computation was chosen to calculate 
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the degree of trust. In this way, the historical profile of users was analysed to gain insight into 
previous authentication records for all users. 
7.1.3 DataSet Synthesis for Authentication 
 
In order to build prediction models capable of making indeterminacy-aware authentication 
decisions, machine-learning algorithms must be applied. These algorithms are classified as 
supervised algorithms as they require labelled datasets to be trained and tested. One of the research 
obstacles in building prediction models for authentication has been the lack of publicly available 
authentication datasets.  
We presented the exemplar (RASA) as our case study in this dissertation in Subsection 4.1. We 
also determined adversary model for the exemplar.  
In order to build our prediction models, we need datasets. Datasets need to be synthesized in 
accordance with the exemplar. In doing so, the relevant literature was studied in Subsection 4.3 to 
determine the corresponding PDFs of attributes needed in our datasets, including user, time, 
location and credentials. According to the state of the art discussed in Subsection 4.3.1, users’ 
online activity follows a power law distribution function. The timing of the authentication requests 
followed uniform distribution based on the literature reviewed in Subsection 4.3.2, and the PDF 
corresponding to the location of the users as discussed in Subsection 4.3.3, was determined to be 
Gaussian. For the credentials attribute, three states were justified in Subsection 4.3.4 in order to 
define a multinomial PDF that describes the behaviour of the authentication requests in terms of 
credentials.  
The findings of the research in the above-mentioned datasets were compared with the results of 
the study of publicly available datasets (LANL) in Subsection 4.4. The analysis confirmed the 
effectiveness of the methodology employed in synthesizing data samples for the user and time 
attributes.  
One of the advantages of this research is that it considered the “mobility” of the users by 
defining different UAs and considering a number of PoIs. Subsequently, a mixture of Gaussian 
PDFs were used to describe the mobility of users, and corresponding parameters were determined 
in a way that reflected three degrees of mobility, known as low, medium and high. Consequently, 
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data samples were generated for three datasets with different mobility patterns. The process of 
generating different datasets in terms of mobility was discussed in Subsection 4.3.3.   
 
7.1.4 Handling Uncertainty in Authentication Using Prediction Models 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, ten classifiers were applied to datasets in order to build prediction 
models: decision tree, random forest, Naïve Bayes, logistic regression, SVM, neural networks, 
voting classifier, gradient boost and AdaBoost classifiers, and K-NN. 
The datasets used in Chapter 5 consisted of three attributes (time, location and credentials). 
According to the findings discussed in Subsection 5.3, the uncertainty-aware models trained and 
built using these datasets were able to predict the class of authentication requests in the low-, 
medium- and high-mobility datasets with 85.50% accuracy (using AdaBoost), 64.43% accuracy 
(using gradient boost) and 61.69% accuracy (using gradient boost) respectively. 
We also studied the behavior of our models created by neural networks (both perceptron and 
MLP) in Subsection 5.2.9. We applied 12 configurations of neural networks including different 
number of hidden layers (up to 3 hidden layers) different number of neurons (up to 40 neurons) 
and different types of activation functions (4 AFs) to investigate the effects of these variants on 
the performance of the prediction models. The results showed that the number of hidden layers 
affects on the performance of the model. 
7.1.5 Handling Trust in Authentication Using Prediction Models 
 
In Chapter 6, the datasets had an extra attribute called a historical profile. Adding this new 
attribute improved the performance of the models for the three datasets. As discussed in Subsection 
6.3, the ambiguity-aware prediction models developed by the above-mentioned classifiers were 
able to predict the class of the authentication requests in low-, medium- and high-mobility datasets 
with 86.92% accuracy (using Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), 64.49% accuracy (using ANN) 
and 61.71% accuracy (using logistic regression) respectively. 
The models created by the datasets used in Chapter 6 were able to handle both uncertainty and 
ambiguity in authentication. The size of the designated models is small enough to be run by IoT-
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friendly devices such as the Raspberry Pi. The prediction models were deployed on a Raspberry 
Pi 4 (Model B) and tested by another set of synthesized datasets to see the performance in action 
(Appendix B).  
7.2 Evaluation  
 
As defined in the first chapter, the main claim of this research was that an “indeterminacy-aware 
prediction model can handle indeterminacy factors in authentication for scalable, heterogeneous 
and dynamic environments”. 
Figure 7.1 is a diagrammatic model of the thesis’s main claim, and the building blocks on which 
this is based. The main claim can be broken down, based on the indeterminacy factors, into two 
parts. Each part, which is shown in an orange box, was explored separately. These factors were 
studied using the datasets developed in Chapter 4. The research direction and the architecture of 
the methodology were defined in Chapter 3. Using the literature review to determine the scope of 
the analysis, we explored the literature to demonstrate the research gap and possible 
methodological approaches. 
Indeterminacy-aware prediction models can handle uncertainty and ambiguity in scalable, 
heterogeneous and dynamic environments because of the following characteristics: 
• The prediction models are fully automatic and work without human intervention.  
• The prediction models can work in scalable environments because increasing the 
number of authentication requests does not affect the performance of the prediction 
models in terms of complexity. 
• The type of the selected attributes in the dataset makes the approach independent of 
local and environmental characteristics. Therefore, it can be deployed in heterogeneous 
environments. 
• Considering time and the location in making authentication decisions makes the 
proposed approach spatio-temporal. Therefore, the model is sensitive to a changing 
environment which is known as a dynamic environment.  
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Figure 7. 1: The thesis’s main claim and its building blocks 
 
7.3 Future Direction 
 
In this Subsection, we propose two possible areas for future research that build upon the 
contributions of this dissertation. 
7.3.1 Handling Indeterminacy in Authorization  
 
As stated in the first chapter, the main focus of this research was on indeterminacy factors in 
the “authentication” phase of access control. Authorization as another phase of access control deals 
with the same challenges. We need to define uncertainty and ambiguity in authorization and find 
related attributes in order to build prediction models.  
7.3.2 Moving Towards Adaptive Model  
 
The second consideration of the proposed approach is that it does not support adaptive methods 
of calculating indeterminacy for mobile users. In other words, when the location of the user is 
changed, the authenticated user has access to the resource, so the proposed method supports only 
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persistent authentication in IoT. Any future work must consider a scheme to cover adaptive 
authentication for mobile users. 
Although the generation of data samples to create the datasets used by this research is one of 
its contributions, working with real datasets consisting of the required attributes would give better 
insight into the usefulness and the performance of the proposed approach.  
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Appendix A: Dataset Synthesis in MATLAB  
 
This appendix contains practical details on synthesizing datasets. We used MATLAB version 
2018a to generate our data samples. The case study used in order to synthesize our datasets was 
explained in Subsection 4.1. We also followed the procedure discussed in Subsection 4.3 to 
synthesize values for our datasets. We defined a zero-matrix called UMax with the size of (5000 
× 8) to store generated data samples using the following command: UMax=zeros(5000,8). We 
upload the code of this section on Zenodo13. 
A.1 Generating Data samples for IDs 
 
As discussed in Subsection 4.3.1, we have 60 users in the system. According to the literature 
power law PDF needs to be used to generate data samples for IDs. Figure A.1 shows the code 
written in MATLAB for synthesizing these samples.  
 
Figure A. 1: MATLAB code for synthesizing data samples for IDs 
 
13 Available at: https://zenodo.org/record/3755539 
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The formula used as power law distribution is as follows: 
Pr(x) = C(x)−(1+α) 
As shown in Figure A.1, we implemented power law distribution formula in MATLAB through 
lines 12 to 21. The “User” function will return one ID number from 1 to 60 at each round of a 
function call.  
A.2 Generating Data samples for Time 
 
As discussed in Subsection 4.3.2, we divided service time into 11 time slots (Table 4.2). 
Moreover, we assigned weights to these time slots according to our threat model discussed in 
Subsection 4.2. In order to generate time related data samples, we first used multinomial PDF to 
choose the time slot and then generate a random value for the time in that time slot using uniform 
PDF.  
 
Figure A. 2: MATLAB code for generating data samples for the time attribute 
155 
 
Line 3 shows a matrix (11×1) which consists of weights assigned to time slots based on table 
4.2. Line 4 shows a matrix (11×3) which consists of time slots and the Uvs assigned to them based 
on table 4.2. Lines 5-7 use multinomial PDF (mnrnd) to randomly choose a time slot. Line 9 uses 
uniform distribution (randi) to randomly pick a time in designated time slot. Lines 10 to 16 split 
the chosen time to Hour / Minute. Based on the values (h and m) of generated time, the 
corresponding UV will be assigned through line 17 to 38. These values were determined in table 
4.2. 
A.3 Generating Data samples for Location 
 
According to the findings of Subsection 4.3.3, we used a mixture of Gaussian PDF to generate 
data samples for the location. Figure A.3 shows the calculated UVs for the locations in the map of 
our exemplar discussed in Subsection 4.1. These values were calculated based on the mixture 
method discussed at the end of Subsection 4.3.3. Please note that at the time of writing this 
dissertation, the UVs assigned to different UAs were different than values indicated in Figure 4.5.  
 
Figure A. 3: Calculated UVs for the map based on the mixture gaussian method 
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Figure A.4 shows the MATLAB code for synthesizing location data samples in medium 
mobility dataset.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In lines 3 to 14, parameters related to Gaussian PDF are initialized based on the values assigned 
to the exemplar in table 4.3 for medium mobility environment. In line 17, a multinomial PDF 
(mnrnd) is used to randomly choose a PoI. Then based on the chosen PoI, a Gaussian PDF 
(normrnd) is used to generate data samples in terms of X and Y through lines 20-29. Finally, 
through lines 31-81, according to the generated values for X and Y, a UV value will be assigned 
based on the calculate values in Figure A.3. 
 
 
Figure A. 4: MATLAB code for generating data samples for the location attribute 
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A.4 Generating Data samples for Credential 
 
As discussed in Subsection 4.3.3, credentials have three states. We simply used a multinomial 
PDF (in line 4) to randomly choose one of those states. The weights assigned in line 3 are based 
on the values of probabilities listed in Table 4.4. According to generated samples for credential, 
corresponding UVs are assigned through lines 7 to 13. These values are listed and justified in 
Subsection 4.3.3.    
 
 
Figure: A. 5: MATLAB code for generating data samples for the credential attribute 
 
A.5 Aggregating UVs to Label Datasets 
 
Decision about an authentication request depends on the total value of uncertainty based on the 
UV values derived from Subsection A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.4. As discussed in Subsection 4.3.5, we 
considered weights for our attributes based on the adversary model. Therefore, we calculated the 
weighted arithmetic mean by averaging weighted UVs per authentication request. Then, we used 
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the calculated value as a weight for a binomial PDF in order to determine the class label 
(Access/Deny). 
Figure A.6 shows the MATLAB code for labelling datasets. As shown in lines 3-6, the weighted 
arithmetic mean is calculated for each authentication request in a loop (for 5000 requests). 
Afterwards, binomial PDF is applied to determine the label of requests through lines 7-17. We also 
corrected our labels for those requests which provided wrong username and password, but they 
were labelled as “Access” in our dataset. This correction has been made through lines 18-22 in 
accordance with match-funder policy.  
 
Figure A. 6: MATLAB code for labelling our dataset 
 
Figure A.7 shows our final uncertainty matrix (UMax) that consists of 5000 generated 
authentication requests. Each request consists of 4 attributes and 4 calculated values. From left to 
right:  
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Synthesized values for attributes: Column 1: User ID, Column 2: Time UV, Column 3: Location 
UV, Column 4: Credential UV,  
Calculated values: Column 5: Mean, Column 6: Label based on the mean, Column 7: Weighted 
Mean, and Column 8: Label based on the weighted mean.  
 
Figure A. 7: Screenshot of the results 
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Appendix B: Developing and Running Model on Raspberry Machine  
 
This appendix presents an overview of technical works done on the building of prediction 
models. It gives a brief comment on different parts of the code and discusses the deployment of 
the models on Raspberry Pi machines. 
We used Python version 3.6 with Jupyter14 to write our code and run it. We also used a number 
of libraries in Python depicted in Figure B.1. These libraries are as follows: 
 
Figure B. 1: Libraries used in the Python code of the project 
• Pandas: It is a library on top of Python used for reading and writing data between in-
memory data structures and different formats. We used pandas to read data from our 
datasets in Excel format. 
• NumPy: This is a package for scientific computing in Python. We used this library in our 
code to implement gaussian PDF in order to generate random noise. 
• SciPy: SciPy library is one of the core packages of SciPy stack. It provides numerical 
routines, like routines for numerical integration, interpolation, optimization, linear algebra, 
and statistics. We used SciPy in order to benefit from interpolation process in ROC curves. 
• Matplotlib: This is a library to create static, animated, and interactive visualizations in 
Python. We used this library to create our ROC curves for the prediction models. 
 
14 Project Jupyter at https://jupyter.org 
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• Scikit Learn: It is a library for machine learning in Python. We used this library to 
implement classification algorithms for the sake of training and testing. It also provides 
cross validation process in addition to the metrics for performance measurement.    
We uploaded the python code for building our prediction models on Zenodo1516. 
B.1 Building Indeterminacy-Aware Prediction Models 
 
The code starts with importing mentioned libraries. Figure B.2 shows the screenshot of this 
part of the code.  
 
Figure B. 2: Libraries imported into the project 
Dataset files are in Excel format. As mentioned earlier, we used Pandas library to read from 
dataset files. We have three labelled datasets for low, medium and high mobility environments. 
Each of them consists of three attributes. In line 141, the values of three attributes are stored in X 
and in line 142, the values of label are stored in Y. Figure B.3 shows the lines of code related to 
this part.  
 
15 Uncertainty-Aware code is available at: https://zenodo.org/record/3755598 
16 Ambiguity-Aware code is available at: https://zenodo.org/record/3756014 
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Figure B. 3: Importing dataset 
 
For indeterminacy-aware prediction models, we used another set of datasets which have 4 
attributes. As discussed in Chapter 6, these datasets have an extra attribute called trust. For reading 
those datasets we made necessary changes in the above code (we changed 3 to 4).  
In order to make our case more realistic, we associated gaussian noise to our datasets. In doing 
so, we used “random” method from NumPy package. Figure B.4 shows implementation of the 
noise. 
 
Figure B. 4: Associating gaussian noise to our datasets 
 
We also used 10-fold cross validation. For this reason, we split dataset into 10 parts and one of 
those 10 parts was used for testing and 9 parts were used for the training. We shuffled test 
associated part in order to build the best-fit model. Figure B.5 shows all these efforts. 
 
 
Figure B. 5: Cross validation and shuffling 
The project code has a function called Report. This function is responsible to report the accuracy 
and confusion matrix for the prediction models. As shown in Figure B.6, it uses k-fold cross 
validation (k=10) at line 120. The model is trained in line 123 and the function calculates prints 
the values of accuracy and confusion matrix after cross validation through lines 125 to 130.  
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Figure B. 6: Report function 
 
Furthermore, developed prediction model is saved with “sav” extension to be used later with 
new datasets. You can find related code in the above figure in line 133. For the visualization 
purpose, we used Matplotlib to draw ROC curves for each prediction model. In order to produce 
ROC curves, we first need to calculate required parameters like FPR and TPR. Figure B.7 shows 
the screenshot of the code related to these calculations (line 102 to 115).  
 
 
Figure B. 7: Calculating parameters for drawing ROC curves 
 
164 
 
 
Figure B. 8: ROC curves plotting 
Figure B.8 shows a code segment related to plotting ROC curves. Calculated parameters derived 
from the last code segment will be passed a function called “ROCPlt” in this part of the code (line 
34).  This function draws ROC plots for all prediction models built by classifiers in the code. It 
draws ROC curves for both Access and Deny classes in addition to the curves drawn as micro-
average and macro-average in every plot (lines 35 to 55). It uses three different colours for these 
curves in each plot (lines 56 to 60).  
The last comment on the code is about classifiers. As discussed in the dissertation, this research 
benefits from classification algorithms in order to build prediction models. Ten classifiers were 
implemented by this code. Figure B.9 depicts a code segment about these classifiers. These 
algorithms were implemented using Scikit Learn library. Each classifier has a default 
configuration. In order to get the best-fit model, we made changes into some of these 
configurations. For example, in the first algorithm (Decision Tree), we have tested different split 
criterions instead of “gini” to find the best-fit model for each dataset. Moreover, we made change 
in the value of minimum sample split and minimum sample leaf (in line 151). 
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For the random forest classifier (line 168), different values were used as the number of 
estimators and the depth of the forest.  
For K-NN algorithm (line 171), different number of nearest neighbours were determined to 
evaluate the performance of the model.   
For neural networks (lines 174 to 181), we have tested four activation functions discussed in 
Subsection 5.2.9 by changing the value of activation parameter. We have also changed the number 
of hidden layer and the number of neurons in line 176 of the code based on the configurations 
defined in Table 5.10. In this line, hidden_layer_sizes() should reflect both the number of hidden 
layers and the number of included neurons. As an example, shown in Figure B.9 at line 176, 
hidden_layer_sizes(10) means current MLP has one hidden layer consisting of 10 neurons. We 
also changed the number of epoch (at line 177) and the type of the solver (at line 179) to compare 
the performance of the models.    
For voting algorithms, we have used both “hard” and “soft” voting modes to build and test our 
prediction model by making necessary changes in lines 198 and 199.  
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Figure B. 9: Implementing 10 classifiers using Scikit Learn library 
 
B.2 Implementing Prediction Models on Raspberry Pi 
 
In this Subsection, we first introduce Raspberry Pi then we train our prediction model using 
Raspberry Pi to show that our approach is feasible for resource-constrained devices in IoT. Finally, 
we test our prediction model using a new dataset on Raspberry Pi to see how our prediction model 
performs in action. 
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B.2.1 Raspberry Pi 
 
With the advent of ubiquitous low-cost, low-power computing devices (e.g. Raspberry Pi), 
exploring various solutions in the field of IoT security becomes more convenient. Raspberry Pi is 
a pocket size, ARM-based architecture computer. We adopted Raspberry Pi 4 Model B to our 
experiments in order to build and implement our prediction model. Figure B.10 demonstrated the 
picture of the raspberry pi board. The hardware specification of the raspberry pi used in this 
research is listed in Table  B.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B. 1: Hardware specifications for Raspberry Pi 4 Model B 
Processor 
Broadcom BCM2711, quad-core Cortex-A72 (ARM v8) 
64-bit SoC @ 1.5GHz 
Memory 4GB LPDDR4 
Connectivity 
2.4 GHz and 5.0 GHz IEEE 802.11b/g/n/ac wireless LAN,  
Bluetooth 5.0, BLE, Gigabit Ethernet 
2 × USB 3.0 ports, 2 × USB 2.0 ports. 
SD cart Support Micro SD card slot for loading operating system and data storage 
Input Power 
5V DC via USB-C connector (minimum 3A) 
Power over Ethernet (PoE)–enabled 
 
Figure B. 10: Board of Raspberry Pi 4, Model B 
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We used Raspbian17 as the operating system for our raspberry pi machines involved in our 
experiments. Raspbian is a Raspberry Pi OS based on Debian Linux. We installed Raspbian Image 
on a 64GB SD card to be used in the raspberry pi devices. The version of Raspbian used in the 
experiments is 20-06-2019. In the next Subsection, we will show screenshots from Raspbian 
environment which depict the process of building prediction models using raspberry pi. We also 
show screenshots of our experiments. 
B.2.2 Building Prediction Model on Raspberry Pi 
 
Python comes pre-installed on most Linux distributions and Raspbian is no exception. We 
updated the version of python on Raspbian and installed Jupyter in order to benefit from an 
interactive coding environment. Figure B.11 shows the process of installing Jupyter on the 
Raspbian. We use bash command line to install Jupyter by running the following command: 
$ pip install jupyter 
 
Figure B. 11: Jupyter installation process 
After installing Jupyter, we imported our code and run it. Raspberry Pi machine showed 
acceptable performance in building our prediction models. Figure B.12 demonstrates our code 
running by Jupyter on Raspberry Pi machine. 
 
17 Available at: https://www.raspberrypi.org/documentation/raspbian/ 
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Figure B. 12: Building our prediction model on Raspberry Pi 
  As shown in the above picture, we built our designated model for low-mobility environment 
using AdaBoost classifier algorithm. The model is 29.5KB. Then we tested our model using new 
authentication requests on Raspberry Pi. Figure B.13 shows the results of our test.  
 
Figure B. 13: Prediction of an authentication request 
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In the above test, we passed three uncertainty values for time, location, and credential (0.2, 0.1 
and 0.95 respectively) to the model and the model predicted the class of authentication as “Deny” 
correctly. We also tested the performance of our model running by raspberry pi in terms of 
scalability of entities. For this reason, we assumed that our model is dealing with 5000 
authentication requests simultaneously. Figure B.13 shows the results.  
 
Figure B. 14: Running prediction model for 5000 authentication requests on Raspberry Pi 
As shown, we ran our model for both single and concurrent authentication request. The model 
can be run in bash environment using “python AdaBoosClassifier.py” command as well. The time 
for handling 5000 authentication requests on Raspberry Pi was measured using                                
“time ./AdaBoostClassifier” command. The real time, the time elapsed between invocation and 
termination of the command, was 23s.  
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